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ABSTRACT
ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF POWERFUL
LEADERS IN FRAMING AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING
PROCESS
John Marshall Callahan
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty

This study identifies and analyzes the decision making and framing processes for
selected cases o f armed humanitarian intervention by the United States in the post-Cold
War Era. It fills a gap in the literature on decision making, focusing on the role o f the
powerful individual leader in national security decision making and the framing o f
interventions to the U.S. public and other stakeholder audiences.

An examination o f

extant literature on the subject o f U.S. foreign policy decision making, and development
and implementation o f framing strategies is used to determine the role o f the individual
leader in those processes using three case studies, the Bush intervention in Somalia in
1992, the Clinton intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and the Obama intervention in Libya in
2011 .
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

In March, 2011, the Obama administration made the decision to intervene
militarily in the Libyan civil war.

While the U.S. had undertaken such interventions

before, what was unusual in this case was the reasoning set forth for U.S. action.
Normally, U.S. national security is the chief framing tool for the justification o f
intervention abroad, however, in this case, security threats to the U.S. were not mentioned
as fundamental causes for the intervention. Instead, the growing humanitarian crisis, and
the threat that Muammar Al-Gaddafi posed to his own people was given as the reason.
This was not first U.S. intervention to be couched in this terms, but it was rare for the
language o f human rights to be applied as the primary motivation to enter into an open
militarized conflict, and not to a natural disaster or manmade disaster such as starvation,
as had been the case in Somalia in 1992. The intervention which followed took place
under NATO and United Nations auspices, and was aimed at securing the people o f
Libya from the depredations o f their leaders. A further facet to the intervention was the
purposeful vilification o f Gaddafi as an attempt to create a media frame and support for
the intervention. While such vilification o f enemies is nothing new in history, it is less
common in the realm o f humanitarian assistance in intervention, in which the enemy is
customarily the symptom, such as famine, sickness, or homelessness, rather than the
cause, or perceived cause.
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How did such a change in U.S. policy making and political reasoning come
about? What was the decision making process which led to the decision to intervene, and
to explain that intervention in humanitarian, rather than U.S. security terms? Was it the
result o f a deliberative staff process, or that o f the influence o f a few key individuals?
Furthermore, if the process recommended armed humanitarian intervention in Libya,
does it always work?

How does the decision making process used in the Libya

intervention compare with earlier cases o f armed humanitarian interventions, such as the
Somalia intervention under Presidents George H.W. Bush, the 1998 Kosovo intervention
under President William Clinton, and the decision o f the U.S. not to intervene in the
Rwanda crisis o f 1994? How could some crises be shaped as U.S. national security
problems, while others could not? Current theories on national security decision making
and framing do not bridge the gap between the two, but it is a key aim o f this study. It is
clear that senior leader engagement, and not a bureaucratic, interagency process per se, is
at the root o f these decisions, and that point is the hypothesis for the research which
follows. This study will examine extant literature on the subject o f U.S. foreign policy
interagency decision making, problem framing, and development and implementation o f
framing strategies to determine the role o f the individual leader in those processes. In
each o f the empirical case studies the research will seek to identify the decision making
process which led firstly to the decision to intervene, and secondly to articulate that
particular intervention in humanitarian, rather than other security terms.
The role o f leadership in determining and framing humanitarian interventions is
rising in importance as the United States has chosen to involve itself in an increasing
number o f such interventions in the decades since the end o f the Cold War. While the
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notion o f armed intervention seems to be out o f favor at the present, this is does not
obviate the need for research on the subject, since these sorts o f interventions also fell out
of favor twice before, after the perceived failure o f the intervention in Somalia, and the
success o f intervention in Kosovo. The value in this research is in tying together the
major

armed

humanitarian

interventions

and

non-interventions

to

determine

commonalities, both in how the intervention was planned and advocated in the
government, but also how the issues were framed to broader audiences.

The

characteristics o f successful interventions appear to include a small number o f inspired,
powerful, leaders who could not only influence the decision making process but also
public opinion in favor of their desired outcomes.

When no powerful leader or

spokesperson emerged to carry a message forward, intervention either did not take place
or else lost support or failed.
One part o f the academic study o f international relations tends to focus on the role
o f state actors and how they interact with each other. The idea that the unit o f analysis
for international relations research should be the state was reasserted by Kenneth Waltz
in 1979 into what came to be known as the Neo-Realist school. Numerous schools o f
thought have risen to dispute parts o f this approach, which basically posits that anarchy
alone shapes state actions.1 However, the processes by which the armed humanitarian
interventions researched in the case studies points to a significant role for actors below
the level o f the state to influence international relations and communications, which is an
interesting contrast to the Neo-Realist paradigm in which great powers are solely swayed
by the need to balance against the strongest in an anarchical world. The nature o f these

1 Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory o f International Politics. Long Grove, 1L: Colom bia University Press, 1979.
88.
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interventions points to dynamics beyond the basic tenets o f Neo-Realism to explain, since
two o f the three interventions, regardless o f what was argued at the time, had little to do
with threats to U.S. Security, and only one, Kosovo, threatened U.S. security
arrangements, in the form o f the NATO alliance, if not the U.S. itself.
Furthermore, this research attempts to tie framing together with decision making
as processes, since they seem, on the surface to be linked together, and often involve the
deciders as the chief framers o f action. In other words, this study proposes to use armed
humanitarian interventions not just to see how the decisions are made, but how they are
sold, and how

the process o f synchronizing

actions and word,

or strategic

communication, can develop into issue framing and have repercussions for the decision
making process. These dynamics are o f use across the gamut o f foreign policy decision
making practices, and need not be limited to military actions or the use o f force.
This study utilizes a wide, cross disciplinary set o f sources on the topics o f U.S
foreign policy decision making, armed humanitarian interventions and the issue framing
processes utilizing the intellectual frameworks developed by Graham Allison, Robert
Entman, and others to illuminate the reviewed literature and verify the gaps in research
that the dissertation will fill.

Critical works reviewed include Allison’s “Essence o f

Decision,” Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond’s, “Rethinking A lliso n ’s Models, ”
Steve Yetiv’s Explaining Foreign Policy, and others; as well as the Strategic
Communication development process with Robert Entman’s Projections o f Power and
Manuel Castell’s Communication Power and moving into three case studies which will
bring both the decision process and messaging cycle into focus. The case studies were
developed using a combination o f memoirs and first person accounts o f events, selected
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studies o f events by other researchers, most particularly when underpinned by previous
policy involvement and subsequent interviews with the participants, and through other
sources such as polling data and journalistic accounts.
Armed humanitarian interventions have come in and out o f fashion in a cyclical
fashion since the end o f the Cold War, hand in hand with updated concepts o f human
security and the place o f human security in a world which is still focused on the nonviolability o f state sovereignty.

The first such intervention after the Cold War, in

Somalia, is one o f the case studies examined in this study. In that intervention, combat
troops were deployed to secure food deliveries and to ensure supply routes in Somalia,
which was at that time an ungovemed area. Following the success o f the initial effort to
feed Somalis, the mission was changed into a political one, o f peacemaking and nation
building, which ultimately led to its failure in 1993. That failure led to a rethinking o f the
concept and a temporary abeyance o f militarized interventions.2
The next major armed humanitarian intervention, in 1999, took place in Kosovo
and looked much more like traditional combat operations than had been the case in
Somalia. The effort, undertaken exclusively by air forces, was designed to compel the
Serbian government to stop atrocities in its province o f Kosovo, and to simultaneously
degrade its capability to do so. While Kosovo was generally seen as a success, it was not
seen as a model to replicate in future armed humanitarian interventions. However, the
lessons learned from it, combined with the lessons o f a failure to intervene in another
crisis, the Rwandan genocide o f 1994, dovetailed into a serious international discussion
on the meaning o f state sovereignty and the rights owed to the citizens o f a country by its
political leadership. As after Somalia, there was a down time after Kosovo in which the
2 W eiss, Thomas. Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012. 8.
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appetite o f the great powers for militarized interventions ebbed.

Meanwhile the

international community, considering Rwanda and Kosovo, developed the formal
doctrine o f Responsibility to Protect, which specifically exhorted the world community to
consider national sovereignty to have been abrogated in countries which waged genocidal
warfare on portions o f their populace, or acted in other ways to violate the human rights
o f their citizens.

Although the concept, which became known as R2P, was not fully

adopted by the UN Security Council, especially in a lack o f agreement on when force
could be used, it survived challenge in the UN General Assembly in 2009,3 and remains
an implicit policy, becoming the measuring stick for future interventions.4
Whereas the gap between Somalia and Kosovo, approximately seven years, took
place over the course o f a single presidency, that o f William Clinton, the next armed
humanitarian endeavor would wait twelve years. This is primarily due to the fact that
humanitarian interventions were replaced both by conventional and unconventional
traditional warfare following the September 11 attacks on the U.S. While the U.S. flexed
its hyper power, R2P was working its way through the UN, and influencing key thinkers
and former foreign policy practitioners from the Clinton era as they considered how they
might act differently if given the opportunity.
That opportunity came in the form o f a new President, Barack Obama, who
brought the aforementioned scholars and practitioners into his government, and a new
crisis which occurred just as one o f the two major wars o f the post 9-11 world, in Iraq,
was being wound down. Starting in late 2010, a series o f popular uprisings known as the
Arab Spring swept across the middle east like a tidal wave stretching from Tunisia to

3 Bellam y, A lex J. G lobal P olitics an d the R esponsibility to Protect. N ew York: Routledge, 2011. 42.
4 Ibid. 162.
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Egypt and as far east as Bahrain and Yemen. There was violent repression in many o f
these countries, but when the eastern half o f Libya joined in the risings in February, 2011,
that country’s leader threatened, and began to implement what amounted to genocide
against his own people.

With the urging o f regional groupings such as the Gulf

Cooperation Council and the Arab League, as well as European partners, the U.S.
initiated airstrikes in Libya with the purpose o f alleviating the suffering o f the rebel
groups and disrupting Gaddafi efforts to attack them with his military. The U.S. slowly
withdrew from the front lines o f the effort, turning the lead over to NATO. In spite of
this, however, the U.S. was involved to the end, which occurred after the death o f
Gaddafi in late 2011, brutally killed in a combined coalition air attack and rebel ground
attack on his vehicle convoy.
While the operation seemed like a success at the time, later events, most notably
the murder o f the U.S. Ambassador to Libya and three other American citizens on
September 11, 2012 cast the operation as a tragic failure.5 In similar fashion to the
pattern which followed Somalia, the U.S. is in another out cycle in terms o f armed
humanitarian interventions, actively choosing not to engage in one in Syria in 2013. It is
always possible that the age of armed humanitarians is over, as the western world focuses
on its economic woes, the U.S. moves toward conventional military engagement with the
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and the rise o f China and a militarily resurgent Russia
draw U.S. attention. However it is more likely that within the foreseeable future, another
crisis which requires U.S. military forces to fight in defense o f human rights and security
will occur, and it is that likelihood which makes this study more than a look back at
5 The Washington Post. “What Obama botched in Libya.” May 5, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-obama-botched-in-libya/2014/0 5 /0 5 /3 a ef7 176-d47a-11 e395d3-3bcd77cd4e 1 l_story.html. A ccessed May 5, 2014.
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history, but a means to help predict how such a future intervention might come to pass.
Furthermore, there is no reasons why the findings o f the research cannot be applied to
other types o f interventions and even other fields o f government decision making.

Problem Statement

Current theories of foreign policy decision making and issue framing do not
adequately explain the role that powerful individuals have on both processes. As Pollack
notes, one reason for this problem lies in the preference o f political scientists to look at
systems, governments, and other phenomena that are easily observable and quantifiable,
as the actions of individuals most usually are not, generating an aversion against the
possibility o f significant individual impact.6

The filter o f armed humanitarian

interventions provides a useful prism through which to observe these processes and to
demonstrate the centrality o f the powerful individual to both o f them.

The two key

research questions, then, focus on the role o f the individual in the process, and whether
that process has issue framing as a focus, or simply the reaching o f the decision to
intervene, with framing taking place later, or separately, if at all.

To answer these

questions, traditional foreign policy decision making models and framing models will be
used, while a new model, the Decide/Explain model, which takes into account the role o f
the individual, decision making, and framing will be tested.

6 Pollack, Kenneth. "Let Us N ow Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In." International
Security, 2001: 107-146. 3.
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Structure

This study follows a traditional research format. After discussing the relevance o f
the study, a literature review on the subjects o f humanitarian intervention, decision
making, and framing will define armed humanitarian intervention and set parameters for
the research. The methodology will describe in detail the plan for examination o f the
case studies which follow it, leading to the research findings and the conclusion. The
case studies to be examined include those mentioned above as well as the decision not to
intervene in Syria in 2013. In each case study the specific and world historical events
will be provided, as well as an examination o f the key players in the decision making
process, what processes produced framing and intervention, how they reflect the models
examined, and what implications the intervention had on future thinking on the subject,
and future decision making efforts. The two non-interventions, Rwanda, and the review
o f the Syria case provided in the findings section o f the work, show how the decision and
framing processes fail when there is no powerful leader pushing for presidential notice
and approval for operations, or the ability to frame such operations to stakeholder
audiences, namely the media and the American people.

Preliminary Results o f the Study

In reviewing the case studies, the preliminary result o f the research is that
personality is always at the center o f the decision making process for U.S. involvement in
armed humanitarian interventions. With the exception o f the Somalia intervention, each
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o f the interventions studied showed the influence o f a powerful agent or agents who
pushed for the cabinet, and ultimately the president, to decide on combat as a better
means than diplomacy to solve the crisis. In the cases where this was true, Kosovo and
Libya, the powerful agent, or actor, was the secretary o f state. In both cases it was she
who ultimately convinced the president o f the need to act.

Where the cases differ,

however, is that in the case o f Kosovo, Secretary o f State Albright was at the forefront o f
the decision making and framing efforts from the beginning. On the contrary, in the case
o f Libya, Secretary Clinton had to be personally convinced o f the need to act, and once
she was became the decisive voice in recommending intervention to President Obama.
The rapid onset o f the Libya crisis versus the slow unfolding o f the Kosovo intervention
is also a significant factor in the decision making and framing processes for each, as well
as the other case studies.

The research shows that rapidly unfolding crises had

significantly more difficult decision making and framing processes than slowly
developing crises.
In terms o f framing, the research shows that the same powerful actors who
pressed for intervention also had a key role in framing the need for intervention to the
American people. This was particularly true o f Secretary o f State Albright in Kosovo
and Secretary o f State Clinton in Syria.

What is less clear from the empirical data

available is if there were direct ties between the decision making and framing cycles, and
if the need to construct frames to build stakeholder support for intervention was a key
factor in any o f the decision cycles examined. The only intervention which appears to
show direct and lengthy framing, tied into the decision making process, was that in
Kosovo in 1999, which saw systematic framing efforts over a period o f months before the
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intervention, clearly tied in with ongoing diplomatic efforts, preparation for combat, and
continued decision making. In the case o f Libya, the reason for this is the rapid onset of
the crisis, in Somalia because there was no solid enemy to frame against, and in a third
case, the tragedy in Rwanda, it occurred because o f the rapidity in which the crisis
unfolded, and the lack o f desire for intervention at senior levels o f the administration.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose o f this review is to provide a comprehensive overview o f the relevant
literature to the topics o f U.S foreign policy decision making, armed humanitarian
interventions and the media and issue framing processes utilizing the intellectual
frameworks developed by Graham Allison, Steve Yetiv, Robert Entman, and Manuel
Castells to illuminate the reviewed literature and identify the gaps in research that the
dissertation will fill.

Ultimately, the review both suggests and validates research

questions for the dissertation, including the hypothesis and thesis statement.
The methodological approach o f the dissertation this review is intended to
underpin is: A definition o f armed humanitarian intervention for the discussion, derived
from an examination o f the key sources in the field, including Nicholas W heeler’s Saving
Strangers.

This is followed by an examination o f U.S. government foreign policy

decision making processes, with examples provided by Steven Redd’s “Policy
Perspectives on National Security and Foreign Policy Decision Making” and Robert
Putnam’s “Diplomacy and the Diplomatic Process: The Logic o f Two-Level Games” as
well as others.

This continues into an examination o f bureaucratic decision making

theories, particularly those proposed by Graham Allison in Essence o f Decision, Jonathan
Bendor and Thomas Hammond’s, “Rethinking Allison’s Models, ” Steve Yetiv’s
Explaining Foreign Policy, and others; as well as the strategic communication
development process with Robert Entman’s Projections o f Power and Manuel Castell’s
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Communication Power and continues into three case studies which will bring both the
decision process and messaging cycle into focus.

The case studies selected reflect

humanitarian crises which ultimately led to military intervention by the U.S., including
Somalia in 1992, Kosovo (former Yugoslavia) in 1999, and Libya in 2011, in each case
showing

the

development

and

implementation

o f the

decision

making

and

communication processes, including the statements and memoires o f key involved
persons and theoretical as well as historical records o f the relevant events. Two mini
cases o f non-intervention, in Rwanda in 1995, and Syria in 2013, are also examined to the
same criteria in order to show processes that did not lead to armed humanitarian
intervention.

Theme One: Armed Humanitarian Interventions

The purpose o f this portion o f the review is to determine a definition for armed
humanitarian intervention in order to provide a baseline to the discussion o f the decision
making and framing processes as well as the case studies.

By their nature, such

interventions seem to be what Richard Haass would call “Wars o f Choice” rather than of
necessity, so establishing that definition will also feed into the discussion o f how wars o f
“Choice” can be framed to build public support for them .1
Nicholas W heeler’s Saving Strangers is a central work on the subject of
humanitarian intervention, and with Andrea Talentino’s Military Intervention after the
Cold War describes the major military and non military interventions o f the first decade

1 Haass, Richard N. War o f Necessity, War o f Choice: A M emoir o f Two Iraq Wars. N ew York: Simon and
Schuster, 2009. 3.
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o f the post Cold War era, with a strong focus on the decisions to military interventions
with an increasingly humanitarian focus; Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Kosovo.2 Both also
discuss various reasons why the great powers failed to intervene in other humanitarian
disasters, such as Rwanda, and the impact that has had on the development o f
humanitarianism as a cause for international action. Wheeler posited four circumstances
in which humanitarian based violations o f sovereignty could successfully occur. First,
grievous humanitarian harm must be evident without intervention. Second, armed force
must be used as a last resort.

Third, proportional force to objectvies must be used.

Finally, there must be a reasonable and high chance that force will actually solve the
problem.3

Each o f these factors is assumed in the broader definition o f armed

humanitarian intervention for this study. Taken together, these two works provided a
general background on the reasons for the various interventions, as well as the political
debates which surrounded each individual intervention and the political idea o f armed
and unarmed humanitarian interventions.
Taking a theoretical approach, Martha Finnemore utilized the then newly
developed theories o f constructivism to analyze the issue o f humanitarian interventions in
a U.S. foreign policy context. Finnemore’s point is that a definition and justification for
humanitarian intervention cannot be found in traditional liberal and realist visions o f the
world, but that the context under which the interventions occur. Her basic definition o f
armed humanitarian intervention is use o f the armed forces to intervene in the territory o f
a sovereign state for purposes which are related to the human security o f the inhabitants

2 Talentino, Andrea. 2005. M ilitary Intervention after the C o ld War. Ohio University Press: Athens, Ohio.
1-4.
3 Wheeler, N icholas J. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. N ew York:
Oxford University Press, 2003. 488.
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o f the area but not directly to the security o f the intervening power.

These types o f

intervention are not new, and she traces the history o f such interventions through the 19th
and 20th centuries, noting that before the end o f the Second World War, most
humanitarian interventions had to do with protecting Christian minorities from some act
or another by the Ottoman Turks. This frames a discussion as to the definition o f what
human and therefore human security means. To westerners, she argues, the definition o f
human is one that has expanded considerably over the last century, to the point that the
definition o f humanitarian is not debated to the extent that the concepts o f legitimacy is in
terms o f interventions.4 Finally, she notes that the armed humanitarian intervention in
Somalia was a watershed in this wider understanding o f the definition o f interventions
and sovereignty, as seen when Secretary General Boutros-Gali critiqued the United States
for intervening in Bosnia but not Somalia, a statement which helped push the Bush
administration to its decision to intervene militarily there later in 1992.5
Finnemore’s work helped to establish the definition for armed humanitarian
interventions, as did “When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard o f Humanitarian
Intervention," in which Robert Pape focused on a revision o f the basic tenets o f
humanitarian intervention following the Libyan intervention as well as the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, each o f which had an element o f humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief/reconstruction in spite o f the fact that neither was couched in humanitarian terms.6
Most useful to the research is Pape’s specific definition for armed humanitarian
interventions, which he describes as “an extraordinary military remedy that temporarily

4 Finnemore, Martha. “Constructing Norms o f Humanitarian Intervention,” ffom The Culture o f N ational
Security, Peter Katzenstein, ed. Columbia University Press: N ew York 1996, 153-185. 175.
5 Ibid. 184.
6 Pape, Robert. "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard o f Humanitarian Intervention." International
Security, Summer, 2012: 41-80. 43.
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sets aside norms o f state sovereignty to prevent the imminent death and permanent
impairment o f people resulting from deliberate actions by their government.”7 This is
supported, though stated as a negative by Micah Zenko, whose work on discrete military
operations specifically excludes humanitarian affairs missions, since they were not
undertaken “to create casualties or cause damage.”8
Pape notes that humanitarian intervention has been most closely associated with
acts o f genocide, which in itself became a critical issue in the aftermath o f the Second
World War.

Genocide, as defined by the 1948 convention for its prevention and

punishment, set out its definition as acts “committed with the intent to destroy... a
national ethnic, racial, or religious group.”9 He notes that this set too high a bar, causing
the Rwanda and Darfur genocides to go unchallenged. On the other hand, he decries the
current trend toward Responsibility to Protect (R2P), as setting the bar too low. While
Pape’s proposed solution is beyond the scope o f this dissertation, his work also provides
all o f the case studies with a wealth o f supporting data. Pape’s definition offered the
most succinct, but broadly based definition for humanitarian interventions, and forms the
core o f the definition which will be used in this study.
Stephen Wertheim offered a critique o f Ambassador Samantha Power’s post
Kosovo work A Problem from Hell, a work with which Wertheim has significant
difficulties.

In this work, Wertheim looks at the history o f U.S. humanitarian

interventions, with a particular focus on the post-cold war era, from 1991-2003. Key
interventions discussed are Somalia and Kosovo, however Wertheim also delivers a

7 Pape. 44. Holzgrefe , J. L. and Keohane, Robert O. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and
P olitical Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003. 1 and 18.
8 Zenko, Micah. Between Threats an d War: U.S. D iscrete M ilitary O perations in the P o st-C o ld War
World. Stanford Security Studies. Stanford, California: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010. 6.
9 Pape. 41.
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useful counterfactual case study o f how an intervention in Rwanda might have played out
had the U.S. and international community felt the need to do so.10 Tellingly, Wertheim in
no way assumes that such an intervention would have been timely or successful, and, o f
greater use to the overall argument o f the dissertation, spends some effort to show that
there was no interest on behalf o f either senior leaders, the media, or the public for such
an intervention.
Wertheim notes that humanitarian type interventions were already part o f the
rhetoric o f U.S. foreign policy before the end o f the Cold War, but that their
implementation afterward, with an emphasis on armed military action, became a sign
both o f American triumphalism and a measure o f its great power status, particularly with
the rise o f the neo-conservatives in the late 1990s.11

Unsurprisingly, he notes the

negative impact that the perceived failure in the Somalia intervention had on future
efforts and the dampening effect it had on them for some time after, the 1994 Haiti
intervention notwithstanding. Power became a key player in the Libya intervention, and
her work and Wertheim’s response were necessary to build an understanding o f the
Obama administrations attitude toward armed humanitarian intervention.
In Humanitarian Intervention, from 2012, Thomas Weiss also offers a definition
coined from Adam Roberts: “A coercive action by one or more states involving the use
o f armed force in another state without the consent o f its authorities, and with the purpose
o f preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.” 12 Further, Weiss
offers insights into the constraints imposed on framing efforts for Somalia, Kosovo, and

10 Wertheim, Stephen. "A solution from hell: the United States and the rise o f humanitarian intervention
1991-2003." Journal o f G enocide Research, 2010: 149-172. 154-155.
11 Wertheim. 150-151.
12 W eiss, Thomas. Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2012. 6.
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Libya, particularly when the stakes in those operations rose, for example, with the
infamous death o f eighteen American soldiers in Mogadishu which brought the Somalia
intervention to a close, and created what Weiss called a drought o f U.S. armed
humanitarian interventions in its wake (with significant impact for Rwanda in 1994).13
Turning to international organizations and their impact on humanitarian
intervention, Aidan Hehir discusses the history and progress o f humanitarian
interventions, with some emphasis on how the U.S. became involved in each o f them,
with a discussion o f the major U.S. post-Cold War interventions, such as Kosovo, with a
particular emphasis on the Libya intervention. Hehir describes the role o f key individuals
in pushing for intervention and helping to frame it, in the case o f Libya, this includes
Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the UN at the tim e.14 Furthermore, Hehir argues that the
issue o f humanitarian intervention calls for a “fundamental restructuring” o f the UN in
order to take into account such operations and their impact on sovereignty.15
Hehir’s work dovetails into a specific discussion o f armed humanitarian
intervention and R2P by Alex Bellamy, who argues that peace operations, in other words,
the efforts by UN and other forces to maintain and enforce peace in war ravaged areas,
began in the Cold War area as a “vision-less” reaction to international crises.16 As the
author notes, however, in the Post-Cold War era, thinking at the UN and in the
humanitarian aid community has added peace operations to those activities which
proponents argue would ultimately lead to a so called liberal peace. A key part o f this is

13 W eiss. 8.
14 Hehir, Aidan. The R esponsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, an d the Future o f Humanitarian
Intervention. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012. 13.
15 Ibid. 11.
16 Bellamy, A lex J. "The Responsibility to Protect." In Security Studies:
An Introduction, /" Edition, Paul D. W illiams, editor. N ew York: Routledge, 2008. 422-437. 422.
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a significant change in the interpretation o f sovereignty. In contrast to the Westphalian
state system, a liberal peace would, according to the author, put the international
community in charge o f the sovereignty o f those states it deemed to be weak or failing.
R2P, which posits that the International Community has the right to intervene when states
fail to protect the human security o f their people, is included in this expanded assumption
o f power. R2P was part of the foundation for, but not specifically cited as, a justification
for the Libya intervention.
Reforms to peace operations were suggested by then Secretary General Kofi
Annan and Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi o f the United Nations.

Brahimi

suggested that peacekeeping needed to become more robust and flexible, that more input
from troop contributing countries was needed to ensure commonality, and that mandates
should reflect existing capabilities, requiring, if necessary, that the same forces which
performed peace keeping would also stay for peace enforcement operations.17 One
product o f these suggestions was the formalization o f the idea o f R2P, which calls for UN
members to intervene either to prevent serious suffering, stop genocide, war crimes, or
crimes against humanity, or to rebuild societies which have been devastated as a result o f
such actions or failures.18 This went so far as to place the concept o f human security
higher than that o f the nation state.19 This utopian desire, however, was not specifically
endorsed by the UN Security Council, in part because o f its implied “Responsibility to

17 Pugh, Michael. 2008. "Peace Operations." In Security Studies:
An Introduction, by Paul D. Williams, editor. N ew York: Routledge, 2008. 407-419. 413.
18 Pape. 51. Further tenets were that the m ission must be achievable, and be as small (tailored) as possible
in its execution.
19 The ICISS states that, after the host country, the Security Council has the primary responsibility to act.

20

Prevent,” abridgements o f human security rather than simply reacting to their
occurrence.20
Criticisms o f peace operations and R2P include sensitizing peace operators to
gender roles and human rights issues, particularly in light o f widespread abuses during
the Yugoslav Civil War and related conflicts o f the 1990s, in which aggressors and
peace-warriors alike were accused o f violations. As noted by Pugh, in the decades since
Somalia the UN is leaving such operations to groups o f like-minded states, and staying
clear o f combat operations.

91

Finally a proposal to use paramilitary and police forces (the

example given is the Italian Carabinieri) into a peace operation in order to lessen the
“war” image and militancy o f the peacekeepers is under consideration. What is unstated
in the writings is a way to ensure that such operations neither are nor are perceived as
simply a new way for imperial powers to get away with interventions and violations o f
the sovereignty o f small states.
Definition: Based on this review o f the literature and the numerous definitions provided
by the authors, the definition for armed humanitarian interventions for this study is: “A
Coercive action by one or more states, in the legitimate context o f an international
organization, involving the use o f armed force in another state without the consent o f its
authorities, and with the purpose o f preventing widespread suffering or death among the
*%>y

inhabitants.”

Furthermore, “It is an extraordinary military remedy that temporarily sets

aside norms o f state sovereignty to prevent the imminent death and permanent
impairment o f people resulting from deliberate actions by their government.”23 This

20 Bellamy, 2008. 426-427.
21 Pugh. 417.
22 Pape. 44.
23 Wertheim. 140-141.
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section set out to determine a definition for humanitarian interventions as a framework
for case study selection and analysis. Each o f the following sections will look at gaps,
where they exist, in the literature in order to provide focus for the study.

Theme Two: The National Security Decision Making Process

This theme examines the specific processes used by the National Security
Council, the wider foreign affairs, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief
communities, the intelligence community, the military, and the White House to drive
foreign affairs decision making.24 Specific themes focus on the disparate powers o f
several key organizations; the National Security Council (NSC), the Department o f State
(DOS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of
Defense (DOD), and the Intelligence Community, to advise the president on decisions.
A valuable resource for understanding the U.S. national security interagency
process and the NSC is provided by Whittaker, Brown, et al., in an annual report on the
subject for the National Defense University based on interviews with relevant leaders and
other extant scholarly work on the presidency and leadership. This document describes
the interagency process from top to bottom, noting the various committees that comprise
both the NSC and Homeland Security Council (HSC) from their inception to the present
day. The authors note the composition o f the NSC and its staff, in which the leads are
generally political appointees, but the subject matter experts are provided by the cabinet
agencies.

Based on the author’s personal experience, this system o f permanent and

24 The military terms the wider government community, except for the Department o f State and the
intelligence community, the interagency.
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temporary staff does little to enhance interagency cooperation.

A key point is the

discussion o f presidential preference in decision-making style. Presidents Eisenhower,
Clinton, and others wished for their staffs to present them reasoned courses o f action
based on consensus among themselves.25

Others, such as Presidents Kennedy and

Obama, preferred to hear the direct opinions o f interagency leaders, which Whittaker
referred to as a “gladiatorial arena,” to hear the why and wherefore o f disagreements, and
then make their decisions.

This work was useful because, while not primary source

material, it showed the history and framework o f the national security decision making
apparatus and how it grew up to serve the needs o f the various presidents.
In their 2000 contribution to Keeping the Edge regarding strengthening the
national security process, former senior leaders John Deutsch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent
Scowcroft discuss the current state o f the process as well as then current issues, and the
potential for reform o f the interagency decision making process.

In their view, an

ongoing process o f “information gathering, decision making, and implementation”
underlies government operations, positing that the right organization is central for setting
the appropriate information requirements on which to base decisions.27 A key point for
them is the ongoing gap in training, outlook, and expectations between the two most
significant stakeholders in the interagency process, the DOS and DOD. Further, the two
departments (as well as the other members o f the interagency process) are highly
dissimilarly funded, particularly in terms o f short term crisis management (the three to
15 Daalder. Ivo, and Destler, I.M. In the Shadow o f the O val Office: Profiles o f the N ational Security
Advisors an d the Presidents They Served - from JF K to G eorge W. Bush. N ew York: Simon and Schuster,
2009. 250.
26 Whittaker, Alan G. "The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and
Interagency System Annual Update.” Washington, DC: Industrial College o f the Armed Forces, National
Defense University, 2011. 10.
27 Deutsch, John. "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process," in K eeping the Edge, edited
by Ashton Carter. Harvard: Kennedy School, 2000, 276-84. 269.
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five year budget cycle for most agencies precludes this), so that interagency processes
can be difficult to implement.

This concurs with W hitaker’s assessment o f the DOD as

a greater than equal partner, with some missions that usurp the DOS’ traditional primacy
in diplomatic affairs.29 It further reflects the seminal findings o f Samuel Huntington in
The Soldier and the State, in which he explains in great detail the factors which make the
military officer (and the departmental ethos) stand out from other government servants
and leaders.30 Further, none o f the authors discuss the framing and support building
processes for the decisions they make.
As noted in Donald Drechsler’s “Reconstructing the Security Process after Iraq,”
the most famous example o f the breakdown o f interagency cooperation in recent years
was the by-design failure of the DOS and DOD to work together on post-kinetic
operations planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, which had far reaching consequences
since key measures in the rebuilding effort that should have been identified in planning
were missed and had to be dealt with on the fly.31 Drechsler advocates reforms to the
process to force the two agencies to work together more consistently as a preventative
measure for the recurrence of such failures.
Deutsch et. al. offered three models for NSC reform to remedy these weaknesses,
including greater centralization o f control o f the security apparatus in the NSC, a

28 Deutsch. 270.
29 Whittaker. 52.
30 Huntington, Samuel. The S oldier an d the State: The Theory an d P olitics o f C ivil-M ilitary Relations.
Cambridge, M assachusetts: Belknap Press o f Harvard University Press, 1957. Deutsch, Whittaker, and
the others cited posit key differences between DOD and DOS including things like time view s (DOS takes
a long view , DOD a short term view), scope (broad for DOS, Narrow for DOD) and workload (wealth and
manpower strength means that a DOD desk officer can often focus on problems that the cash and personnel
strapped DoS can not.) Marcella (2004) adds differences in mindset on training (needed by DOD, not by
DOS) and ambiguity (w elcom ed by DOS, disdained by DOD).
31 Drechsler, Donald R. "Reconstructing the Interagency Process After Iraq." Journal o f Strategic Studies,
2007: 3-30. 6.
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regionally focused system, and the creation o f a separate homeland security structure.
They also advocated for a strengthening o f the position o f CIA Director, a step which
was, to an extent, taken with the establishment o f the Office o f the Director o f National
Intelligence in 2005. What is interesting about this is that many o f these options were
adopted by the Bush Administration to create the HSC and the Office o f the Director o f
National Intelligence.

This article and the Drechsler work serve as a background for

understanding the decision making body, and process, o f today.
One o f the problems in implementing the type o f interagency reform is that noted
by Richard Doyle for Public Administration Review in 2007. Namely, there are no hard
and fast rules for how the interagency process is to work.32 The NSC o f course has
principles and deputies committees, but it relies on individual relationships and
personalities to get the work done and for decisions to be reached, which brings the all o f
the differences in culture and funding back into focus. The congressional requirement for
the executive branch to create a periodic National Security Strategy (NSS) is also
inadequate as a function for forcing cooperation in planning issues and crisis
management.33
Michele Flournoy, who would later become Director o f Defense Policy Planning
under President Obama, echoed these sentiments in, Strategic Planning fo r National
Security: A New Project Solarium in 2006, decrying the fact that there was no formalized
process for national security planning, even a decade and a half after the end o f the Cold

32 D oyle, Richard B. "The U.S. National Security Strategy: Policy, Process, Problems," Public
Adm inistration R eview , 2007: 624-9. 626.
33 Ibid. 626.
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War.34 Her solutions include a requirement for a Quadrennial National Security Review
much like those performed by the Departments o f State and Defense, a pan-government,
inter-agency process including the intelligence community to handle issues from the
information state to plan implementation, and a reformed budget process capable o f
allocating funds according to the policy guidance o f the president rather than the
-> c

competing department needs.

This is reinforced by M arcella’s 2004 contribution to the

Army War College’s Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy and its call for a
dedicated National Security staff with its own incentives, professional standards, and
rewards, as is the case in the DOD Joint Community.36 Flournoy’s call for a specified
budget is echoed in Brook’s 2012 “Budgeting for National Security, a Whole o f
Government Approach,” in which the author argues that the whole o f the non-DOD
portion o f the security apparatus is underfunded, even under normal conditions, and that a
redesign or re-imagining o f interagency roles and responsibilities would have to be
accompanied by a rethinking o f the budgets allocated for those activities.37
Flournoy’s recommendations were echoed in the early days o f the Obama
Presidency by a General Accounting Office (GAO) report on the specific subject o f
interagency cooperation. They add the need for the creation o f specifically collaborative
organizations, and a workforce trained to support those organizations, to the basic
recommendations made by other contributors to this review.

A key example o f the

failure o f agencies to align on each other is the unresolved example o f the misalignment
34 Flournoy, M ichelle. "Strategic Planning for National Security: A N ew Project Solarium," Joint Force
Q uarterly, 2006: 80-6. 80.
3 Flournoy. 81.
36 Marcella, Gabriel "Chapter 17, National Security and the Interagency Process," in U.S. Arm y War
C ollege G uide to N ational Security P olicy an d Strategy. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War C ollege,
2004, 239-60. 254.
37 Brook, Douglas A. "Budgeting for National Security: A W hole o f Government Perspective," Journal o f
Public Budgeting, Accounting, an d Financial Management, 2012: 32-57. 37.
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o f areas o f responsibility between the DOD’s regional combatant commands and the
DOS’s regional bureaus.38 The Fiscal Year 10 National Defense Authorization Act went
some way toward fixing this issue, as it required the president to designate a commission
to develop such a system.39 In the 2010 Government Accounting Office report, John
Pendleton noted a lack o f clarity on which agency might lead what type o f effort as a key
failure o f the current system, which ties into the overall criticisms raised by Flournoy,
Deutsch, and others in this study.40
Writing after the Vietnam War, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew O ’M eara’s Civil
Military Conflict builds on Huntington’s analysis from The Soldier and the State, noting a
series o f divisions between military and civilian leaders which bleeds over from a purely
defense perspective into the national security realm. He emphasizes the very different
training and skill sets o f the military officers, as well as a different set o f role
expectations, claiming that the senior military leader expects, and is dismayed, when he
finds himself out o f control, while the civilian leader is inculcated with the principle o f
tightly controlling the military.41 Further, differences in governance style between liberal
and conservative administration can also cause significant consternation among military
leaders, who find themselves alternately empowered or undercut depending on which
party is in power.42 Further, modem communications allow all senior leaders, including
civilians, unprecedented levels o f access and control over the slightest minutia o f

38 Pendleton, John H. "National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency
Cooperation" Washington D.C.: General Accounting O ffice, 2010. 7.
39 Ibid. 1.
40 Pendleton. 5.
41 O ’Meara, Andrew. “Civil Military Conflict within the D efense Structure.” Param eters, Journal o f the
Arm y War College, 1978. 85-92. 87.
42 Ibid. 88.
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operations, to include combat, a trend which is most famously seen in Vietnam, but has
increased in pervasiveness in the decades since.43
A countervailing opinion, and one which may well reflect the realities o f the post
cold war paradigm, is provided by Deborah Avant, who noted in “Conflicting Indicators
o f “Crisis” in American Civil-Military Relations” that the 1990’s saw a swing in the
opposite direction, toward an expansion o f military roles and influence, to the point
where military leaders are said to have negatively influenced policy.

One example

provided is that o f Colin Powell’s interference in policies on the Yugoslav Civil War,
which saw the military focusing on its desired tasks rather than the goals proposed by
civilian leadership, and Powell actively influencing outcomes beyond the expected role o f
trusted advisor.44 Indeed, as will be seen in the case studies, the military stood, in the
main, against each o f the interventions undertaken. Avant proposes several fixes for this
separation o f goals, primarily focused on reversing the military’s separation from civil
society both in physical proximity and in mindset, possibly through a reinstitution o f the
draft,
In National Security and the Interagency Process, Gabriel Marcella discusses the
development o f the interagency national security decision making since the Second
World War, noting its beginnings as a means to achieve total wartime mobilization.45
According to Marcella, the NSC serves to provide information and policy advice to the
president, manage the policy coordination process, monitor policy implementation,
manage crises, articulate the president’s policies, perform long term strategic planning,

43 O ’Meara. 89.
44 Avant, Deborah. “Conflicting Indicators o f “Crisis” in American Civil-M ilitary Relations. Arm ed
Forces an d Society, Vol. 24, N o. 3, Spring 1998, 375-388. 376.
45 Marcella, 2004. 239.
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liaison with the U.S. Congress and foreign governments, and coordinate summits and
international visits.46 With this in mind, Marcella notes that the interagency environment
is a process, rather than a place, and embodies more than the narrowly defined mission o f
the NSC. Further, such a process, to perform optimally, must have such factors as perfect
goal setting, complete intelligence, flawless articulation, etc., in other words, a utopian
perfection which is impossible to achieve in the real world.47 Finally, he notes that a
central problem with the whole process is its lack o f centrality or central control. This
means that things work when personalities mesh, and they don’t when they don’t.48
Marcella’s findings are mirrored in those o f “Institutionalization o f the National Security
Staff, 1949-2001,” by Matthew Dickinson, who noted that the national security staff
assists the president with mitigating uncertainty both in in foreign policy planning but
also in mitigating what he calls “bargaining outcomes” including domestic politics.
Dickinson reviewed the roles o f powerful advisors in the 1970’s, but also how the
embarrassment o f the Iran Contra Affair led to a more curtailed role for the Council
under President George H.W. Bush, and how President Clinton expanded the N SC’s role
to address international economic issues, but largely kept the Bush model in place.49
John Burke’s work is in agreement with the general responsibilities o f the NSC
and interagency leaders as articulated by Marcella in his concept o f the need for a Neutral
broker in the decision making process.

He focuses on the necessity for the national

security advisor to act as an “honest broker” to make the system function effectively.
This “managerial custodianship” requires balancing actor resources, bringing in new

46 Marcella, 2004. 243-244.
47 Ibid. 245.
48 Ibid. 253.
49 Dickinson, Matthew. “Institutionalization o f the National Security Staff, 1949-2001.” 2003 M eeting o f
the Am erican P olitical Science A ssociation, 38, 2003. 12.
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advisors to advocate for unpopular decisions, making sure that there are always multiple
channels o f information to assist presidential decision making, and monitoring the system
as needed.50 The article discusses the development o f the national security advisor in this
role, starting with President Truman and Eisenhower’s national security advisors, who
focused narrowly on their duties as described above. This o f course changed with the
appointment o f Henry Kissinger, who set the bar for activist advisors. The broker, versus
activist role has been seen with Brent Scowcroft, and to a lesser extent Sandy Berger
among recent presidencies, and this fact bears significantly on the quality o f the decision
making process and the outcomes o f that process, something that is borne out in the case
studies.51
Concluding the look at the NSC structure and interagency issues is the CSIS
report “Beyond Goldwater Nichols” Clark Murdock notes successive failures to achieve
whole o f government solutions, a problem which has hindered success in intervention
missions.

He makes a series o f recommendations for improvement o f the decision

making process, including the creation o f an assistant on the NSC staff with the specific
job o f integrating agency plans and strategies, mirrored by similar bodies in the relevant
cabinet agencies.

Deeper presidential review of complex operation planning procedures,

and designation o f on the ground interagency leads for complex operations are also
mandated, and this stands in agreement with Ross’s support o f Richard Holbrooke’s role
in Yugoslavia discussed below.54 The general agreement among writers on the NSC and

50 Burke, John P. "The Neutral/Honest Broker in Role in Foreign-Policy D ecision Making: A
Reassessment." P residential Studies Q uarterly, 2005: 229-258. 230.
51 Ibid. 236.
52 Murdock, Clark A. B eyond G oldw ater Nichols: Defense Reform f o r a New S trategic Era Phase I
Report, Wahsington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004. 60.
53 Ibid. 63.
54 Ibid. 64.
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the interagency is that the DOD is not structured or intended to go it alone in foreign
policy planning and implementation, just as DOS and the other key members o f the
interagency, such as the FBI, the Department o f Commerce, USAID, and others cannot
achieve their maximum capability without working in concert.
Peter Rodman, focusing directly on the office o f the presidency, generates a series
of insights on what makes a successful presidency in terms o f foreign policy
development. His work, based on his personal experience and interviews, is one o f the
primary foundations for the development o f the case studies because o f its broad scope
and specific detail on relevant decision making and decision makers. Rodman’s chief
observation is that a president must know when and where to apply his personal will to
issues, while successfully managing his staff such that that will gets applied even when
the president himself cannot do so.55 While Rodman casts a wide net, the most useful
sections o f his work deal with the presidencies o f George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton.
Rodman details the workings o f each presidency, from the unified team o f Bush to a
Clinton team that was chosen in some ways to reflect the new president’s lack o f interest
in foreign affairs, evidenced by Warren Christopher, or to prevent threats from the
Defense Department, which lead to Les Aspin’s appointment there, since he was
perceived to be weak.56 The work does not specifically address the Bush decision to
enter Somalia, however, significant time is spent discussing the Clinton decision making
process and how it bore on the decision not to intervene in Rwanda, but to do so in
Kosovo.

55 Rodman, Peter. P residential Command: Power, Leadership, an d the M aking o f Foreign P olicy from
R ichard Nixon to G eorge W. Bush. N ew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. 140.
56 Ibid. 2 0 5 ,2 0 7 .
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In his recent work on presidential leadership, Joseph Nye examines how a series
o f U.S. presidents contributed to what he calls the U.S. primacy o f the 20th and 21st
Centuries. Nye characterizes leaders as transactional or transformational, depending on
their motives and personal styles.

O f greatest interest to this dissertation is N ye’s

description o f President George H. W. Bush as a transactional leader, so called because
his motives were good, and he did not seek fundamental change to the world system.57
O f value to the overall theme o f the dissertation is N ye’s assessment that presidential
leadership was, indeed, pivotal to the development o f foreign policy and the framing o f
strategic communication messages.
Based on the personality o f a given president, and the constitutional seniority o f
the various cabinet members, the interagency process can be dominated by a powerful
cabinet member. The most recent example o f this is the role that Vice President Cheney
and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld played in the Bush administration.

These types o f

relations can limit the effectiveness o f the NSC and the interagency community to get
fo

their plans cleared through the president.

In Statecraft: How to Restore A m erica’s

Standing in the World, Dennis Ross engages in a discussion o f interventions in the postCold War Era, and notes the success in Bosnia when a single trusted agent (in this case,
Richard Holbrooke) took the lead in formulating and implementing policy.59
Supporting the “One Man” argument, Gordon Craig focuses on Kissinger’s role
as a “great man”, moving the focus o f power and decision making down one level from
the president to a trusted advisor.

This was a unique situation, since Kissinger often

57 N ye, Joseph. P residential Leadership an d the Creation o f the Am erican Era. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2013. 6.
58 Ibid. 29.
59 Ross, Dennis. Statecraft: A nd H ow to Restore Am erica's Standing in the World. N ew York: Farrar,
Straus and Giraux, 2007. 135.
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operated independently from his presidential masters, but always had to reason with their
personalities.60 Kissinger centralized the foreign policy apparatus, juggling, and, when
necessary deceiving, both his international and domestic interlocutors, including, on
occasion, his bosses.61 Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served Carter as Kissinger had served
Ford and Nixon, adds weight to the discussion o f foreign policy decision making. He
emphasizes his personal relationship with President Carter, and how others, who did not
share the same level of personal connection, were increasingly less able to get their
opinions heard and policies implemented. This was most clearly exhibited with Secretary
o f State Cyrus Vance, and the series o f conflicts he and Brzezinski had with each other 62
Moreover, a system o f decision making that was highly centralized in the White House
under a dominant president created a situation in which the National Security Advisor
was increasingly the bureaucratic beneficiary o f active presidential predominance.

In

their history o f the NSC and the National Security Advisors, Ivo Daalder and I.M. Dester
also note the unique role that one man, such as Kissinger, could play, recognizing that
specific steps would be taken by subsequent chief executives to limit the power o f the
National Security Advisor, or any other single person, to control events.63 They concur
with assessments o f other relevant players such as Brent Scowcroft as completely loyal to
George H.W. Bush,64 and Anthony Lake’s Council, per Bill Clinton’s design, as focused,

60 Craig, Gordon. The Diplomats, 1939-1979. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994., 571. “ ...h is
mercurial yet morbidly suspicious chief. This meant accommodating h im self to N ixon ’s distinctly odd
working habits; it also required unquestioning support for questionable policies.”
61 Ibid. 580.
62 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. P ow er an d Principle: M emoirs o f the N ational Security A dviser 1977-1981. N ew
York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux. 524.
63 Daalder. Ivo, and Destler, I.M. In the Shadow o f the O val Office: Profiles o f the N ational Security
Advisors an d the Presidents They S erved - fro m JF K to G eorge W. Bush. N ew York: Simon and Schuster,
2009. 305.
64 Ibid. 168.
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at least in the beginning o f the administration, on de-prioritizing foreign policy,65 but
steadily forming a decisive, problem solving partnership, especially after transitioning to
the leadership o f Lake’s former deputy, Sandy Berger.66

In the same vein, Burke

advocated for a return to the honest broker role for the National Security Advisor, noting
that this choice is ultimately up to the president who makes the choice o f advisors and
roles.67
Eugene W ittkopf and James McCormick turn our attention to the role o f domestic
factors on foreign policy decision making.

In their compilation o f articles, the

author/editors examine the sub-unit level actors who impact U.S. foreign policy, namely,
the media, the Congress, the public, and others.

The authors spend significant time

discussing the armed humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Kosovo, reaching similar
conclusions to the other authors cited in this review. The authors emphasize the self
view o f the U.S. as an idealistic power, how this plays out domestically, and how left
over pressures and predilections from the Cold War era impacted U.S. interventions.68
They also note the growing education, motivation, and understanding gap between the
U.S. defense establishment and the civilian national security apparatus, a factor which
has contributed to misunderstandings as borne out in the case studies. Emphasis is also
placed, as in other cited works, on what personality traits the president brings to decision
making, how he chooses to staff his national security apparatus, and who he chooses to
lead it in terms o f their impact on the decision making process. This work specifically
reinforces Robert Putnam’s view o f foreign policy development as a “two-level” game in

65 Daalder. 215.
66 Ibid. 207.
67 Burke, 2005. 250.
68 Wittkopf, Eugene and McCormick, James. The D om estic Sources o f U.S. Foreign Policy: Insights and
Evidence. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 15.
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which the role o f different domestic political groupings exerts direct influence on, and is
directly influenced by, foreign policy decisions.69
Literature Gaps Revealed: The most significant gap that has been revealed in the works
reviewed is a lack o f connection between the national security decision making process
and the process of framing the decisions resulting from it to stakeholder audiences, in
other words, through the media and other communications tools to the American people.
While the media are mentioned as an influencer on policy, policy as an influence on the
media is not covered. It is this gap which the dissertation proposes to fill. While there
are a variety o f structures in place to facilitate decision making, there appears to be no set
mechanism or process to achieve a similarly strong level o f information dissemination to
relevant stakeholder audiences. This can result in a lack o f support or even resistance to
decisions o f if and at what level to launch armed humanitarian interventions.

Theme Three: Decision Making Theories and the “Powerful Leader”

The purpose o f this section is to review extant debate on rationality and the
decision making process and drawing relevant conclusions on that process and how it fits
in with the larger discussion on humanitarian affairs and framing.

Furthermore, the

definition of “powerful leader” in foreign policy decision making is discussed.
The foundational work on crisis decision making is Graham Allison’s Essence o f
Decision, as updated in 1999 with Phillip Zelikow. Essence o f Decision uses a discussion
o f the Cuban Missile Crisis as the background for a deeper analysis o f the methods used

69 Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic o f tw o-level gam es.” International
O rganization, Volume 42, Issue 3, Summer 1998: 427-460. 434.
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by leaders to reach decisions in times o f peace and crisis, although notably without
significant attention to the issue o f how the decision making and framing processes
interact. One o f the main contributions o f Allison’s work is the Rational Actor Model
(RAM) o f government politics, decision making, and group dynamics. The RAM posits
that actors “consider problems o f policy in terms o f largely implicit conceptual models
that have significant consequences for the context o f the thought.”70 The first section o f
the work considers the definition o f rationality, as well as a discussion o f the first,
implicit conceptual model (Called the Classical Model). Its core concepts are: A ranking
o f objectives, discussion o f alternatives, attachment o f consequences to the alternatives,
and a rational selection o f the alternatives to act upon based on required goal completion.
This model’s assumptions are:

Unitary states are the key actors, states act rationally,

calculating costs and benefits for actions, and that the world is a “Hobbesean Jungle,” or
anarchic in the neorealist sense in which there is no higher authority to moderate state
action.

In such an environment, it is assumed that states will seek to increase their

security and power.71
Further expanding on the concept o f rationality is “The Rationality o f Rational
Choice Theory.” In this article, Stephen Quackenbusch defends rationality by noting that
it is not a unified theory, and that a lack o f understanding o f rationality has created
confusion as to its ultimate value, since it is actually a cover term for a series o f different
theoretical arguments.72 In order to rectify this, the author seeks to clarify instrumental
rationality, focusing on the role o f assumptions (both provable and improvable) in

70 A llison, Graham, and Zelikow, Philip. Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban M issile Crisis, Second
Edition. Longman: N ew York, 1999. 18.
71 Ibid. 37.
72 Quackenbush, Stephen. “The Rationality o f Rational Choice Theory.” International Interactions, no.30,
2004. 87.
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rational decision making.

71

He claims that assumptions should be judged by their

usefulness rather than their veracity, and that conflating rational decision making with
economic choices, as early analysts did, is fraught with danger, since rationality must
encompass more than economic awards and outcomes.74 This argument on assumptions
and rationality supports the implementation o f a rational actor model, in that key
assumptions must be made and the resultant conclusions acted upon in the decision
making process, without normative judgment on the good or bad nature o f decisions.75 In
other words, a decision need not be perceived to be good in order to be perceived as
rational.
Furthering the discussion o f rational decision making, Catherine C. Langlois and
Jean-Pierre P. Langlois discuss the issues that rationality causes in behavior. The authors
present behavior and rationality from a game theoretical standpoint, providing a series o f
examples, concluding that neither evolutionary nor classical game theoretical arguments
are adequate to explain changes in strategic behavior.76 Their vision o f a “rational”
strategy would utilize a combination o f strategies designed to hold opponents to a single
pattern o f behavior while deterring them from harmful moves.77 They claim that their
process roughly mirrors diplomatic and political discourse, because decisions can be
made without plans being fully revealed to the other player.78 This seems to be relevant
to the issue o f foreign policy decision making in that each party to the decision must
engage in these thought processes in order to negotiate bases for action.

73 Quackenbush. 89.
74 Ibid. 91.
75 Ibid. 95. This instrumental rationality, or the rationality o f rational theory as alluded to in the title.
76 Langlois, Catherine C. and Jean-Pierre. “Behavioral Issues o f Rationality in International Interaction.”
Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 1999. 627.
77 Ibid. 628.
78 Ibid. 640.
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Returning to a discussion o f Allison’s models, the second model developed is the
Organizational Process Model (OPM), in which leaders tend to break down problems
along organizational lines, and are therefore often limited to reacting to crises with pre
existing plans because o f the time required to develop new plans. This conforms to Peter
W olfs work on the American bureaucracy, which posits that role o f the any federal
bureaucracy, regardless o f its location in the hierarchy is significant in the barriers that
can be erected to discussion, and implementation, o f any agenda, even that o f the
president. This is well represented by the change o f focus which fundamentally altered
the calculus in the Somalia intervention.79
The third model, and the one most applicable to the interagency process as it
applies to the Libyan intervention, is the Governmental Politics Model (GPM). In this
model, these decisions are viewed as “outputs of large organizations functioning
according to standards o f behavior.”80 Key here is that organizational, not individual,
dynamics and cultures influence outcomes. Bureaucracies serve themselves first, then
their higher authorities.

Large gaps form between the choices o f leaders and the

implementation capabilities and priorities o f subordinate organizations. Organizations do
not easily or efficiently share information, resulting in potentially incomplete information
for decision makers. The OPM and GPM provide a basis for enhanced explanation and
predictions. The authors argue that their expanded models can also be used to analyze
decision making processes in extra-governmental fields such as law, economics, or
business.

81

In these models even a shared goal can cause conflict because o f the differing

views o f leaders based on the points o f view o f their parent organizations, personal
79 Woll, Peter. Am erican Bureacracy. N ew York: Norton, 1977. 206-207.
80 Allison and Zelikow. 143.
81 Ibid. 7.
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interests, and backgrounds. In such an environment, even a paramount leader, such as the
president, must seek consensus with his subordinates, if for no other reason than to
prevent misunderstandings.
Because o f these limitations, the personalities o f key leaders and their propensity
to fight for their views or acquiesce, even to the paramount leader, are central. This is
witnessed in the case study discussion o f the Somalia and Libya interventions, when key
senior leaders such as the U.S. Ambassador to the UN and the Secretary o f State appear
to have been pivotal in swaying President Obama both to intervene, and to do so under
humanitarian auspices.

The Governmental Politics Model takes the perspective that

government behavior is not unitary at all, but made up o f a wide array o f actors, each
pulled by numerous priorities which may not be central to the issue at hand. Crucial to
the model is the idea that “the leader’s initial preferences are rarely a sufficient guide for
explanation or prediction.”83 Bargaining takes place amongst agencies o f varying relative
power and interests, sometimes crippling the ability to make rational choices.
Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond take a critical look at the three major
models postulated by Graham Allison in the first edition o f Essence o f Decision.*4 They
recognize the importance o f Allison’s work and its centrality to the study o f the impact of
bureaucracy on decision making.

However, it is that centrality o f importance which

causes their concern, as they describe the models as largely descriptive rather than
prescriptive or theoretical.

Part o f their critique lies in the fact that they are writing

nearly two decades after the release o f Essence o f Decision, with much history, including

82 Allison and Zelikow. 7.
83 Ibid. 259.
84 Bendor, Jonathan, and Hammond, Thomas. “Rethinking A llison ’s Models. ” The Am erican P olitical
Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (Jun., 1992), 301-322. 301.
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new perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis, between them. It was this type o f criticism
as well as a desire to update the model that led Graham Allison to team up with Philip
Zelikow to rewrite Essence o f Decision in 1999.
Four typologies are developed by the authors for use in examining Allison’s three
models. The first focuses on the number o f actors. Unlike states, which are viewed as
unitary actors, decision making groups are broken down into constituent groups.85 This
leads to questions o f similarity o f goals, which is not guaranteed with large groups.86
Third is the assumption that all players are rational.87 Fourth, rationality notwithstanding,
is how informed or uninformed the actors are.

The authors find the RAM to be too

simple in its examination o f rationality. In part this is because o f uncertainty on whether
oo

rational actors have just one goal or many.

Another potential flaw is Allison’s seeming

presumption that decisions taken at key points in time draw their decision cycles to an
end. This does not pay adequate note to the ongoing impacts o f decisions, changes in
circumstances, as seen in Somalia, and the possible need for revisits o f the same topics.
In part, this weakness is attributed to a lack o f adequate progress in game theory as a tool
when Allison first wrote the book.
The second model, the OPM, is described by the authors as Allison’s strongest
work. They criticize it, however, for its core assumption that the actors making decisions
will follow simple organizational rules or standard operating procedures.89 These rules
include: Straight lines o f organization, programmed character, and the constraints placed
on the number and types o f choice by these rules. The authors posit that the rationality o f

85 Bendor and Hammond. 304.
86 Ibid. 305.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid. 309.
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behavior is based on various inputs, including information. Limits on information can
impact the quality o f the rules and the decisions made. Other limitations o f the model
include the lack o f acknowledgement o f the possible non-linear nature o f crises as well as
the combined, complex interplay o f multiple actors and choices. In other words, events
will be far more complex and far less linear that acknowledged by Allison.90 Further,
operating rules and may be more numerous and complex than individual actors can
process. Additionally, hierarchy, or how smaller decisions/influencers fit into a larger
picture, is not recognized in Allison’s work. Furthermore, modem bureaucracies are not
always as sluggish or staid as Allison proposed. Indeed, organizations can potentially
bring more cognitive power to bear on issues than individuals.91

Finally, modem

decision makers are not as uninformed as assumed (and may be quite specialized,
although sometimes in different ways).
Critiques o f the GPM focus on whether the highest levels o f the government
actually work in the manner supposed by Allison.

The authors question if goals of

leaders at the cabinet level are actually so disparate, and both whether and why a
president would have to bargain with his own appointees.92 The authors posit that a
president would try to avoid bargaining if possible, and that he would be in a paramount
position unless his subordinates possessed sources o f information and or power/support
outside o f the executive branch.93 It could be suggested this could be seen in action
during the Somalia intervention decisions o f the Bush administrations, and far less so in

90 Bendor and Hammond. 309.
91 Ibid. 311-312.
92 Ibid. 314.
93 Ibid.
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the Clinton and Obama interventions, with the differences explained by the unique
personalities in play.
Concerning Allison’s use o f the Cuban Missile Crisis as the empirical backdrop to
his analytical models, the authors posit that, in spite o f Allison’s analysis, the key
decisions in the crisis were taken by the president and a very small inner group, and were
not the result o f bargaining or political compromise.94 The author’s claim that the GPM
is both too complex and inadequately cognizant of the importance o f hierarchy in the
decision making process.

In conclusion, the authors conclude with a final warning

against the kind of devotion to Allison’s model that sprung up after its promulgation.
Stephen Redd and Alex Mintz expound upon the decision making models,
introducing Applied Decision Analysis (ADA) method and bias in decision making.95
The ADA creates a decision matrix for the user, which focuses on available alternatives,
decision dimensions, and rates each decision dimension in terms o f the implications o f
that decision.

Examination o f decisions according to this rule can help do determine

which o f the processes was used, and therefore how the leader thinks or is influenced.
This model would be very useful if applied through systematic interviews with key
leaders on specific decision making cycles, such as those surrounding the selected case
studies.96
In Explaining Foreign Policy, Steve Yetiv attempts to broaden the tools
developed by Allison by use o f a new case study, that o f the decision making process
which surrounded the U.S. led coalition’s armed rejection o f Iraq from Kuwait in 1991.

94 Bendor and Hammond. 314.
95 Steven B. Redd, and Mintz, Alex. "Policy Perspectives on National Security and Foreign Policy
D ecision Making." P olicy Studies Journal, 2013: 11 -37. 11.
96 Ibid. 26.
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One o f his refinements o f the Allison models was a Theory o f Government Politics, by
which key leaders acted as “pied pipers” and brought others along with them through
persuasive power, particularly if the outlook o f and relationships among the group
members were similar and strong.

07

Yetiv’s model appears particularly persuasive for

explaining the interventions in Kosovo and Libya, in which powerful actors, not always
at the cabinet level, formulated their positions and dragged other key leaders along,
ultimately also participating in the public framing o f the issues, although this is not
discussed explicitly.

The idea o f “pied pipers” provides part o f the basis for the

“powerful leaders” referenced in this study.
It must be noted, o f course, that both Allison and Yetiv wrote about unique events
which are unlikely to recur.

This does not render their work merely historical, but

implies that other theories and narratives can augment their explanatory power. One o f
these narratives is provided by Richard Haass, who, writing about his experience as a
cabinet official in both Bush administrations, noted that there seemed to be little if any
discussion around the decision to begin the second Iraq War in 2002-2003. Rather, it
appeared that the decision was made nearly unilaterally by President Bush and then
•

pushed to the cabinet for planning.

Q fi

This is in contrast to environment under which the

decisions o f the first G ulf War were undertaken."
Moving from group dynamics to the role o f the individual, Byman and Pollack
begin their engagement o f theory by discussing why other researchers have dismissed or
under-studied the role o f the individual in international politics. The reasons given focus

97 Yetiv, Steve A. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. D ecision M aking an d the G u lf War. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2004. 120.
98 Haass, Richard N. War o f Necessity, War o f Choice: A M emoir o f Two Iraq Wars. N ew York: Simon
and Schuster, 2009. 6.
99 Ibid. 82-83.
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on the difficulty o f crafting theories which can explain individual actions and their
importance, something that the authors look to rectify with their own work. The authors
significantly engage other theories, particularly realism. Given their aim, this is primarily
done through an exposition o f Ken W altz’s seminal work Man, the State and War, and
the three images o f analysis, man, society, and the international system as well as his
Theory o f International Politics.100 They acknowledge W altz’s inclusion and explanation
o f the role of man, even if they note that W altz’s dismissal o f the role o f the individual
leaves a gap in the overall analysis. Case studies utilized to emphasize the role o f the
individual include leaders such as Hitler, Napoleon, Saddam Hussein, and Hafez al
Assad, and the authors take pains to demonstrate that it was their personal actions which
were the primary drivers for decisions and events. In terms o f the selected case studies,
less malevolent examples o f seminal leaders are the Presidents, Bush and Clinton, and
other key leaders, such as Secretaries o f State Albright and Clinton. This emphasis on
the role o f the individual combines with that o f Yetiv’s “pied piper” to identify the
“powerful individual” who can sway opinion in decision making.
Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney posit that wars can begin because o f a
transfer from a deliberate planning mode to an execution mode amongst civilian and
military leaders.101

Once this transition takes place, it becomes significantly more

difficult to defuse a situation, or to steer leaders to choose non-combative courses o f
action. Thus, even when peaceful options may be available, leaders stick to their chosen

100 Byman, Daniel L. and Pollack, Kenneth M. "Let U s N ow Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman
Back In." International Security 25, No. 4 (2001): 107-146. 111.
101 Johnson, Dominic, and Tierney, Dominic. “The Rubicon Theory o f War: How the Path to Conflict
Reaches the Point o f N o Return” International Security 36, No. 1 (2011): 7-40. 7.
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path, often toward w ar.102 This construct seems particularly useful for a discussion o f the
road to intervention in Somalia.
Through this theory, the authors hope to resolve several key issues.

One is

apparent fear o f war in times o f peace and limited tension contrasted with overconfidence
in the crisis phase leading to conflict.103 A second is that leaders are the primary actors in
international relations, and that their actions may lose rationality once an implemental
mindset has taken hold.104 Although not the only example given, the events o f the
summer o f 1914 and the outbreak o f the First World War in Europe form a centerpiece
for explanation and support for the theory.
Overconfidence is the first component o f the argument to be analyzed. A series
o f historical examples are given to demonstrate that the road to war (in this case the
Second World War and the 1991 G ulf War) moved from the theoretical to the inevitable,
feelings o f fear and uncertainty gave way to overconfidence and overestimation o f
capabilities. In the case o f the Second World War, the foreign policy establishment in
Great Britain collectively could be described as having went through a series o f four
psychological phases, ending in confidence that the war could be won.

Similarly,

confidence in the U.S. o f a successful outcome to the G ulf War increased as war became
more likely through the winter o f 1990-1991.

The authors hypothesize that

overconfidence can be traced back to the closed nature o f the implemental mindset, since,
in both cases, the only variable which changed was that o f time, here described as
nearness to likely conflict.

102 Johnson and Tierney. 7.
105 Ibid.
104
1 Ibid. 8.

No important change in military capability took place in

45
either case.

This methodology can be seen in action in all three o f the case study

interventions.
The implemental mindset is described as unreceptive to issues or questions which
challenge the chosen course o f action.105

Information that is received tends to be

processed in a way that it supports pre-existing plans, while an “illusion o f control” over
events can set in.106 O f particular interest is evidence that leaders in the implementation
mindset even dismiss personal danger and everyday risks such as illness or accidents.107
Overconfidence and the implemental mindset are brought together as influencers on war
perceptions. The authors posit that perceptions o f war can be traced to three event types:
Leaders can choose conflict, have it chosen for them (entrapment) or slide into war as a
result o f uncontrollable turmoil. The “slide” to war can be furthered by the implemental
mindset and overconfidence posited by the Rubicon Theory o f War.
In conclusion, the authors note that an implementation mindset need not be
completely negative, and state that it can endow leaders with the discipline and will to see
operations through to completion.

However, they caution against allowing such

endowments to drift into excessive risk taking and refusal to accept information inputs
which could defuse crises. They posit that leaders, expecting this behavior, should plan
to both harness and mitigate its effects.108 Notably, the article does not enter into a
discussion o f the processes leaders take to frame and justify their positions during the
crisis planning events discussed.

105 Johnson and Tierney. 15.
106 Ibid. 17.
107 Ibid. 11.
108 Ibid.
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Rose McDermott’s Political Psychology in International Relations serves as a
strong analytical accompaniment to Allison’s work.
strains

of

thought

and

analysis

surrounding

This book examines the various
political

psychology,

including

recommendations on how future research can move the field forward and make it more
useful to political science researchers. 109 One key point o f this work is that context and
history are crucial in understanding psychology and its impact on the decision making
process.
McDermott focuses on theories o f politics and International Relations and their
impacts on the study o f political psychology.

Realism, Liberalism, Marxism, the

domestic policy model, the RAM, Constructivism, and the role o f individuals are
discussed, leading into a discussion o f developmental psychology. In fact, the role o f
upbringing on individual leaders is referred to several times through the course o f the
book, with attention to specific reference to Hitler, Woodrow Wilson, Nixon, and Ghandi
among others. Further, discussion o f choice and chance, and the impact o f one on the
other, is discussed.110 As the author notes, chance does not self-correct, in spite o f the
commonly-held belief that it does. For example, rolling the dice repeatedly still gives the
same chance for a given outcome as existed in the first roll, in spite o f the human mis
perception that odds change.111
Chapter four discusses cognition and attitudes and the interaction between them.
Attitude change, predicted in part by the number o f interlocutors around the person
making decisions, is discussed as a key part o f this process.

Similarly, social rules,

109 McDermott, Rose. P olitical P sychology in International Relations. Ann Arbor, MI: University o f
Michigan Press, 2004. 17-20.
110 Ibid. 271-273.
111 Ibid. 61.
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hierarchy/authority, and norms can influence attitudes, while cognitive dissonance, or the
ability to hold one set o f views for a considerable period while acting in a way which
may contradict that belief. The power o f context is explained as forcing attitudes and
drives to change, thus changing perceptions and cognition. This leads into a discussion
o f behavior, which begins with the role o f crises and how the resultant sub-optimal or bad
decision making.

Crises can cause leaders to omit key data and objectives, fail to

examine costs and risks, fail to find adequate information, process information
selectively, fail to reconsider previously rejected alternatives, and failure to consider
issues o f implementation and monitoring.

11 ?

International terror networks and the

methods o f recruitment, training, and operation o f terrorists, the military, and other
groups are examined in this light, focusing on emotion and its role in the decision making
process. Jealousy, reciprocity, and other traits are derived from this, and can heavily
impact decision making.
Chapters eight and nine o f the study focus on the role o f the leader and the impact
of group think, respectively. Chapter eight emphasizes the need to understand a leader’s
history and emotional underpinnings in order to understand that leader’s motivations and
choices.

113

Chapter nine focuses on Irving Janis’ groupthink theory, and the ways in

which a group can shape individual choices and learning.114 Graham Allison’s three
models from Essence o f Decision are specifically analyzed, with the author claiming that
the organizational process and bureaucratic politics models are not mutually exclusive o f
one another. Weaknesses of groupthink, which align closely to the earlier discussion o f
the impact o f stress on the decision making process, include an illusion o f invulnerability
112 McDermott. 124.
113 Ibid. 216.
114 Ibid. 249.
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and a feeling o f overconfidence as crucial factors, along with the power o f the group to
coerce.115 This is borne out in the case studies, particularly with the Somalia and Kosovo
interventions.
In “The Theory and Practice o f Foreign Policy Decision Making,” Jonathan and
Stanley Renshon discuss the development o f decision making processes, noting that the
beliefs and psychological lenses with which leaders view the world will necessarily
impact their decisions.116 The Renshons base their work on earlier studies by Alexander
George utilizing psychoanalytic theory, noting the impact o f entry biases, time pressure,
stress, and threat/security levels can distort or lessen the quality o f decision making. This
is in line with other cited works, most notably the Rubicon Theory o f War. For purposes
o f this dissertation, threat will be interpreted as political, rather than military threat, given
the nature o f the interventions to be discussed.
Literature Gaps Identified: The definition o f the powerful leader was discussed, with a
focus on how informed and motivated leaders who can sway opinion in decision making
and framing dominate decision making processes. The major literature gap revealed by
this research concerns the selling o f decisions to the stakeholder audience. This audience
could include foreign countries, partisan political leadership, other key groups, but is
primarily meant as the public. Little note is given in most o f the works examined to the
process by which the president, a key leader, or the government convinces these
audiences, and most particularly the public, of the need to implement the decisions made
in the processes discussed. This leads to the question o f how intervention decisions are
justified to stakeholders. Is there a connection between the process o f decision making
115 McDermott. 253.
116 Renshon, Jonathan and Stanley A. The Theory and Practice o f Foreign Policy D ecision Making.
P olitical Psychology, Vol 29, No. 4, 2008. 509.
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and the framing o f that decision? Is framing simultaneous with decision making, or does
it follow the decision? Is the planning for both concurrent? This is a question which will
be addressed in the case studies, but the evidence examined in them seems to indicate that
all o f the aforementioned times for a discussion o f framing occur depending on the nature
of the decision and situation.
A further potential gap, as mentioned in the reviews, is very specific nature o f the
examples selected by Allison and Yetiv for their reviews. First, the Cuban Missile crisis
took place in an era of bi-polarity and with a level o f threat (nuclear war) that does not
currently exist, and is unlikely to return in exactly the same fashion. Yetiv’s example o f
the first G ulf War was shaped by a massive U.S. predominance in the immediate
aftermath o f the Cold War, as well as a level o f unity and professionalism in the national
security team. Both o f these factors are also highly time and personality dependent, and
may be difficult to replicate. This is an important issue which must be borne in mind
when developing the methodology o f the paper and applying it to the case studies.

Theme Four: Framing Policy and Strategic Communication

Given the demonstrated nature o f armed humanitarian operations as non
threatening to the intervening state, the “War o f Choice” embarked upon must then be
communicated to the public in such a way as to build and maintain support.117 This
theme focuses on the methods the interagency community and the government used to
frame and communicate their themes and messages concerning their opponents and world
events in connection with their decisions to intervene. It is not specifically tied to the
117 Haass, 2009. 10.
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national security decision making process, and this fact allows for questions to be asked
linking the two issues.
Robert Entman provides the primary source for the issue o f framing, focusing
attention on the efforts o f the government to frame key events, and the media’s
countervailing efforts to “counter-frame” them .118 The theory he develops, the Cascading
Network Activation Model, describes the process by which frames are used “to generate
support or opposition to a political actor or policy,” as well as how the stakeholders can
shape the process.119 Entman uses a series o f historical examples to show that the
government is generally successful in framing when it can call on shared themes and
ideals and get its themes in “early and often.” Yetiv also adds to this discussion by
describing the methodology used by Bush in constructing an image o f Hussein as a new
Hitler, and the overwhelming need to confront him rather than face a “New Munich.” 120
Manuel Castells’ work focuses on a variety o f communications issues, noting that
power is based on the ability to form, shape and adjust networks and m essages.121 In
chapter three, Networks o f Mind and Power, the author focuses on the development and
implementation o f frames as devices for control o f communication o f messaging,
including examples on the government media framing o f the U.S. invasion o f Iraq in
2003.122 This section provides a central foundation for arguments on the U.S. framing o f
interventions connected with the Arab Spring. Conflicting framing agendas, as Castells
describes, are also referenced by Glazier and Boydstun in their 2012 discussion in

118 Entman, Robert. Projections o f Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, an d U.S. Foreign Policy.
Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 2004. 1-3.
119 Entman. 47.
120 Yetiv. 94-95.
121 Castells, Manuel. Com munication Power. N ew York: Oxford University Press. 2009. 3.
122 Ibid. 165-189.
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Political Communication o f the conflicting frames generated by the Bush Administration
and the media regarding the War in Iraq, in which the White House, after initial success,
was increasingly unable to dominate the framing effort to the public.

1

James Fearon, in contrast, focuses on the perceptions o f the domestic political
audience and how they can shape national security decsions.

According to Fearon,

leaders will view decisions as having varying “audience costs,” and decisions on when,
if, and how to pay those costs will impact decsion making.124 This helps Fearon to deal
with the question o f how states choose to engage in conflict when there may appear to be
other solutions available. The perception o f the leader making the choice, according to
Fearon, might be that all options have been exhausted.125 Hindrances to the decision
making process can include perception o f the time and political and economic price o f
mobilization. Questions o f national honor and political price can also come into play,
and this is borne out in the Kosovo case study, in which it can be argued that the U.S. was
shamed into its reaction to Serbian attrocities by a failure to act in the case o f the
Rwandan massacres o f 1994-1995 as well as the previous events o f the Yugoslav Civil
War.
Lawrence Freedman provides background for a discussion on how to frame
conflicts with “On War and Choice.” The author expands the concept o f wars being o f
choice and o f necessity, reaching back to medieval philosophers such as Maimonides,
who predated the discussion with his concepts o f obligatory and discretionary W ars.126

123 Glazier, Rebecca A., and Boydstun, Amber E. “The President, the Press, and the War: A Tale o f Two
Framing Agendas.” P olitical Communication, 29:4 2 8 -4 4 6 ,2 0 1 2 . 428.
124 Fearon, James D. “Dom estic Political Audiences and the Escalation o f International Disputes.” The
Am erican P olitical Science Review. Vol. 88, N o 3., September 1994, 577-592. 577.
125 Ibid. 577.
126 Freedman, Lawrence “On War and C hoice.” The N ational Interest, May/June 2010. 9.
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Freedman takes the view that a humanitarian style intervention would contradict the
rabbinical concept that wars o f discretion, or choice, would be inherently offensive.127
The case studies will demonstrate, however, that the rabbis were most likely correct in
their assumption, since each o f the examined studies involved offensive action for
humanitarian goals. This argument is continued in two presentations for the American
Political Science Association, in which John Schuessler noted that a war can be justified
when it can be shown to be defensive in nature (or o f such impact to national security that
an offensive is required), cheap, and easy to win, and that decision makers create such
perceptions successfully in cases where interventions take place.128

This type o f

salesmanship, according to the author, is particularly difficult for the U.S., which is an
insular power which faces few threats o f direct attack.129
In Selling a “J u st” War: Framing, Legitimacy, and U.S. Military Intervention,
Michael Butler uses a series o f case studies to examine how U.S. national authorities built
support for both kinetic and humanitarian interventions from the end o f the Cold War to
the invasion o f Iraq in 2003. While it most closely supports the Kosovo case study, the
book provides useful insights to the concept o f framing and how it is tied into the
decision making process. This book is the only work identified in this literature review
which implicitly ties national security decision making on the decision to intervene with
the requirement to explain the decision to a wide variety o f audiences, in other words, to
frame policies.

127 Freedman. 10.
128 Schuessler, John. “When Wars o f N ecessity Becom e Contested as Wars o f C hoice.” Presentation for the
American Political Science Association, September 2-5 2004. 2.
129 Schuessler, John. “N ecessity or Choice? Securing Public Consent For War.” Presentation for the
Midwest Political Science Association, April 15, 2004. 9.

53
For Butler, the crux o f the argument reaches back to just war theories, and the
ways in which interventions can be framed to play to the core liberal underpinnings o f
U.S. philosophy and foreign policy.

Framing an action as just, righting a wrong, or

protecting the innocent are all tactics that were used in framing the Kosovo crisis as well
as the other interventions in the case studies. For frames to work, they must be credible,
salient, and dynamic, and the Kosovo intervention is examined as a series o f presidential
speech actions emphasizing all o f these points.130
Admiral James Stavridis, a noted military advocate o f and expert on Strategic
Communication (SC), adopts a military approach, noting its power as an enabler for
operational forces.131 He acknowledged the role o f the national security apparatus and
entreated leaders to “take an early and persistent role in deciding how ideas and decisions
are shaped and delivered.132 For Stavridis this need required a shared understanding o f
what SC is and is not, particularly in an international context.133 This is re-enforced by
Joseph Nye, who in Soft Power, warned that “A communications strategy cannot work if
it cuts against the grain o f policy,” reiterating the need for coordination o f messaging at
the highest levels.134 Further discussion is provided by Christopher Paul’s Strategic
Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates from 2011 in which he notes
that a successful framing or communication strategy calls for synchronizing messages

130 Butler, Michael J. Selling a "Just" War: Framing, Legitimacy, a n d U.S. M ilitary Intervention. N ew
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 156.
131 Stavridis, James G. "Strategic Communication and National Security." Joint Force Q uarterly, 2007: 47. 4.
132 Ibid. 4, 7.
133 Ibid. 7.
134 N ye, Joseph. Soft Power. N ew York: Public Affairs, 2004. 110.

54
with deeds.

Mari Eder also echoes this entreaty in Leading the Narrative, the Case fo r

Strategic Communication.136
In a Strategy Research Project for the Army War College, Colonel Jeryl
Ludowese examined the interagency process, specifically as it related to SC, and offered
several relevant recommendations and solutions. He notes that the U.S. Department o f
State sits at the pinnacle o f the SC Project, but echoed the opinions o f other contributors
to this review, namely that a common understanding o f the term must come before
meaningful collaboration is possible.137 His recommendation is for some form o f return
to something like the U.S. Information Agency to sit at the pinnacle o f the Interagency
SC process for all government communications efforts outside the U.S., and be led by a
i

government wide “Director o f Strategic Communications.”
Jeff Motter describes the framing o f the U.S. relief effort which followed the 2004
tsunami in Indonesia, noting the Samaritan, exceptional ist identity attributed to the effort
by the White House.139 For Motter, the case exhibits a wider U.S. effort to identify with
Muslim populations both in Indonesia and elsewhere, such as President Clinton’s
comments on U.S. actions in Kosovo and Bosnia as primarily protective o f Muslims.
Continuing the discussion o f the tsunami relief effort, Jaime Alvarado’s "New
Multilateralism in Action for Peace: A Case Study of the US - led Operation Unified
Assistance in the Asian Tsunami Disaster," describes the functioning o f the U.S. led

135 Paul, Christopher. S trategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, an d Current D ebates. Santa Barbara,
CA: Praeger, 2011. 8-9.
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138 Ludowese. 22.
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international relief effort for Indonesia in light o f U.S. efforts to foster security
cooperation in Asia following the September 11 terrorist attacks on US soil.140 The relief
effort is described as an overtly hegemonic act aimed at demonstrating that that the U.S.
was benevolent and could be a valued long term partner for countries in the region.141
Returning to the impact o f the media, Babak Bahador examines two factors in
relations to the U.S. Intervention in Kosovo. The first is the occurrence o f five event
spikes which inspired significant upticks in media coverage o f the crisis. The second are
five political events, and Bahador demonstrates the connections between the two sets o f
events, noting that in four out o f five cases, it was the media which built the frame for
intervention. In only one case did the government appear to build such a frame.
Bahador's purpose is to discuss the “CNN effect,” an argument that the media can
successfully own the debate on issues through the display o f unexpected, shocking
images which were used by the media to show shortcomings in administration policy
toward the Kosovo issue and the government o f Serbia.142 Interestingly, the one obvious
instance o f government framing dominance over the mainstream media networks was
during Operation “Determined Falcon,” a series o f exercises involving NATO air assets
in June 1998. This overt act successfully led the debate on the Kosovo issue while it was
underway.143
Continuing the media discussion, Adam Berinsky and Donald Kinder focused on
the Kosovo crisis and framing article addressing framing and the American public's

140 Alvarado, Jaime. "New Multilateralism in Action for Peace: A Case Study o f the U S-led Operation
Unified Assistance in the Asian Tsunami Disaster." G lobal E conom ic Review, 2007: 183-192.
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perception o f government policies and foreign po licy .144 The authors quote Gamson and
Modigliani, who describe a frame as “A central organizing idea or story line that provides
meaning to an unfolding strip o f events, weaving a connection among them. The frame
suggests what the controversy is about, the essence o f the issue.145 They also note
Entman's theory the media have taken on an increasingly independent framing role since
the end o f the Cold War bi-polar situation.146 These conclusions are based on an
experiment performed by the authors in which audiences were exposed to a series o f
controlled news articles on Kosovo, with the end result that readers took on the point o f
view that was fed to them in purposefully tailored news stories.
Literature Gaps Revealed: One gap is an explanation for the frequent disconnect between
U.S. public opinion and that o f policy makers and framers. The communication process
at the national level is also little discussed, as most o f the literature is focused on the
media as a receiver rather than how the government and elites act as providers o f
information.

This study bridges this gap by providing a theory o f the government

communication process and how the foreign policy community interacts with its
stakeholder audiences.

Butler is the only identified source who implicitly ties in the

decision making process to the framing or explanation process to try to build a coherent
picture o f the whole o f the process.
While downward information flow is a gap, upward pressure also requires further
explanation. While the role o f media as receiver is heavily covered in the literature, its

144 Berinsky, Adam J. and Kinder, Donald R. “Making Sense o f the Issues Through Media Frames:
Understanding the K osovo Crisis.” The Journal o f P olitics Vol. 68, No. 3, August 2006, 640-656. 640641.
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JA1 Press, 1987. 143.
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own role in driving foreign policy action is not a focus o f the sources reviewed. That role
fits into the decision making process as a whole, not the communication process, and will
be discussed in that light in the methodology and case studies.

Theme Five: The Case Studies - Somalia, Kosovo, Libya - and the Non-Interventions in
Rwanda and Syria

The purpose o f this section o f the literature review is to examine key works on
each o f the case studies to determine what gaps may exist in the writing, and how each
can shed light on the question o f if and how the strategic decision making process is
linked to the framing process for armed humanitarian interventions. The case studies are
based on primary source documents, including media articles and programs, polls,
memoirs, and testimony.

The sources examined in the study include some o f those

materials as well as analytic works which bring focus to the events examined.
David Halberstam examines the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations
with a focus on how each reacted to foreign policy issues.

He discusses the Bush

decision to intervene in Somalia and the resultant debacle which followed. He traced the
development o f humanitarian interventions which began shortly thereafter with Haiti and
culminated with the Kosovo intervention o f 1999. The author detailed the development
o f the Clinton foreign policy, which was primarily an adjunct to domestic political
concerns and an effort to capitalize on the so called “peace dividend” following the end
o f the Cold W ar.147 Halberstam’s analysis is augmented by that o f William Hyland, who
focused on Clinton’s political personality, which was primarily domestic focused, and
147 Halberstam, David. War in a Time o f Peace. N ew York: Scribner, 2001. 231.
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how that focus played out in foreign policy.148 Conflicts with senior military leadership
as discussed in theme two, and a relatively hands off Secretary o f State (Warren
Christopher) plus a prediliction to take events personally and apply an often innapropriate
domestic political frame were hallmarks o f the administration.
David Phillips provides a useful overview both o f the U.S. decision to intervene
in Kosovo and the interventions which both preceeded and followed it, namely Somalia,
Rwanda, and Libya. Primarily focused on Kosovo, the book discusses the lead up to the
Yugoslav Civil War as well as the role o f key personalities in pushing for the
intervention, most notably Madelaine Albright, General Wesley Clark, and Richard
Holbrooke. This fits with an overall discussion o f the key role o f individuals in forcing
key decisions to be made.

Further, Phillips disucces the impact o f the Somalia

intervention and the failure to intervene in Rwanda in terms o f the increased pressure that
placed on the Clinton administration to act in Kosovo.149 Finally, the author establishes
a rubric for armed humanitarian intervention, positing that there are only a set o f
definable circumstances under which such interventions should occur. He then applies
that criteria to the Libya intervention to describe how and why the Obama adminstration
intervened there.
In Waging Modern War, Wesley Clark discusses the development o f the
humanitarian crisis in the former Yugoslavia, tracing the change in the crisis as time went
on. While the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was portrayed primarily in security
terms this changed when Serbia cracked down on the province o f Albania.150 Clark led

148 Hyland, William. Clinton's World: Remaking Am erican Foreign Policy. London: Praeger Books, 1999.
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the NATO response which resulted from the successful framing o f the operation in
humanitarian terms. Madelaine Albright’s Madame Secretary and Richard Holbrooke’s
To End A War detail their own personal roles in the Somalia and Kosovo humanitarian
crises, supporting the argument that powerful spokespersons and strong individual
leaders can both sway the foreign policy process but can also impact the implementation
and positive framing o f armed humanitarian interventions.
In his second autobiography, Secretary o f Defense Robert Gates discusses his
career, with a focus on his tenure as Secretary o f Defense during the administrations o f
George W. Bush and Barack Obama. He provides significant insight into the National
Security decision making process which is in line with other authors in this review. He
notes, however, that the Obama White House had a very strong tendency to concentrate
power at its center rather than distributing decision making and authority outwards.151 He
goes on to note that this is a trend with antecedents to the Truman administration,
although that in the Obama White House it reached its peak to-date both in terms o f
power concentration and in military micro management.152 While his autobiography
focuses on decisions regarding the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, he also notes his strong
resistance to the intervention in Libya due to a combination o f his perceptions that the
American people were war-weary and that Libya posed no significant security threat to
the United States.153 While Secretary Gates did spend significant time on his dealings
with Congress, and discusses war weariness as a problem, there is little mention made o f
the process o f explaining his department’s decisions to the American people, particularly

151 Gates, Robert. Duty: M em oires o f a Secretary a t War. N ew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 288.
152 Ibid. 585-586.
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with decisions such as the Libyan intervention, and this leaves room for the proposed
research contribution o f this dissertation.
Nikolas Gvosdev directly examines the use o f humanitarian themes in the Libyan
intervention as well as the decision making process which led to the decision. He argues
that there was “little effort to portray twenty-first century Libya as a looming security
threat to the United States.” 154 For them, the administration’s embracing o f humanitarian
issues as the primary cause for intervention is a significant turn away from traditional
national security motives.155 In fact, significant administration leaders loudly noted the
lack o f security interest even while the intervention was taking place.

This implies a

serious disconnect amongst the key interagency foreign policy decision makers.
However, in citing the U.S. reaction to humanitarian crackdowns in Bahrain and
elsewhere, he does acknowledge that neorealist themes (especially oil resources) still
resonate,156 a point which would become more apparent when the Obama administration
attempted to justify an intervention in Syria in 2013.

Gvosdev notes that the

administration elected to portray the threat Gaddafi posed to his own citizens as the
primary justification for intervention.157 The Kosovo intervention, in particular, was, by
contrast, framed both in security and humanitarian terms. In fact, for Gvosdev, it is the
Kosovo intervention which marked the watershed between security focused framing and
humanitarian focused efforts.158 Gvosdev considers this fundamental switch to be a
move toward increased Wilsonianism and away from realism in U.S. foreign policy
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Taking a different tack, Pierre Atlas contributed “U.S. Foreign Policy and the
Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests ” for the Digest o f Middle East Studies.
This 2012 work claims that the contraction o f decision cycles caused by the rapid press o f
events in the spring o f 2011 was impossible for policy makers to adapt to.160 The result
was significant discord between the common threads o f U.S. policy, idealism and
realism, and a series o f decisions made with short term goals in m ind161 Ironically,
according to Atlas, it is the move toward an idealistic approach to Egypt and Syria, rather
than the realist approach to Syria and Bahrain, which is in discord with traditional U.S.
approaches in the region.

Atlas uses three key speeches by President Obama on the

Middle East and the Arab Spring to show how far along the idealist path the
administration has become. The vacillation between realism and idealism is also noted in
Pinto’s Mapping the Obama Adm inistration’s response to the Arab Spring, which notes
that the administration eventually came around to the idea that a different policy would
be needed for each Arab country, and that a one size fits all approach would not w ork.163
Atlas noted a continuing bi-polar struggle in U.S. foreign policy, between the
realists and the idealists. This theme recurs throughout the literature, and is most clearly
revealed by two separate cases, the Libyan armed humanitarian intervention, and the hard
handed approach the administration took to the spread o f the Arab Spring to Bahrain.164
In that case the administration gave Saudi Arabia the green light to intervene and
crackdown on dissent. The authors point out that the inclusion o f an idealistic strain into
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U.S. dealings with the Middle East is the incongruity, and represents an ideational change
in U.S. policy toward the region.
In Exit Gaddafi, Ethan Chorin describes the message development process for the
U.S. and its foundational claim that Gaddafi was a bloody tyrant who was about to launch
a massacre on a dissenting part o f his population. The discussion drew heavily on the
overall UN opinion that Libya’s failure to protect its people was a failure o f its
sovereignty that could only be rectified by the international community. In her speech of
March 2, 2011, Secretary Clinton noted her concern o f “ ...Libya descending into chaos
and becoming another Somalia.” 165
Chorin describes the internal gamut in U.S. interagency leadership statements as
shown by the gulf between the statements o f the White House and the Department o f
Defense as well as a bipartisan group in the NSC, the Senate and the House o f
Representatives who spoke out against the intervention, with oil being a key issue on
both sides o f the debate. Pro-interventionists noted the threat to Europe’s oil resources
and the loss o f investment opportunities.166 Chorin noted that the interagency conflict
between the Departments o f State and Defense was a deadlock, as a result o f which the
will and the plan for Libyan intervention would have to be constructed by powerful
spokespersons who could trump the bureaucracies, specifically discussing how Secretary
o f State Clinton became that person.167 The president was convinced over a three day
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period to switch his personal effort toward intervention. This hastened the passing o f
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 within weeks and facilitated the U.S.
intervention, in contrast with similar efforts which took months to construct, such as the
Kosovo intervention o f the 1990s.168
Chorin and Bruce Jones, who provided “Libya and the Responsibilities o f Power”
for Survival in 2011, note how the concept o f R2P was invoked in Libya by Washington
insiders who believed that “The will to humanitarian intervention, destroyed by Bush
administration actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, must be rebuilt.”

Secretary o f State

Clinton and Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice bore the burden o f selling R2P to the rest
o f the world as a justification for intervention.169 The two were joined, significantly, by
NSC Directors Samantha Power and Gayle Smith. Their collaboration seems to be a
successful example o f interagency cooperation, as they joined Rice and Clinton as the
leading government hawks on intervention, convincing others to fall into line both by
appealing to humanitarianism and by noting the benefits that intervention would provide
to U.S. standing in the Arab world, according to Chorin.170
Mir Sadat examines the overall U.S. approach toward the Syrian revolution and
potential interventions there. It progresses in a similar fashion to the Atlas article, but
with a direct focus on the situation in Syria and developing U.S. responses to it. The
article points out the significantly different operational, strategic, and diplomatic
environment in Syria as compared with Libya and Egypt, which had completely different
historical relations with the U.S., and did not have great power support (in the form of
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Russia) in the sense that Syria does.171 The authors concur with other contributors in that
the U.S. has been forced to modify its approach toward each o f the different countries
impacted by the Arab Spring. Overall, the article recommends diplomatic versus military
approaches to the problem.
Maria Pinto echoes others in this examination o f the U.S. response to the Arab
Spring, with a focus on the civil war/revolution in Syria.

The U.S. is described as

ambivalent and reflective o f an overall decline in U.S. power and status in the Middle
East, and by inference, worldwide.

Comparisons and criticisms are made o f the

ambivalent policies o f the U.S. in Egypt and Syria versus the forceful and violent stance
taken in Libya. According to the author, the U.S. was forced to realize that a regional, or
general solution would not work, and that responses to the Arab Spring events would
have to be done on a country by country basis. This article will be useful in helping to
explain the variance in U.S. responses to the Arab Spring events. Finally, Emily Parker
addresses one o f the fundamental issues o f this study, namely, why was the
administration unable to secure an intervention for Syria when it had previously in
Libya?

I 7T

Several reasons are given, including the different strategic situation as well as

the simple fact o f “war fatigue” in a country which is still bogged down in several wars at
the time o f writing.

171 Sadat, Mir H. “U.S. Foreign Policy Interests Toward Syria: Balancing Ideology and National Interests.”
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The Review in Review

This literature review brought together a disparate set o f criteria and arguments
about the decision making process, framing, strategic communication, and the definition
o f humanitarian intervention. The works have been linked to each other by theme, and
organized in support o f an interagency examination using the Allison/Yetiv/Brendon
models to determine when, if, and how the interagency decision making process was
effective, and, if not, why. This was combined with an effort to understand issue framing
and how armed humanitarian interventions were sold to critical stakeholders, such as the
U.S. public. Extant literature on the interagency strategic communications process was
examined, with particular emphasis on the efforts o f very senior leaders to sway the
process. This research also explained the interagency strategic communications process
and how interagency discussions are used to frame issues for public and international
consumption.
The result o f this effort is there are few direct observable ties between the
decision making process and the framing effort in the literature. There are significant
conflicts between key interagency institutions and leaders which make consistent
planning and messaging difficult. This appears to enable powerful personalities to make
their wishes realities in terms o f crafting responses to crises. Inferred, however, is the
difficulty in synchronizing messages, or making “actions and deeds match” in such a
decision making environment.

The case studies, and particularly the primary source

materials which comprise them are intended to help bridge this gap in knowledge, as will
be

discussed

more

fully

in

the

research

findings

section

of

the

study.
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CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to examine the decision making and framing
processes for armed humanitarian interventions by the United States o f America in the
post-cold war era to determine the impact o f powerful individual leaders on both. As
noted in the introduction the study will apply a series o f questions to determine this,
including: How did such a change in U.S. policy making and political reasoning come
about? What was the decision making process which led to the decision to intervene, and
to explain that intervention in humanitarian, rather than U.S. security terms? Was it the
result o f a deliberative staff process, or that o f the influence o f a few key individuals?
Furthermore, if the process recommended armed humanitarian intervention in some
cases, does it always work? How does the decision making process used in each o f the
selected

case studies o f armed humanitarian interventions, such as the Somalia

intervention under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton, the 1998 Kosovo
intervention, and the 2012 Libya intervention by U.S. forces compare with the others and
with cases in which no intervention was undertaken? Furthermore, why did some efforts
to frame interventions through a framing or strategic communications process succeed
while others failed? And were those processes o f deciding and framing linked?
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As noted in the introduction, the hypothesis for the study is that armed
humanitarian interventions occur when a powerful leader or small group of leaders
dominates the decision making and framing process to force and explain such an
intervention. In each o f the empirical case studies we will seek to identify the decision
making process which led firstly to the decision to intervene, and secondly to articulate
that particular armed intervention in humanitarian, rather than other security terms.
Research questions for each o f the case studies are firstly, was the decision to intervene
the outcome o f a deliberative staff process, or that o f the influence o f a few key
individuals?

Drawing on the theoretical frameworks provided by Allison and others,

such as the models o f governmental politics as discussed in Essence o f Decision as well
as theories o f framing and strategic communication as discussed by Entman in
Projections o f Power, the study will seek to confirm the hypothesis that strong individual
leaders build consensus for, and frame, armed humanitarian intervention efforts.

Results o f the Literature Review, a Summary

The literature review sought to identify, consider and bring together a disparate
set o f criterion and arguments about the decision making process, framing, strategic
communications, and the definition o f armed humanitarian intervention. The reviewed
works were linked to each other by theme, and organized in support o f an examination to
determine when, if, and how the interagency decision making process was effective, and,
if not, what factors caused the differences for each situation as well as an effort to define
media and communication framing and how armed humanitarian interventions were
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framed and marketed to critical stakeholders to generate support for intervention. Extant
literature on the interagency strategic communications process was examined, with
particular emphasis on the efforts o f very senior leaders to sway the process.
The review highlighted the fact that there is little direct tie between the decision
making process and specific framing efforts. There are significant conflicts between key
interagency institutions and leaders which make consistent planning and messaging
difficult. This appears to enable powerful personalities to make their wishes realities in
terms o f crafting responses to crises. Inferred, however, is the difficulty in synchronizing
messages, or making “actions and deeds match” in such a decision-making environment.
With this in mind, one major task for the dissertation is to help to fill that literature gap
through the use of case studies on key interventions, as discussed below.

Overview o f Approach

The emphasis o f the research will be on a qualitative study based on primary sources,
books, articles, public sources, and, where possible, on primary, on the record interviews.
The methodology o f the dissertation is as follows: An examination o f U.S. government
interagency foreign policy decision making processes, as well as the framing
development process; continuing into an examination o f bureaucratic decision making
theories, particularly those proposed by Allison in Essence o f Decision; and moving into
case studies which will bring the decision process and messaging cycle into focus.
The research methods used for this dissertation are primarily qualitative in nature,
relying on analysis o f case studies for analysis due to the small number o f cases and the
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nature of the data to be analyzed in order to ascertain the impact o f key leader actions on
the decision making and framing processes. During the course o f the literature review,
the author looked for the ways in which each author sought to engage the extant literature
and theories to the work, as well as the purpose o f the work and the approach taken to
achieve that purpose. The design and findings o f each study was examined as well as the
methods, and instruments used in analysis.

Definitions

Common definitions o f key terms such as armed humanitarian intervention and
strategic communication and framing are necessary in order to narrow the focus o f the
research and provide a common framework for discussion in the context o f this research
project:
A:

Armed humanitarian intervention, as defined in the extant literature, refers to “A

coercive action by one or more states, in the legitimate context o f an international
organization, involving the use o f armed force in another state without the consent o f its
authorities, and with the purpose o f preventing widespread suffering or death among the
inhabitants.” 1 This could take the form o f the use o f armed forces to enter a sovereign
territory for the purpose of protection o f the human security o f the inhabitants. It could
also be to provide relief after a natural disaster or to protect one part o f a populace from
another, or from the government o f the territory in question. The author’s addition is that
wide scale combat operations must be associated with the intervention for it to qualify.

1 Pape, Robert A. "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard o f Humanitarian Intervention." International
Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 41-80. 44.
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For example, the Haiti intervention of 1994, while involving forced entry by combat
forces, did not result in significant combat operations, and varied only in small ways from
the later 2010 earthquake intervention in the same country.2
B:

Framing and strategic communication refer to the processes by which policy

makers explain their actions and build credibility for decisions with their various
stakeholder groups, but, with a focus for this project on three key groups, Congress, the
Media, and the American people.

Building from the military doctrinal definition o f

strategic communication (since 2013, the term has been changed to Communication
Synchronization), it is defined as ensuring that words and deeds match, and that cross
•5

government messaging is fully coordinated.

Framing is based on Entman’s “Cascading

Network Association Theory” .4 Since the government remains the primary source for
information, this creates a system o f asymmetric interdependence, but this can only be
taken advantage o f if there is unanimity in the message. Further, conflicting frames can
be provided not only by the media, but by the party out o f power and a variety o f other
formal and informal actors.
C:

The “Powerful” or “Dominant” individual is someone whom Byman and Pollack

would call a “Statesman.” While the president sits at the peak o f the decision making
apparatus, and his power is undisputed, the term powerful or dominant, for purposes o f
this study, refers to a member or group o f members o f the decision making process who
are A:

Politically powerful, either because o f their position in the cabinet, or other

2 U.S. Department o f State O ffice o f the Historian. “Intervention in Haiti, 1994-1995.”
http://history.state.gov/m ilestones/1993-2000/haiti. A ccessed on 29 July 2014 at 0942.
3 Paul, Christopher. Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, an d Current D ebates. Santa Barbara,
CA: Praeger, 2011. 8-9.
4 Entman, Robert M. Projections o f Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, an d U.S. Foreign Policy.
Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 2004. 9-13.
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unique access to the president; B: Are sufficiently motivated by a particular cause to use
their position to overcome the resistance o f other members o f the decision making
apparatus to convince the president o f the need to act; and C: Able to participate in
framing efforts to build support among the wider stakeholder audience for decisions.5
Yetiv notes that what he calls “Great Men” are a useful, but simplistic tool for analysis,
and this study acknowledges that and seeks to place the role o f these individuals into an
overall decision making context.6
D:

Foreign policy decision making: This includes planning and decision making by

the senior most levels o f the U.S. Government. For purposes o f this research, it refers to
the President o f the United States, the members o f the NSC, most important being the
National Security Advisor, the Secretaries o f State and Defense, and the Director o f
National Intelligence (or his predecessor, the Director o f Central Intelligence) and other
lead agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development. It also includes
key Congressional leaders and the leaders o f subordinate organizations such as the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations, Ambassadors abroad, and military Geographic Combatant
Commanders (GCCs).

As provided by Graham Allison in Essence o f Decision, two

primary foreign policy and decision making concepts will be used to develop arguments
on the role o f the individual in decision making, and the resultant framing o f
interventions:

5 Byman, Daniel L. and Pollack, Kenneth M. "Let Us N ow Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman
Back In." International Security 25, N o. 4 (2001): 107-146. 134.
6 Yetiv. 233.
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1.

Rational Actor Model (RAM): Under the RAM, government actors assign values
to their various courses o f action, and pick the action that had the highest utility or
payoff.7

2. Governmental Politics Model (GPM):

In the GPM, a nation's actions are best

understood through the prism o f the personal politics and negotiations o f key
leaders.

In this model even a shared goal can cause conflict because o f the

differing views o f leaders based on the points o f view o f their parent
organizations, personal interests, and backgrounds. In such an environment, even
a paramount leader, such as the president, must seek consensus with his
subordinates, if for no other reason than to prevent misunderstandings.8 This
invites a discussion o f the role o f transformational and transactional leaders into
the discussion o f decision making.

Description o f Data Collection Tools and Study Procedure

As stated in the introduction, the challenge for this study is to demonstrate the impact that
individual leaders have, or do not have, on the processes o f decision making and framing
as it pertains to U.S. armed humanitarian interventions. The literature review covered the
key sources to be used for analysis. The research will consist o f a qualitative study o f
those sources with emphasis placed on document studies, such as books, articles, public
sources; and primary sources, including on the record interviews if possible as well as
memoirs, first-hand accounts, and original reports. A review will be undertaken on the
7 Allison, Graham, and Zelikow, Philip. Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban M issile Crisis, S econ d
Edition. (Longman: N ew York, 1999). 19-21.
8 Ibid. 255-258.
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impact o f public statements on the decision making process to determine the impact o f
framing efforts on the decision making process and vice versa.

Statistics:

This study will rely on prolonged engagement and triangulation o f

sources in addition to positive and negative case analysis to ensure academic rigor o f this
research.

The stress is on a deep investigation o f the cases, or purposive/specific

sampling rather than random sampling. This is due to the small number o f cases to be
examined (Five cases, three interventions and two non-interventions address the
requirements mentioned previously). With this in mind, a deep dive, or saturation, o f a
small number of specific cases is more appropriate to the research.9 Each case will also
be subjected to a negative analysis in which reexamination o f each case will attempt to
determine if the themes which emerged from later cases apply to all o f them. Due to the
nature o f the data and the limited number of cases, quantitative statistical analysis was
not undertaken. The level o f rigor involved ensures that the results o f the research will be
transferable to other groups o f cases in which similar events and decisions occur. An
attempt will be made to identify, however tentatively, some o f these cases.
Data collection:

As previously described, data collection consists o f primary

source documents, books, peer reviewed articles, relevant media articles, and where
appropriate and possible, interviews with subject matter experts (non-participant
observation of conditions and processes relevant to the study) and participants in decision
making.

Archival research included both electronic and hard-copy issues o f relevant

journals, newspapers and other media and similar documents. There is a potential for

9 Padgett, D. K. Q ualitative methods in so cia l work research: Challenges an d rew ards. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1998. 52.
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incomplete records, recollections, and gaps in knowledge, however, the literature review
the depth o f research, and application o f critical thinking are designed to remove that risk.

Intellectual Models and Frameworks

The following models will be used to test the case studies to determine the validity o f the
decision making and framing processes while examining the role o f the individual in
these processes:

Graham Allison's Refined Models

Graham Allison contributed two models for decision making which are most relevant to
the research and were used to test the case studies. Allison’s work relies on the Rational
Actor Model (RAM) o f government politics, decision making, and group dynamics.10
The RAM posits that actors consider problems o f policy in terms o f largely implicit
conceptual models that have significant consequences for the context o f the thought. Its
core concepts include: The ranking o f objectives, discussion o f alternatives, attachment
o f consequences to the alternatives, and a rational selection o f the alternatives to act upon
based on required goal completion.11 Under the RAM, it is assumed that other world and
domestic actors will follow the same rational system o f decision m aking.12 Further
assumptions include the primacy o f unitary states as actors, and the perception of the

10 Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Philip. Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban M issile Crisis. Vol. 2.
N ew York: Longman, 1999. 13-16.
11 Ibid.
12 Bradford, Jeffrey Peter, “Political Aspects o f Strategic D ecision Making in British D efence Policy.” PhD
Thesis, Cranfield University, Royal Military C ollege o f Shrivenham, 1999. 9.
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international environment as a self-help based “Hobbesean jungle,” or anarchic world
with no higher authority to moderate state action.

11

In such an environment, it is assumed

that states will seek to act increase their security and power.
The second model to be used, underscored by rationality and the precepts o f the
RAM, is the Government Politics Model (GPM). In this model decisions are viewed as
“outputs o f large organizations functioning according to standards o f behavior.” 14 In this
model, outcomes will be influenced by organizational, not individual, dynamics and
cultures.15 The various bureaucracies which make up the decision making process serve
themselves first, then their higher authorities, which can cause the creation o f gaps
between the choices of leaders and the implementation capabilities and priorities o f
subordinate organizations.16 Information is not easily or efficiently shared, resulting in
potentially incomplete knowledge for decision makers. In this model even a shared goal
can cause conflict because o f the differing views o f leaders based on the points o f view o f
their parent organizations, personal interests, and backgrounds. In such an environment,
even a paramount leader, such as the president, must seek consensus with his
subordinates, if for no other reason than to prevent misunderstandings, and even a
president’s power may be curtailed by powerful subordinate bureaucracies.17
Because o f these limitations, the personalities o f key leaders and their propensity
to fight for their views or acquiesce, even to the paramount leader, are central.

This

model can be heavily influenced by the power o f key informed and motivated leaders to
obtain their desired outcomes. Crucial to the model is the idea that “the leader’s initial

13 Allison and Zelikow. 15-16.
14 Ibid. 143.
15 Ibid. 255.
16 Ibid. 257.
17 W oll, Peter. Am erican Bureacracy. N ew York: Norton, 1977. 206-207.
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preferences are rarely a sufficient guide for explanation or prediction.” 18 Bargaining
takes place amongst agencies o f varying relative power and interests, sometimes
crippling the ability to make rational choices.
In Explaining Foreign Policy, Steven Yetiv broadens the tools developed by
Allison by use o f a new case study, that o f the decision making process which surrounded
the U.S. armed rejection o f Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. One o f his refinements o f the
Allison models was a Theory o f Government Politics, by which key leaders acted as
“pied pipers” and brought others along with them through persuasive power, particularly
if the outlook o f and relationships among the group members were similar and strong.19
The facets o f Allison’s models, with Yetiv’s modifications, are shown graphically
in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1: Comparison of National Decision Making Models
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among all actors

Operational routines
are implemented.

Operational routines
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18 Allison and Zelikow. 259.
19 Yetiv, Stephen A. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. D ecision M aking an d the G u lf War. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. 120. Referring to the Fairy Tale Character who uses music to
entice children into follow ing him.
20 Bradford. 39.
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Yetiv’s model looks particularly useful for explaining the interventions in Kosovo and
Libya, in which powerful actors, even though not in paramount roles, formulated their
positions and drug other key leaders along, ultimately also participating in the public
framing o f the issues, although this is not discussed explicitly.

Similarly, the role o f

outside pressures, such as those generated from the international community, other great
powers, alliances such as NATO, and international organizations, particularly the UN, are
also not addressed.

Expectations Based on A llison’s Models

Case studies utilizing Allison’s models should reveal several points o f reference.
The first is that one would expect all decision making actors to be rational, and to assume
that other actors are also rational. The decisions made would resemble “outputs o f large
organizations functioning according to standards o f behavior.” Organizational, rather
than individual dynamics and cultures, will drive a bureaucratic decision making style.
The initial preferences o f leaders, where known, do not sufficiently inform the eventual
outcome, which is reached by a process o f significant bargaining, which occurs among a
variety o f agencies o f varying relative power and interests. Usually, these agencies are a
set group, including the office o f the president, the Department o f State (sometimes with
the US Mission to the UN as a separate actor) the Department o f Defense, and the
Intelligence Community. This bargaining may come at the expense o f rationality.
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Weaknesses o f Allison’s Model

The most important critique Allison models is that they were developed with a
hyper-focus on a single event, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and its sub events. Similarly,
Yetiv’s take on the Governmental Politics Model has a deep focus on the approach to the
first Persian G ulf War in 1990-1991.21 As articulated by Bendor and Hammond, it is
possible that the group o f people and the specific events used by Allison may simply not
be able to be replicated, thus making the work primarily descriptive rather than
prescriptive or theoretical.22 Jeffrey Bradford’s theoretical approach focused the use o f
repeated games to look at issues such as UK annual defense budget negotiations,
providing an additional counterpoint to Allison’s analysis. Bradford noted that Allison’s
original draft was handicapped by how recently it appeared after the events it described.
With this in mind, one purpose o f this dissertation is to assess the ongoing validity o f
these models.23
Other issues are raised as potential weaknesses. Unfolding events may prove to
be far more complex and far less linear that acknowledged by Allison. Further, operating
rules and may be more numerous and complex than individual actors can process. In
addition, the issue o f hierarchy, or how smaller decisions/influencers fit into a larger
picture, is not recognized in Allison’s work.24 Modem decision makers are not as
uninformed as assumed (and may be quite specialized, although sometimes in the wrong
ways) and modem bureaucracies are not as sluggish or staid as Allison proposed. Indeed,

21 Yetiv. 120.
22 Bendor, Jonathan and Hammond, Thomas H. "Rethinking Allison's Models." The Am erican P olitical
Science R eview 86, no. 2 (1992, June): 301-322. 302.
23 Bradford. 20.
24 Bendor and Hammond. 306. The term they use is “Single Time Period” organization.
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organizations can potentially bring more cognitive power to bear on issues than
individuals. Unlike states, which are viewed as unitary actors, decision making groups
are broken down into constituent groups, leading to questions o f similarity o f goals.25 A
further potential problem is the assumption that all players are rational, or if they will
ever have adequate information on which to base decisions.26 A lack o f clarity in the
model on the potential for multiple goals on the part o f a single actor provides a challenge
to Allison’s definition o f rationality, thus bringing the RAM into question.27 Finally, the
cases in Allison’s study appear to be closed loops, a situation which may expose a
potential flaw is Allison’s seeming presumption that decisions taken at key points in time
draw their decision cycles to an end.

This does not pay adequate note to the ongoing

impacts o f decisions, changes in circumstances, and the possible need for revisits o f the
same topics, which also points to events and crises as non-linear in nature.
A major criticism o f the GPM focuses on whether the highest levels o f the
government actually work in the manner described by Allison.

Bradford questions

whether goals o f leaders at the cabinet level are actually so disparate, and both whether
and why a president would have to bargain with his own appointees.29 A common thread
on this is that a president would try to avoid bargaining if possible, and that he would
normally be in a paramount position to implement his or her desired course o f action
without doing so.

25 Bendor and Hammond. 302.
26 Ibid. 305.
27 Ibid. 302-303.
28 Ibid. 303.
29 Bradford. 18.
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Between the Models: Linking the Foreign Policy Decision Making Process to Framing

The U.S. government uses an interagency process to decide on when and how the
nation will intervene abroad. At some point in this process, and not necessarily
concurrent to it, leaders frame and communicate their themes and messages concerning
their opponents and world events.

As noted in Christopher Paul’s 2011 Strategic

Communication, a successful framing or communication strategy calls for synchronizing
messages with deeds.30 Admiral James Stavridis, a noted military advocate o f and expert
on strategic communication, acknowledged the role o f the national security apparatus and
entreated leaders to “take an early and persistent role in deciding how ideas and decisions
are shaped and delivered.31 For Stavridis this need required a shared understanding o f
what strategic communications is and is not, particularly in an international context.32
This is re-enforced by Nye (2005), who warned that “A communications strategy cannot
work if it cuts against the grain o f policy,” reiterating the need for coordination of
messaging at the highest levels.

As noted by Rodman and others, based on the

personality o f a given president, and the constitutional seniority o f the various cabinet
members, the interagency process can be subverted by a powerful cabinet member.34
Constitutional seniority in this case refers to the legal hierarchy o f the cabinet, in other,
words, that a powerful Secretary o f State, the senior cabinet officer, will have more
influence than a CIA director, or the Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff. Well known
30 Paul, Christopher. Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, an d Current D ebates. Santa Barbara,
CA: Praeger, 2011. 8-9.
31 Stavridis, James G. "Strategic Communication and National Security," Joint F orce Q uarterly, 2007: 4-7.
4, 7.
32 Ibid. 7.
33 N ye, Joseph. Soft Power. N ew York: Public Affairs, 2004. 110.
34 Rodman, Peter. Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, an d the M aking o f Foreign P olicy from
Nixon to G eorge W. Bush. N ew York: Alfred A Knopf, 2009. 53, 55-57.
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examples o f this include the role that Henry Kissinger played in the Nixon and Ford
administrations, or that Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld played in
the Bush administration. Richard Holbrooke, Madeleine Albright and Hilary Clinton also
played this role in several instances, including the lead ups to the interventions in Kosovo
and Libya, but no similar leader, including Secretary o f State John Kerry, had the
political clout to carry the frame through in regards to Syria or with Russia over the
Ukraine. Inordinately strong leaders can either enhance or limit the effectiveness o f the
NSC and the interagency community to develop effective plans, to communicate them, or
to get their plans cleared through the president.35
Even without the interference o f personalities, however, a significant source o f
friction and conflict in the decision making process is the radically different institutional
mindsets o f the various interagency players, most specifically the Departments o f State
and Defense.

A key point here is the ongoing gap in funding, crisis response

methodologies, training, outlook, and expectations between these two most significant
stakeholders in the decision making process, making such a process difficult to
implement.36 Where only one o f the leading policy development organizations pushes a
program, it is not likely to succeed, but when a key leader can convince other
organizations, action becomes more likely. This would have ramifications for the attempt
to intervene in Syria, since none o f the cabinet leaders were in favor o f military action.

35 Nye. 29.
36 Deutsch, John. "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process." In K eeping the Edge, edited
by Ashton Carter, 276-284. Harvard: Kennedy School, 2000. 270.
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Framing and the Entman/Castells Model

Robert Entman provided a model for framing in Projections o f Power, noting that
the purpose o f a frame is “to generate support or opposition to a political actor or
policy.”37 This is what he calls the “Cascading Network Association Theory” .38 Since
the government remains the primary source for information, this creates a system o f
asymmetric interdependence, but this can only be taken advantage o f if there is unanimity
in the message, particularly in a media environment which is prepared to conflate news
with entertainment.39

Manuel Castells drew upon and added to the concept in

Communication Power, most particularly in his writing concerning Networks o f Mind
and Power.

For this concept, Castells draws significantly on the models o f framing

developed by Robert Entman, who focuses attention on the efforts o f the Government to
frame key events, and the media’s countervailing efforts to “counter-frame” them.40 A
graphic depiction of Entman’s theory, showing the downward impact o f framing and the
upward, communicative impact o f stakeholders on decision makers, is shown in Figure 2
on the following page:41

37 Entman. 47.
38 Ibid. 17-21.
39 Bennett, Lance, and Entman, Robert. M ediated Politics: Com munication in the Future o f D em ocracy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 166.
40 Entman. 17-21.
41 Ibid. 10.
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Figure 2: Network Activation Theory
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In the graphic above, the downward hollow arrow lines show the cascade o f
information downward, while the upward lines show feedback mechanisms in the
process. According to Entman, the government is generally successful in framing when
it can call on shared themes and ideals and get its themes in “early and often.”42 Yetiv
provides an example o f this theory in action by describing the methodology used by Bush
in constructing an image o f Saddam Hussein (who, in the summer o f 1990, had just
invaded and occupied Kuwait) as a new Hitler, and the overwhelming need to confront

42 Entman. 10.
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him rather than face a “New Munich,” implying that appeasing, rather than opposing
Hussein would have the same dire consequences that appeasement had in 1938, after
which general war followed within a year.43
Castells’ work focuses on a variety o f communications issues, noting that power
is based on the ability to form, shape and adjust networks and messages. This is referred
to as “network power,” which he calls the power to modify, change, or create networks 44
To Castells, power lies within networked systems.

Their operations, the interplay

between them, and switching between them is a source o f power to those who are able to
implement the change. This ties directly back into the concept o f framing, which can
always be done by those with the power, information, and interest to do so.45 According
to Castells, “The framing o f the public mind is largely performed through processes that
take place in the media. Communications research has identified three major processes
involved in the relationship between media and people in the sending and receiving o f
news through which citizens perceive their selves in relation to the world: agenda setting,
priming and framing.”46 With that in mind, agenda setting seeks to delineate the terms o f
acceptable debate, while framing describes the manner in which the coverage provided
emphasizes desired aspects o f events in order to reach desired interpretations and
outcomes.47 Castells states that “Only those frames that are able to connect the message

43 Yetiv. 94-95.
44 Castells, Manuel. Com munication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 45.
45 Nanabhey, Mohammed. "From spectacle to spectacular: How physical space, social media and
mainstream broadcast amplified the public sphere in Egypt's 'Revolution'." The Journal o f North African
Studies. 2011: 573-60 3 .5 7 7 .
46 Castells. 157.
47 Ibid. 158.
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to pre-existing frames in the mind become activators o f conduct... by finding resonance
and increasing the magnitude o f their repetition.”48
In the cases to be examined, the government is the organization with the power
and interest to establish, maintain, and capitalize on the power o f communication
networks in order to frame the debate on armed humanitarian interventions, and to
persuade stakeholders o f the need to intervene. Carrying this argument one step further,
it is highly placed, powerful individual actors who create the frames used to encourage
intervention. According to Alex Mintz, decisions are “sold” to the public, or framed, in
order that elites and decision makers can enhance their political standing and popularity,
naturally preferring to have more support than opposition in the process.49 Further,
conflicting frames can be provided not only by the media, but by the party out o f power,
which has significant implications for the Libya case study and others.

Expectations Based on the Entman/Castells Model

A model drawing off the work o f Entman and Castells would expect to see a
concerted, planned effort by senior decision makers to set the terms o f public discourse
on a given issue, and to capitalize on the government’s unique position as a single source
for definitive information on key foreign policy and defense issues. Influencers outside
o f the foreign policy decision making process would be counteracted and refuted in order
to maintain information primacy. Narratives would attempt to draw simple parallels to
historical examples, not always contextually relevant, but well known and inflammatory
48 Castells. 158.
49 Mintz, Alex. U nderstanding Foreign P olicy D ecision Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2010.
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at times.

Control or influence on information networks would be established and

increased so that messaging could be enhanced.

Weaknesses o f the Entman/Castells Model

The Entman/Castells model describes a process by which power holders and
decision makers monopolize information and attempt to use that monopoly to frame key
issues both to enable decision making and to justify decisions that have been made.
However, neither model describes the how o f that process. Castells’ is criticized for two
reasons. The first is because o f the negative linkages he draws with framing, network
power, and free market capitalism however, the political side o f his model is not central
to its contribution in this case.50

The Combined Decide/Frame Model, Expectations, and Challenges

Inductive reasoning was used to develop the grounded theory on decision making
and framing employed in this study.

According to Strauss and Corbin, “A grounded

theory is one that is inductively derived from the study o f the phenomenon it represents.
That is, it is discovered, developed, and provisionally verified through systematic data
collection and analysis o f data pertaining to that phenomenon.”51

Based on the

hypothesis that armed humanitarian interventions occur when a powerful leader or small

50 Taffel, Sy. “Manuel C astells’ Communication Power.” M edia Ecologies.
http://m ediaecologies.wordpress.com /2010/05/31/manuel-castells-com munication-power/. A ccessed on
July 10, 2014.
51 Strauss, Anselm and Corbin, Juliet Basics o f Q ualitative Research Techniques an d P rocedures f o r
D eveloping G rounded Theory (2nd edition). London: Sage Publications: 1990. 23
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group o f leaders dominates the decision making and framing apparatus to force and
explain such an intervention, it is necessary to construct a theory that explains the
concurrence or nexus o f the decision making and framing processes.

Relying on the

literature review and a thorough examination o f the Allison, Yetiv, Entman, and CastelFs
models, the following theory was developed and will be tested by the case studies; it
could be suggested that when the foreign policy decision making process is dominated by
powerful individuals with a motivation toward intervention, and the framing process is
dominated by the

same or similarly minded individuals,

armed humanitarian

interventions take place driven by this alignment.
A deciding and framing model would expect to see the decision making process
dominated by key stakeholders with powerful interests in a given issue formed by their
own experiences and pressures on them formed through their own participation in events,
both in forcing a decision on a given issue (in this case, armed humanitarian
interventions) and in framing that process and the associated decisions to the various
stakeholders (in this case, the public, through the media). Such an explanatory model
will face the same challenges that have been posed to its constituent models, however, it
is believed that by unifying the two key processes (deciding and framing) into a single
model, that weakness can in part be overcome. That, then, is the purpose for this study.

Case Studies and Case Study Selection

The method o f research agglomeration for this dissertation is selective sampling.
Under selective sampling, a thorough literature review, which has been performed, is
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used to illuminate the various items (in this case, events) which form the overall sample,
and to infer the strongest examples to be examined. While less than ideal for quantitative
studies,

purposeful sampling is a key element in qualitative studies such as this

dissertation. In part, purposeful sampling was selected because o f the very small size o f
the overall sample.

As seen above, fewer than twenty total events, or cases, can be

examined. Furthermore, the nature o f the evidence to be analyzed, books, memoirs, and
primary source documents lend itself to a purposeful sample. The cases also have similar
background conditions, helping to control for third variable influences, or at least to
acknowledge those differences, while avoiding the pitfalls and narrowness inherent in a
single case study approach.53 Finally, as Stephan van Evera notes, case studies can go
farther in answering the question o f how variables impact on each other more readily than
quantitative tests.54

Explanation o f Related Variables

Along with explaining why certain methods are used in the study, it is important
to discuss variables, theories, and case studies which were not used in the study, and why
they were judged to not be central to it. This will demonstrate the rigor o f the research as
well as the durability o f the theoretical model described in the previous section, while
incorporating or explaining competing factors in the decision making and framing
processes.

52 Creswell, John W. Research Design: Q ualitative an d Q uantitative A pproaches. London: Sage
Publications. 1994. 119.
53 Van Evera, Stephen. G uide to M ethods f o r Students o f P olitical Science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1997. 52-53.
54 Ibid. 54.
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The case studies were selected based on the following criteria:

First, each

intervention met the criterion established in the literature review, meaning that they were
military, combative interventions, against the will o f the host government, for purposes
named as humanitarian. The interventions all took place after the end o f the Cold War in
1991.

This allowed a focus on U.S. power and capability little constrained by other

powers, in other words, the so called “Unipolar moment.”55 In terms o f the case studies
adopted, it is clear that there are numerous interventions in the period from 1991 to 2014
that are not included. Notable U.S. interventions involving armed force in the period
include: The Bush-Clinton interventions in Somalia from 1991-1993 (used), the Haiti
intervention o f 1994 (not used), the Rwandan Genocide (referenced), the end o f the
Yugoslav Civil War (used in terms o f the lead up to the Kosovo crisis), the Kosovo
intervention (used), the interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003)(not used),
Pakistan Earthquake (2005 and 2010) (not used), Indonesian Tsunami relief (2004)(not
used), Lebanon and Georgia Non Combatant Evacuations (2006 and 2008)(not used),
Operation Tomodachi (2011) (not used) and the Libyan intervention o f 2012 (used). A
key to the major U.S. interventions is provided below.

Figure 3 below shows the

interventions, the years o f the operation, an area to note whether the operation met the
definition o f armed humanitarian interventions revealed by the literature review, and if
the intervention would be one o f the case studies for analysis.56

55 Krauthammer, Charles. “The Unipolar Moment.” Foreign Affairs, V ol. 70, N o. 1, America and the
World 1990/91. 23-33.
56 O f course key data points from interventions not used in the case studies will be cited where appropriate.
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Figure 3: List of Post-Cold War U.S. Humanitarian and Other Interventions
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Brief synopses o f operations included in this chart help to illustrate the main points o f the
interventions and why they may or may not have been chosen for analysis.
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Somalia 1 (1992) - Response to humanitarian crisis caused by failure and collapse
o f Somali Government. U.S. armed forces intervened as part o f a UN effort to provide
food, medicine, and humanitarian relief under President George H. W. B u sh .57
Somalia 2 (1993) - Mission morphed under President Clinton into a manhunt for
Somali Warlords, and failure in this effort led to shut down o f the mission.58
Haiti (1994) - This intervention was undertaken to remove the administration of
Raoul Cedras, which had overthrown the U.S. backed Aristide government. U.S. forces
did land to provide security and humanitarian relief, but the issue was resolved
diplomatically, and without significant use o f Force.59 Had the planned invasion taken
place, then this intervention would have been included in those being analyzed.
Bosnia (1992-98) - The Bosnian intervention took place near the end o f multi
year Yugoslav Civil War.

Operating under a UN Mandate, NATO forces arrived in

Bosnia to assist with peacekeeping following the withdrawal o f Bosnian Serb forces from
the country.60 Not included as a case study because the mandate was not humanitarian,
and did not involve significant U.S. kinetics.
Rwanda (1994) - The most important non-intervention in the last century. Ethnic
Rwandan Tutsis slaughtered over half a million Ethnic Hutus over the summer o f 1994.
In spite o f some pressure from the UN, the international community remained largely
inactive through the crisis.61

57 W eiss, Thomas G. Humanitarian Intervention. 2 ed. War and Conlict in the M odem World. Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2012. 30-31.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid. 10.
60 Hyland, William. Clinton's World: Remaking Am erican Foreign Policy. West Port, CT: Praeger, 1999.
33.
61 Hehir, Aidan. The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, an d the Future o f Humanitarian
Intervention. N ew York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 30-34.
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Kosovo (1999) - Provides one o f the case studies. Military force used for the
humanitarian purpose of protecting the Kosovar Albanians from Serb atrocities in winter
1999.62
Afghanistan (2001-2014) - Military intervention and occupation o f the country as
part o f the counter-attack following the 9-11 attacks. Although some disaster relief and
reconstruction activities have occurred since the invasion, in 2001, they were not the
purpose for the intervention, and Afghanistan was rejected as a case study because o f
this.
Iraq (2003-2010) - Military intervention and occupation o f the country for a
variety o f reasons, but with the stated objective o f ending the Hussein government’s
support o f terrorism and abrogation o f treaties on the development o f Weapons o f Mass
Destruction. Although some disaster relief and reconstruction activities have occurred
since the invasion, in 2003, they were not the purpose for the intervention, and Iraq was
rejected as a case study because o f this.
Indonesian Tsunami (2004-2005) - Response to this 2004 Earthquake and
Tsunami was provided by the armed forces, in part because o f the remoteness o f the
stricken areas and the unique transport and response capability o f the U.S. armed forces.
However, the operations were not inherently combative in nature, therefore, this
intervention will not be considered as a case study.
Pakistan Earthquake (2005) - Response was provided by the armed forces,
particularly given the proximity o f major combat operations in neighboring Afghanistan,
however, the operations were not inherently combative in nature, therefore, this
intervention will not be considered as a case study.
62 Phillips, David L. Liberating K osovo. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center, 2012. 90.
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Lebanon Non Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) (2006) - This operation
saw U.S. forces used to help evacuate U.S. Persons from Lebanon as a result o f the 2006
Hezbollah War. Since the purpose was specifically to evacuate Americans, and not to
impact the situation on the ground, this intervention was not considered for a case study.
Georgia NEO (2008) - This operation saw U.S. forces used to help evacuate U.S.
citizens from Georgia as a result o f the Russian invasion o f the country.

Since the

purpose was specifically to evacuate Americans, and not to impact the situation on the
ground, this intervention was not considered for a case study.
Pakistan Flooding Relief (2010) - Response to floods in the tribal areas o f
Afghanistan was provided by the armed forces, in part because o f the remoteness o f the
stricken areas and the unique transport and response capability o f the U.S. armed forces.
However, the operations were not inherently combative in nature, therefore, this
intervention will not be considered as a case study.
Haiti Earthquake (2010) - Response to the Earthquake in Haiti was provided by
the armed forces, in part because o f the level o f infrastructure damage o f the stricken
areas and the unique transport and response capability o f the U.S. armed forces.
However, the operations were not inherently combative in nature, therefore, this
intervention will not be considered as a case study.
Japan Earthquake (Operation Tomodachi) (2011) - Response to the earthquake in
Japan was provided by the armed forces, in part because o f the level o f infrastructure
damage o f the stricken areas and the unique transport and response capability o f the U.S.
armed forces. Furthermore, U.S. bases and personnel were impacted, and evacuation was
offered to all Americans who wished it. Since the purpose was specifically to evacuate
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Americans, with some lifesaving and search and rescue assets assisting the Japanese, and
not to impact the situation on the ground, this intervention was not considered for a case
study.
Libya (Operation Odyssey Dawn) (2012) - Provides one o f the case studies.
Military force used for the humanitarian purpose o f protecting the Libyan civilians,
particularly in the eastern part o f the country, from attacks by regime forces.63 This fits
the qualifiers for intervention set out in the literature review.
Syria (2013) - Syria is the second “nonintervention” to be considered. Syrian use
of chemical weapons provided the catalyst for significant debate and diplomatic
maneuvering surrounding a possible intervention in 2013, however, the intervention
never took place. This dissertation argues that one reason for this is that no powerful
leader emerged in support o f the intervention either in the decision making or framing
cycles.

By 2014, air strikes, not under humanitarian auspices, commenced against

Islamic State targets in Syria, but this also falls outside o f the types o f interventions
examined in the study.
With these thoughts in mind, three primary case studies have been selected for
analysis to help determine the role o f individuals in advocating and framing intervention
decisions. The chosen case studies were selected on the basis o f responses to natural as
well as man-made disasters, government threats to human life, and attempts at genocide.
They cover differing political administrations and one case study, Somalia, straddles a
change in political administration.

Geographic diversity is also ensured, with

interventions in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East selected for study. This will allow a
determination as to whether a particular region, ethnic, or religious group was treated
63 Hehir. 12-13.
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significantly differently.

The selected cases occurred during both Republican and

Democrat administrations and provide a balanced sample for analysis, helping to rule out
a partisan based intervention hypothesis.

The Rwanda non-intervention will also be

discussed since it provided the impetus for the development o f current definitions and
concepts of armed humanitarian intervention, while the decision not to intervene in Syria
in August 2013 will be discussed as part o f the findings.
Analysis o f the case studies focuses on the following questions and themes. How
did the case meet the criterion for humanitarian interventions as described in the literature
review? What is the timeline o f events, in other words, what caused the intervention, and
what were the key decision and framing points in time? What was the decision making
process? Was it implicitly tied into the framing process? Did the same people undertake
each?

Since the events examined take place in a time line, how did each armed

intervention, or decision not to intervene, impact future choices?

Limitations o f the Study and Intervening Variables

In examining the national security decision making and framing cycles, and the
impact o f the individual on them, there are several intervening variables which must be
acknowledged for their potential impact on both cycles and leaders.

Intervening

variables to be discussed are: War weariness, public distraction, the attractiveness o f the
international narrative o f R2P (where applicable in terms o f the timeline), the lack o f
attractiveness o f the narrative o f other frames, such as chemical weapons abuse,
geography and its impact on intervention, the timeline o f interventions, and the efforts o f
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allied or opposition countries to impact U.S. framing o f armed humanitarian intervention
efforts. The foundational beliefs o f leaders can play a role, with leaders drawing on the
Second World War era for their beliefs such as George H.W. Bush and Madeleine
Albright, saw appeasement as something to be avoided, whereas those o f the Vietnam
generation, such as Clinton, saw internal dissent and defeat as a bigger problem.64
Finally, the fundamental divide in America’s view o f itself as either a realist or liberal
actor on the world stage must be considered.65 The latter is, on one hand, a motivator for
the leaders analyzed in the case studies, but can also be a significant factor in the public’s
support for or rejection of an intervention. This, in turn, becomes a planning factor for
decision makers.
One intervening variable is the cumulative effect o f events outside o f the case
studies. War weariness, for example, or the internal focus o f the public following the
world financial crisis o f 2008 may be contributing factors in both the stance taken toward
intervention in Libya in 2012, and the lack o f interest in a similar intervention in Syria in
2013.66 Lack o f international support, or the active interference o f a great power, such as
Russia, China, or France, can also be a factor in decision making.
Further factors in the decision to intervene have included the discourse on
chemical weapons usage, particularly on civilians, as well as a broader academic and
practitioner discourse on humanitarian interventions in general, with a focus on R2P.
Chemical weapons have been a source o f international discussion and at least tacit

64 Albright interview on the McNeil/Lehrer Newshour, 10 June 1999. From Schnabel, Albrecht and
Thakur, Ramesh. K osovo an d the Challenge o f Humanitarian Intervention: S elective Indignation,
C ollective Action, an d International Citizenship. N ew York: United Nations University Press, 2000. 89
65 Kissinger, Henry. D iplom acy. N ew York: Touchstone Books, 1994. 43-45.
66 Dugan, Andrew. "Support for Syria Action Lower Than Past Conflicts."
http://w w w .gallup.eom /poll/l64282/support-syria-action-lower-past-conflicts.aspx. A ccessed on
September 25, 2013.
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agreement on their non-use since the First World War, while armed humanitarian
interventions are relatively new and require discussion in terms o f the narrative.

In

response to a series o f man-made humanitarian disasters after the end o f the Cold War,
the principal arose that the international community has a responsibility to protect the
lives o f citizens whose sovereign governments were unable or refused to do so. The three
principal events which brought this about were the killing o f over a million Rwandans in
1994, the breakup o f the former Yugoslavia from 1992 to the Kosovo air campaign of
1999, and the ongoing Darfur crisis.67 A codification o f the principal o f humanitarian
interventions came about as the result o f the 2000 UN Millennium summit, and the
subsequent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
which officially coined the phrase “Responsibility to Protect” in its final report o f the
same name.

R2P implies that the security o f individuals and groups o f people is

paramount over that o f the state, when that state fails to account for that security, or
actively acts against it.68 Utilization o f R2P provided networking power which enable
framing to take place in Libya, while chemical weapons failed to provide the same for
Syria.
Moral authority, or America’s self-perception o f its moral authority, as a final
intervening variable in the decision to launch or not to launch a armed humanitarian
intervention.

In “Necessity or Choice? Securing Public Consent for War,” John

Schuessler discusses this as a problem o f marketing, noting that the realist paradigm is in

67 Bellamy, A lex J. "The Responsibility to Protect," in Security Studies: An Introduction. N ew York:
Routledge, 2 0 0 8 ,4 2 2 -3 7 . 423.
68 Ibid. 424
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conflict with core American values.69 This poses a problem in that any intervention or
conflict must be framed to the American public as a war o f necessity, forced on the
nation by dire circumstances, or even by armed attack. When America acts, it should do
so not for low goals, but with the goal o f improving mankind’s lot.70 This is summed up
by a quote from John Mearsheimer:
“Americans tend to like (liberalism) because it identifies the United States as a
benevolent force in world politics and portrays its real and potential rivals as
misguided or malevolent.”71
It is this struggle between the moral and the realist that creates challenges for decision
making and framing. Richard Haass, writing in Wars o f Necessity and Wars o f Choice,
there is a significant burden on the government to prove the benefits o f its actions,
particularly when American lives are at risk. This adds to the burden o f both deciding on
and explaining armed humanitarian interventions, which are, in the end, wars o f choice,
rather than necessity. For Haass, the benefits o f such an intervention must outweigh the
costs, while the net result must be positive, “If this test cannot be met, the choice will
appear to be ill advised and most likely is.”72 Thus the “bang for the buck” test joins the
other tests, motivators, and detractors for intervention which must be considered when
examining each one, and which serve as intervening variables for the cases. In cases
where there was no decision to intervene, it is often because the cost benefit analysis, or a
perception o f that analysis, comes up negative, meaning that the human, monetary, and
political price o f armed humanitarian intervention is simply not worth the perceived

69 Schuessler, John. "When Wars o f N ecessity Becom e Contested as Wars o f Choice." In 2004 Annual
Meeting o f the American Political Science Association, 2004. 4.
70 Schuessler, 4.
71 Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy o f G reat P ow er Politics. N ew York. W.W. Norton and Company,
2001. 23-25.
72 Haass. 10.
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gains. The inference here is that framing acts o f choice, such as armed humanitarian
interventions, is a more difficult and time consuming act, less certain to succeed than is
the case in wars o f necessity.
A key point to be noted is that this study is focused exclusively on U.S.
government decision making and framing processes. That is to say that any linkage to
similar processes is coincidental. The nature o f the U.S. political system is especially
suited to the influence o f the types o f powerful leaders and framers discussed in the
study. That said, it is reasonable to extrapolate that, where conditions in the political
processes, institutions, and media o f other countries are similar to those in the U.S., the
lessons o f this study could apply.
The limitations presented do not detract from the value o f studying the role o f the
individual in foreign policy decision making and framing, whether for armed
humanitarian interventions or other foreign policy endeavors. Rather, they augment and
complete a picture o f the foreign policy and framing processes which has heretofore been
little explored. By bringing the literatures on decision making and framing together in a
policy environment, this study expands the overall body o f work on both fields, as well as
on the case studies themselves.

It also offers useful information to other researchers,

policy makers and practitioners. Applicable implications focus on the linkages between
policy making and framing, and the centrality o f powerful motivators/spokespersons to
each process.
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Conclusion

As will be seen in the case studies, the common factor underpinning each o f the
interventions discussed is the intervention and interaction o f key leaders who could both
push the decision making process and serve as spokespersons in successful efforts to
frame the interventions. Similarly, in cases in which intervention did not occur, there
was no clear spokesperson or mover with the political and framing cache able to provide
the vital impetus for action. Having discussed the main themes o f the literature on armed
humanitarian interventions, the foreign policy decision making process, and the framing
process, the purpose of this section o f the dissertation is to describe, in detail, the
theoretical arguments o f the dissertation, and to define the tests that will be undertaken
with the case studies to demonstrate the feasibility o f the proposed theories.
The purpose o f this research is to examine the decision making and framing
processes for U.S. armed humanitarian interventions in the post-cold war era to determine
the impact o f individual transformational leaders on both processes. This section o f the
study reviewed the hypothesis that interventions occur when a powerful leader or small
group o f leaders dominates the decision making and framing apparatus to force and
explain such an intervention, as well as the literature review which helped to frame it.
Key definitions, particularly o f armed humanitarian interventions derived from the
literature review were discussed more fully, while the choice o f qualitative over
quantitative analysis was both described and justified in light o f the small number of
cases and the nature o f the evidence, which is primarily anecdotal and not easily
quantified.

This section also discussed the cases, as well as rejected cases, and the
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rationale for their selection, noting a series o f intervening variables and their potential
impact on the findings. It also reinforced the utility o f the study and its potential value to
decision makers and other researchers.

Preliminary findings o f this study are that in

armed humanitarian intervention situations, the existence o f one or a few powerful
leaders are required in both the foreign policy decision making process and the media
framing process in order for such an intervention to take place.

Where no powerful

leader emerges to sway the opinion o f other leaders and bureaucracies, in either the
deciding or framing processes, interventions fail to occur.
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CHAPTER IV

THE CASE STUDIES

This section o f the study provides the data for examination according to the
standards set forth in the methodology section. It is divided into three sections, covering
the Somalia, Kosovo, and Libya interventions. The second section, on the interventions
o f the Clinton administration, is divided into two sub-sections, facilitating a discussion of
the non-intervention o f the U.S. in Rwanda and its impact on future armed humanitarian
interventions. As noted in the methodology, the case studies will examine the historical
and political contexts o f the events, the makeup and decision making processes o f the
administrations in question, the decision to intervene, framing and its impacts, and the
usefulness o f the selected models on the case. Finally, each study will note how the
intervention ended and if and how that end impacted future armed humanitarian
interventions.

Case Study 1: George H.W. Bush and the Decision to Intervene in Somalia, 1992

“The very real threat was that as much as one-fourth o f all Somalia could
starve to death before January, 1993.”
Dr. Phillip Johnston, Director o f Care, 1994.1

1 Johnston, Phillip. Som alia Diary: The President o f C are Tells One C o u n try’s S tory o f Hope. Atlanta, GA:
Longstreet Press, 1994. ix.
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In 1992, Somalia lay in ruins. Decades o f civil war, inspired by a mixture o f the
influence o f the Cold War, the rise o f militant Islam, and the international drug trade had
transformed the former Italian colony into the quintessential failed state. The epidemic o f
starvation which followed the end o f the civil war on 1991 was so bad that by September,
1992, the media were reporting that 100,000 out o f the population o f six million had died,
nearly half o f starvation, with an amazing, and staggering 95% suffering from some form
from illnesses related to malnutrition.2 In December, 1992, the U.S. intervened with a
massive military force designed at first to ensure safe food deliveries to the Somali
people, and to defend those food shipments in an extremely hostile environment.
The U.S. armed humanitarian intervention in Somalia began in December, 1992,
during the waning weeks o f the presidency o f George Herbert Walker Bush.

While

tragedy would strike the mission nearly a year later, with the battle o f Mogadishu (of
“Blackhawk Down” fame) and the graphic deaths o f eighteen U.S. soldiers, the focus o f
this case study is rather on the decision making process which led to the initial
intervention, an operation generally judged as a success in its mission to alleviate the
suffering, and in particular, the starvation, o f many o f the people o f Somalia.
The Somalia intervention, according to Andrea Talentino, marked the first
military intervention by the international community into a civil conflict since the end o f
the Cold War.3 This case study will describe the situation in Somalia which led to the
U.S. decision to intervene, as well as describing the processes both for deciding on
intervention and on the framing o f the intervention in humanitarian terms. It will also
2 Johnston. 2.
3 Talentino, Andrea K. M ilitary Intervention after the C o ld War: The Evolution o f Theory an d Practice.
Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2005. 95.

104
describe the role played by key empowered individuals in both decision making
processes. That process was dominated by President George H.W. Bush, and it is he who
was the powerful leader whose actions led directly to the intervention. Unique among the
cases examined, the Somalia intervention took place during a presidential election
campaign, and the incumbent, who lost, proceeded with the intervention with the
recognition and acceptance of his replacement, and undertook the operation during his
lame duck session with the knowledge that it could well continue into the Clinton
administration’s first term.

Somalia in 1992, Background to Intervention

The first major rumblings that there was an international crisis brewing in
Somalia came in March, 1991, with the announcement by Under Secretary o f State for
African Affairs Howard Cohen that Somalia was in the midst o f “civil strife.” 4 The U.S.
Embassy in Mogadishu had been closed down in February o f that year, with negative
impacts for information gathering both by the U.S. Government and the media on the
crisis.5 The greater conflict in the former Italian colony has its roots in the Cold War, and
is tied to the communist takeover in nearby Ethiopia. When that country’s pro-western
leadership was overthrown by communists in 1974, U.S. efforts in the region shifted to
support o f Sidi Barre’s regime in Mogadishu, and included military basing in the port o f

4 Rutherford, Kenneth R. Humanitarianism under Fire: The U.S. A n d UN Intervention in Somalia.
Sterling, Virginia: Kumarian Press, 2008. 14.
5 Sommer, John G., and Collins, Carole C. “Humanitarian Aid in Somalia: The Role o f the O ffice o f U.S.
Foreign Disaster Assistance (O FDA ) 1990-1994.” Refugee P olicy Study Group, Novem ber, 1994. 2. For
over a year afterwards, OFDA remained the only U.S. Government A gency to remain in country.
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Berbera through the end o f the Cold War.6 Barre had him self taken over by means o f a
coup in 1969, but he made some real progress in the development o f the Somali state,
driving up literacy and attempting to suppress clan-ism in favor o f a wider Somali
identity.

n

What he could not overcome, though, was the strong sense o f tribalism within

the country, as well as the pastoral nomadic system o f agriculture.8 With the ending o f
the Cold War, Barre proved unable to continue the suppression o f dissent in the country,
leading to a series o f coups and upheavals.
By 1991, the country was largely lawless. Mogadishu itself was wracked with
violence as two sub clans of the Hawiye clan, led by Mohammed Farrah Aidid and Ali
Mahdi Mohammed struggled for control.9

Aidid, the former foreign minister, and

probably the strongest of the warlords, harbored significant animosity against both the
universalist aspirations o f the United Nations in general and with Secretary Boutros-Gali
personally, since Boutros-Gali, an Egyptian, was in part responsible for Egypt’s strong
support for the former dictator Barre.10 With nearly all vestiges o f central government
gone, the countryside fell victim to the drought and desertification which had famously
afflicted Sudan and Ethiopia in the 1980s. Further, the epicenter o f the clan violence was
the main agricultural area o f the country, meaning that even food that could be grown
was either pillaged, not harvested, or not distributed.11 As a result o f these factors, a UN
report o f 22 July 1992 claimed that Somalia would not be able to grow enough to feed

6 Cohen, Herman. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacem aking in a Troubled Continent. N ew York:
St. Martin’s Press, 2000. 197.
7 Oakley, John L. and Hirsch, Robert B. Som alia an d O peration R estore Hope: Reflections on
Peacem aking an d Peacekeeping. Washington DC United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995. 5.
8 Ibid. 23.
9 Rutherford. 16.
10 Oakley and Hirsch. 19. He had served as Egyptian Foreign Minister and other positions before he
became Secretary General o f the UN in 1992.
11 Rutherford. 16-17. According to the author, only 15% o f the land in Somalia was arable in any case.
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more than half of its population for the following year.

19

Prices for food, when it was

available, had increased by 1,200%, putting the purchase o f food beyond the reach o f
many.13 Death therefore stalked the land, both in the form o f malnutrition and starvation
related illness caused by constant warfare amongst the tribes aspiring to take over the
country.
Early efforts by the UN to provide assistance to the people o f Somalia were
focused on food aid, and did little to attempt a political solution, which meant that, given
the lack o f force projection and protection capability on the part o f UN forces, both UN
and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) relief efforts came under frequent
attack. Clark and Herbst documented the following major attacks as listed in Figure 4:

Figure 4: Snapshot of Violence of Fall 1991
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12 UN Secretary General’s report S /2 4 3 4 3 ,22 July 1992. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/undocuments/document/Somalia% 20S% 2024343.php. A ccessed on August 20, 2014.
13 Natsios, Andrew. U.S. Foreign policy and the Four Horsemen o f the Apocalypse: Humanitarian R elief
in Complex Emergencies. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Washington
Papers, 1997. 21.
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Source: United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees Situation Report14

By 1992 it was becoming more and more clear that the United Nations and the
various members o f the NGO community were unable to adequately respond to the
Somalia crisis. By m id-1992, an estimated 3,000 Somalis were dying, primarily from
starvation, each day.15 Whereas such a crisis would have caused an outpouring o f civil
relief during the cold war, as seen by the response to the Ethiopia drought in the early
part of the 1980s, the end of the Cold War meant that a more potent, military backed
intervention might be contemplated. Furthermore, the desperate nature o f the situation,
and the failure o f the international relief community to ameliorate the crisis, left a
military response as the only solution which promised success.

The U.S. and the World in 1992, Context fo r Intervention

The central political fact o f the early 1990’s was the end o f the Cold War and the
increasingly unilateral role of the U.S. during an emerging unipolar moment.

An

optimistic mood prevailed, best personified by Francis Fukuyama’s The E nd o f History
and the Last Man, which appeared in 1992, and posited that the U.S. victory over
communism meant that liberal democracy had permanently displaced it. In this era o f
triumphalism, however, the country, and the world, were led by the same politicians who
had finished the Cold War, and were in fact still cold warriors.

This was borne out

through the first two years o f the Somalia crisis, 1990 and 1991, in which the U.S. had a

14 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Situation Report, Somalia Unit-Djibouti, October 31,
1991. In Rutherford. 17-18.
15 Sahnoun, Mohamed. Somalia: The M issed Opportunities. Washington, D.C: U.S. Institute for Peace,
1994. 15-16.
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consistent stance, namely, that the problems o f Somalia were internal in nature, and that
therefore, the U.S. would stay out o f them .16 In 1992, the U.S. was just beginning to
contemplate, if not to understand, the implications o f the end o f the bi-polar world that
was the product o f the Cold War, which had come to an end with the collapse o f the
Soviet Union the year before.
Washington was, in effect, left holding the bag for a world in which the control
and stability provided by bi polarity and the gravity o f the Cold War ideological conflict
was rapidly devolving. The centerpiece for this decay was not in Africa, however, but
the devolution o f the Yugoslav Socialist Republic into its constituent parts, and the
efforts o f the Serbian government in Belgrade to prevent this.

It was the breakup o f

Yugoslavia which most concerned the U.S. and its allies, as well as its former enemies, in
the first years o f the decade, and which received the most attention from the media as
well as politicians.
As important as the growing war in Yugoslavia was, there were a host o f other
international issues to occupy the Bush team through 1992. Russia, the former enemy o f
the Cold War, was also trying to adapt to the new reality, and efforts to assist the new
Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, to stabilize his country through economic measures
such as Most Favored Nation Status were priorities.17

The U.S. international aid

community was also focused on providing humanitarian assistance across the new states
which rose up across the former Soviet Union.

1ft

In the Middle East, Israel’s efforts to

absorb an influx o f Jews from the former Soviet Union caused demographic instability in

16 Talentino. 106.
17 Bush, George H.W. A ll the Best: M y Life in Letters an d O ther Writings. N ew York: Scribner, 1999,
2012. 396.
18 Sommer and Collins. 3.
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the region, while the development o f new settlements on Palestinian land caused political
upset.

lO

Even in Africa, there was competition for attention for the administration.

In

South Africa, the most important country on the continent, the political fallout o f the fall
o f the apartheid regime occupied significant attention.

In Angola, the post-Cold War

settlement was still working itself out in the form o f a continued civil war.

In

Mozambique, civil war also loomed as a major distractor for the administration. Even in
a year that was not going to be a “Year o f Africa” there was little reason to think in
January 1992 that by December Somalia would be a leading foreign policy issue with
U.S. troops on the ground.
In terms o f domestic politics, the impending November, 1992 presidential election
was the key event o f the year, with the slow crawl out o f economic recession a prime
issue.

As early as March, Bush expressed growing concern o f the right o f center third

candidate Ross Perot and his capacity to swing the election in favor o f a Democrat
challenger by stripping away Republican votes.

i

By May, Bush’s approval rating had

dipped down to 40%, while his disapproval rating had reached 53%.22 While Bush
dismissed fears o f Perot and disapproval at the time, his correspondence indicates that the
election came to take on increasing amount o f his and his team ’s time, particularly in the
critical period after the Democrat National Convention in July. Personnel changes came
along with this, most notably as James Baker, the capable Secretary o f State, was moved
to the more political position o f White House Chief o f Staff and senior counsel to the

19 Bush, 2012. 397.
20 Powell, Colin L. M y Am erican Journey. N ew York: Balentine Books, 1996. 559.
21 Bush, 2012. 403.
22 Powell. 553.
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president.23 Somalia became a key part o f the electoral debate, with candidate William
Jefferson Clinton accusing Bush o f a major foreign policy failure for choosing not to
intervene in either Bosnia or Somalia.24
One result o f the attempt to overcome the recession was a planned reduction in
the expenditures across the foreign policy apparatus. On one hand, the Department o f
State had cut back its funding and staffing o f embassies.25 The Chairman o f the Joints
Chiefs o f Staff Colin Powell reports that, in 1992, the Department o f Defense was in the
process o f a Post-Cold War draw down o f 25% o f its manpower.26 At the same time, it
was deeply involved in military assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, who were in the process o f
fighting off efforts by the Saddam Hussein regime to conquer their homeland. Indeed, in
spite o f its defeat and humiliation in the 1991 Persian G ulf War, Iraq remained a high
priority for the administration, and another potential distraction from events in Somalia.
In an era in which budgets still mattered, the Pentagon, which had already seen a billion
dollars siphoned off to Post G ulf War Operations in support to the Iraqi Kurds, was leary
of further potentially open ended and costly commitments. Whenever Robert Wolthuis,
Deputy Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Global Affairs, brought the money point up in
interagency planning meetings, he was countered by Cohen, who continually reminded
the group that Somalis were dying while they deliberated.27

23 Bush, 2012. 409.
24 Krieg, Andreas. M otivations f o r Humanitarian Intervention: Theoretical an d E m pirical Considerations.
Berlin: Springer Science and Business Media, September 3, 2012. 76.
25 Lofland, Valerie J. Somalia: U.S. Intervention an d O peration Restore Hope. Newport: The United
States Naval War C ollege, 2012. 55.
26 Powell. 548.
27 Poole. 9.
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The Bush Administration in Its Second Half, Leadership, Processes, and Strong
Voices

In Presidential Command, Peter Rodman gives us a snapshot o f an administration
that was the closest thing to a finely oiled policy making machine as any in U.S. history.
He describes the Bush leadership team as “the most collegial and smoothest run” o f the
administrations he reviewed in his study.28 The key leaders in the administration had
worked with one another before, and in varying hierarchical situations.

For example,

Colin Powell was National Security Advisor while Bush was Vice President, and Bush
had been Director of Central Intelligence when Richard Cheney was White House Chief
o f Staff.

According to Steve Yetiv, who covered the same team and their decision

making process for the First G ulf War, George H.W. Bush was one o f the most
knowledgeable and prepared foreign policy presidents in the history o f the Republic,29
noting that he was often better informed and educated on key issues than his cabinet
subordinates.30 On the other hand, while this was invaluable in the case o f the G ulf War,
it must be noted that none o f the senior members o f the administration were Africa hands,
and by natural processes this tended to push African issues down in level o f apparent
importance. Bush himself cites his military service as something which helped to inform
his decision making, and this is significant considering that he is the last U.S. President to
have served in combat.31 Bush’s leadership team were nearly all supportive o f him first

28 Rodman, Peter. P residential Command: Power, Leadership, an d the M aking o f Foreign P olicy fro m
Nixon to G eorge W. Bush. N ew York: Alfred A Knopf, 2009. 180.
29 Yetiv, Steve. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. D ecision M aking an d the G u lf War. 1 ed. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. 9.
30 Rodman. 180.
31 Bush, 2012. 441.
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and their bureaucratic identities second. The sense o f camaraderie and common purpose
among the Bush team were so strong that confrontations between them were inevitably
the result o f poor information sharing on decisions rather than on purposeful deception or
disagreement.32
Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s National Security Advisor, came to embody the position,
having held it before during the Ford Presidency. He is described as being wholly the
president’s man, but he was also an innovator, establishing the NSC Principals
Committee, which regularly consisted o f the full NSC without the president.33 Such a
gathering o f senior leaders allowed for stronger, more final results than the already
existing Deputies Committee.

Scowcroft also brought the intellectual strength and

organizational prowess to successfully help Bush to coordinate the activities o f his two
principal subordinates, Defense Secretary Cheney and Secretary o f State James Baker,
both o f whom were powerful personalities, but also known for their absolute loyalty to
the president.

Cheney, in particular, is described by Rodman as being “The classic

example of a cabinet secretary acting as the president’s man at the head o f his
department, imposing the president’s agenda, not as the spokesman to the president o f his
department’s institutional agenda.”34 Secretary Baker is seen in a similar light in terms o f
his loyalty to the president. Although by the time o f the events in question, Baker had
left the Department o f State, his temporary successor, Lawrence Eagleburger, continued
in a similar vein to his predecessor.
Jon Western, in “Sources o f Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and
Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia,” describes the main group o f
32 Rodman. 181.
33 Ibid. 183.
34 Ibid. 185.
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decision makers in the Bush Administration as “selective engagers” who were able to
build a frame o f the situation in Somalia as being based on such deep seeded historical
enmities that the U.S. intervention would be ineffective and dangerous.35 Because o f
their paramount positions in the administration, this group had superior access to
information and influence to get their point o f view across, and this explains why they
were able to delay their selection o f option to intervene. In this analysis, one reason for
the resistance to intervention by the administration was that, with the end o f the Cold
War, the Horn o f Africa, which had been a significant flashpoint in the struggle between
east and west, had significantly diminished in importance generally and as a threat to
U.S. national security specifically.

The opposing group, which eventually won out and

drove through the implementation o f intervention, are termed “Liberal Humanitarians,”
and include some in government but primarily the consist o f non-governmental
organizations focused on human rights and food issues. This argument concludes that it
was collusion with the media that allowed the liberal humanitarians to win out and secure
intervention on humanitarian lines.37
Key to any intervention would be the Department o f Defense (DOD). Following
the end o f the Cold War, the department was operating under the so called Powell
Doctrine, which was adopted from a similar Reagan era policy championed by then
Secretary o f State Caspar Weinberger.

Under this doctrine, the U.S. would only

intervene militarily in situations in which it could quickly commit overwhelming force on
a rapid timetable for mission completion and success.

Leaping into civil wars, or

35 Western, Jon. “Sources o f Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S.
D ecisions on Somalia and Bosnia.” International Security, Spring 2002, Vol. 26, N o 4, 112-142. 117.
36 Ibid. 118.
37 Ibid. 117.
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seemingly unending commitments, was anathema to the spirit o f the doctrine, and it was
adhered to adamantly by DOD officials until the remarkable turnaround o f November
1992.38 Even with the change in DOD opinion, the influence o f the Powell Doctrine is
still clearly visible in the form in which the decision to intervene was made, and its
mandate that the mission was only one o f providing food aid in Somalia rather than
acknowledging the political nature o f the disaster, and also in the initial proposal that the
intervention last no longer than Inauguration Day, January 20, 1993.39
The end o f the Cold War was also forcing a review o f structures, organizations,
and outlook in the Department, under the leadership o f Richard Cheney, as Secretary, and
Colin Powell, the Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff. There was a sense that the U.S.
should not “go it alone” in countering threats, but should do so as the leader o f a coalition
o f friends and allies. The Defense Planning Guidance for 1992 emphasized that the U.S.
must be willing to continue to provide the decisive leadership for such coalitions and
missions.40 This would be borne out when President Bush decided to intervene in
Somalia with a military force.

Who Is Behind the Wheel? Drivers fo r Intervention

In the early days o f the crisis in Somalia, leadership from within the Bush
administration was primarily provided by a group o f junior level leaders, primarily in the
Department o f State. Herman Cohen states that this was because o f an ongoing budget

38 Powell. 557.
39 Poole, Walter S. The Effort to Save Somalia. Washington D.C.: Joint History O ffice, O ffice o f the
Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, 2005. 2.
40 Cheney, Richard. In My Time: A P ersonal an d P olitical M emoir. N ew York: Simon and Schuster,
2011. 236.
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crisis and a feeling o f conflict fatigue, with over a dozen U.S. commitments around the
world since the end o f the Cold War.41 In spite o f this, Congress, became the strongest
and most consistent supporter o f relief aid, and, later, intervention in the struggling
country.42 Although the final decision for U.S. intervention was made relatively quickly,
the groundwork for the ultimate decision stretched out over the whole o f 1992.

In

January, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 733, which provided for armed
intervention, imposed an arms embargo on the country, called for a cease-fire, and
mandated the deployment o f unarmed cease fire monitors. Ironically, as it would turn
out, the resolution passed in this form in spite o f efforts by the U.S. delegation to the UN
to weaken its provisions43 The U.S. would continue to classify the crisis in Somalia as a
food issue through the decision making process and well into the intervention, which had
the benefit o f securing support across the interagency community, but would have
significant consequences when the intervention was well underway.44 Indeed, it was only
the insistence on starvation rather than politics as the central issue in Somalia that
eventually made military intervention possible, since the DOD would never have agreed
to intervene, nor would the president have directed them to, had Somali politics have
seemed to be paramount.45
Meanwhile, the Department o f State, and particularly the Africa Bureau under
Cohen, began a push to raise awareness o f the Somalia issue in the government, with an

41 Cohen. 207.
42 Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey. Learningfrom Somalia. Boulder, Colorado: W estview Press, 1997.
191.
43 Natsios. 1. This was because the U.S. was concerned about payments for UN peacekeeping operations,
o f which there were already 12 at the time.
44 Interview with Ambassador Herman Cohen, May 12, 2004, in Rutherford. 22.
45Talentino. 113.
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opening step being to steadily increase the number o f meetings on the Somalia issue.46
This desire for greater attention was echoed by other key players on the international aid
and development scene at the Assistant Secretary level, most notably Andrew Natsios o f
the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance (OFDA), and later the director o f the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

In a congressional hearing in

January, 1992, Natsios called the crisis in Somalia the “Worst in the world, with up to
90% o f children under age five were malnourished.”47
In terms o f international pressure to act, the primary motivator for overall action
was UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali, who as an Egyptian saw the crisis in
Somalia as a personal issue and one which he would expend much capital to have solved.
Boutros-Gali was closely associated with several o f the key players mentioned above,
such as Cohen, and Undersecretary o f State for International Security Affairs Frank
Wisner 48 In addition to the personal nature o f the conflict for the UN Secretary General,
he also suffered from a case o f UN triumphalism. Boutros-Gali believed that the postCold War world was the time o f the UN, which he called “the central instrument for the
prevention and resolution o f conflicts and the preservation o f peace.”49 Further, he
expected the membership o f the UN, more specifically the members o f the Security
Council, and very specifically the US and the other Cold War winners to bear more
burdens in support o f the UN, famously calling out the west for its willingness to engage

46 Cohen. 205.
47 U.S. House o f Representatives Select Committee on Hunger. “Humanitarian Tragedy in Somalia:
Hearing Before the Select Committee on Hunger.” 102nd Cong., 2d Sess, report serial N o. 102-120, 30
January, 1992. 5. Testimony by Andrew Natsios.
48 Interview with Ambassador Herman Cohen, in Rutherford. 22.
49 Boutros-Gali, Boutros. A genda f o r Peace. N ew York, United Nations, June 1992.
http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439. A ccessed on October
10, 2014.
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what he called a “rich man’s war” in European Bosnia while ignoring the plight o f
Africans, and in particular Somalis.50
It is worth noting that all voices in the Department o f State were not unanimous as
to the sources and primary nature o f the problem in Somalia. While the Africa Bureau,
with the backing o f USAID, consistently pointed to the food crisis as the paramount issue
in the country, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, led by John Bolton,
continued to insist that the primary problem was the political infighting in the country
and its impact on the security situation.51 At the time o f the intervention, significant
media sources seemed to side with the position o f Bolton, with the New York Times in
particular emphasizing the need to disarm the Somali warlords as part o f the
intervention.

The most significant resistance to a focus on Africa came, however, not at

the deputy level, but at the top, where Secretary Baker was little focused on the issue, but
increasingly dominated by the presidential campaign which he left to join in August
1992.
The U.S. Congress, and in particular the Congressional Black Caucus and key
Senate leaders such as Nancy Kassebaum and Paul Simon, were central in pushing, in an
increasingly louder tone, for increased U.S. action in Somalia.

According to the

Congressional Record, there were 162 events in with Somalia mentioned, covering both
the Senate and House o f Representatives, during the 102nd Congress. To demonstrate the
increase in importance o f the issue, 44 o f those events took place over all o f 1991. 118

50 Boutros-Gali, Boutros. “Remarks in the UN Security Council, July 23, 1992.” Facts on File, Vol. 52,
N o. 2700. 623.
51 Cohen. 207.
52 Bonner, Raymond. “Buy up the Som ali’s Guns.” New York Times, December 2, 1992.
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occurred in 1992, and 86 of those are from June onwards.53 In June, 1992, for example, a
note to Bush signed by 88 House members implored the president to increase Somalia to
the highest priority for U.S. attention and action, calling the situation “an unprecedented
humanitarian disaster.”54 They find no evidence that any media report induced the
administration to launch the airlift, rather that the airlift announcement incited the uptick
in coverage.55 Acting Secretary o f State Eagleburger stated that it was congressional
pressure, rather than the media, which generated support for the airlift. His term for what
did work was "...intense pressure from key members o f congress." In his estimation
Senator Kassebaum’s visit in July was the turning point, and was undertaken specifically
to engender media pressure.56 On July 22, her trip report appeared in an ABC Evening
News story which directly prompted President Bush to meet with Secretaries Cheney and
Baker to discuss and commence the airlift.57
In response, the Senate went directly to the source o f U.S. relief operations,
requesting that USAID immediately step up its support for relief efforts, including further
mobilization o f the Office o f Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).58

OFDA

Administrator James Kunder notably echoed Andrew Natsios’ statements on the dire
situation in Somalia.59 A series o f seven hearings began in the spring in several House
committees right up through the decision to intervene, with queries and requests for
action sent from the Congress to all o f the U.S. players, Secretary General Boutros-Gali,
53 Congressional Research Service. “Congressional Record o f the 102nd Congress.”
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/thom as2. A ccessed on 9 October, 2014.
54 O ffice o f U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. “Situation Report N o. 10, ‘Somalia-Civil Strife’” 23 June
1992. 3.
35 Livingston, Stephen and Eachus, Todd. "Humanitarian Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and the
CNN Effect Reconsidered." P olitical Communication 12, 1995: 413-429. 425.
56 Interview with Secretary Eagleburger on May 12, 1995, Livingston and Eachus. 425.
57 Livingston and Eachus. 426.
58 Rutherford. 39.
59 Livingston and Eachus. 424.
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relevant international organizations, and even several o f the Somali faction leaders to
raise awareness, gamer support, and urge action.60
This is not to say that the voice o f Congress was unanimous, as significant
resistance existed, based on several factors.

The major cause o f complaint was the

perceived price o f the operation.61 Another was a reluctance to have the UN take charge
o f such a massive, but delicate issue as the resupply effort. Some democrats resisted on
the principal that the whole problem in Somalia could be traced back to republican led
actions in the Reagan administration in support o f the Barre regime, although this was
refuted by the administration.
By July, 1992, pressure from all o f the aforementioned sources increased to the
point that the White House began actively pressuring the Department o f State to develop
an array o f policy responses for Somalia, under the leadership o f Herman Cohen and the
Department’s Africa Bureau. President Bush, although beginning to feel some pressure
to act, did so at this time only on the pretext o f developing ways to better assist the UN
mission.63 As a result of these pressures to intervene somewhere in the world, which
openly manifested themselves at the 1992 Republican National Convention, President
Bush announced on August 14th one week before the start o f the convention, that the U.S.
would commence the transport o f relief supplies to Somalia.64 The airlift was undertaken
with the support o f Kenya, but America’s traditional allies in Europe remained focused
60 Clarke and Herbst. 6.
61 Oakley and Hirsch. 37. At this time the U.S. already ow ed the Security Council over a $100 million for
the support o f peacekeeping operations.
62 Ibid. 37. The source o f this complaint was Democrat Howard W olpe o f Michigan.
63 Brent Scowcroft, as interviewed by Western. 125. Western quotes Scowcroft on the mechanism for this
decision, also noting that it was the Hempstone cable from Kenya, and it’s posting in the Washington Post,
which inspired the response.
64 Fitzwater, Marlon. “Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Additional Humanitarian Aid for
Somalia.” Washington, D.C. August 14, 1992.
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on events in Russia during 1992.65 Notably, this was the last major administration
decision on Somalia before the November elections. This decision was undertaken so
quickly that the Kenyan government was not notified beforehand, which was significant
since the neighboring country would necessarily be a location from which relief efforts
would be launched.66 The airlift was, in hindsight, the fundamental policy shift that set
the administration on the road to full intervention, and yet it was not decisive, since the
main player in any intervention, the DOD, was still not compelled to cooperate beyond
the airlifts, in spite o f Department o f State proposals that troops also be used to guard the
supply distribution centers.
While the airlift did succeed in significantly increasing the amount o f food on
hand in the crisis areas, the fact that the aerial ports o f debarkation were not secured
meant that the local militants were able to seize a growing amount o f relief aid for
themselves, with OFDA claiming that the amount o f aid actually reaching Somalis fell by
nearly half during this period due to corruption and violence.67 Furthermore, with the
onset o f the 1992 election, interest in Somalia by the senior leaders o f the Bush
administration was at a low ebb.

However, interest was maintained, and increased,

through some portentous moves the secondary level o f decision making, such as the
appointment o f Frank Wisner, a known advocate for African Affairs, as undersecretary of
State for International Security Affairs, with a specific brief to develop strategies for
Somali relief.

Wisner and the NSC Deputies Committee, with Walter Kansteiner

65 Lofland. 58.
66 Hempstone, Smith. Rogue A m bassador: An African Memoir. Sewanee, TN: University o f the South
Press, 1997. 21.
67 OFDA Situation reports numbers 13, 14, and 18, covering September 16, October 1, and N ovem ber 6,
1992. In Oakley and Hirsch. 25.
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serving as Scowfcroft’s eyes and ears there, would have to struggle between the
competing distractions o f the political campaign, Bosnia, and other, seemingly more
threatening and promising events in Africa, such as the planning for free elections in
South Africa as well as the increasingly violent civil wars in Mozambique and Angola.69
With all o f this in mind, the Deputies Committee, through September and October, came
to the conclusion that the airlift should be ended by December, and that a brigade sized
force o f approximately 3,000 personnel would be needed to secure the supply areas from
corruption and pillage. They strongly encouraged greater UN involvement both in the
supply and security operations, and offered to transport the multi-battalion UN force
which was promised for Somalia on 4 November.70
President Bush began to get personally and deeply involved in the Somalia issue
in July, 1992, in response to pressure from Congress and media reports on the situation in
the country, and with Somalia already emerging as a campaign issue. He provided direct
comment as well as a series o f personal follow up questions to a report based on OFDA
Director James Kunder’s visit to Somalia on 2 August and a report from the U.S.
Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hemptsone, which provided a description o f how the unrest
in Somalia was bleeding across their shared border.71 His "A Day in Hell" cable was so
powerful and moving that Brent Scowcroft ensured that it was seen by the president.72
Bush was described as acting with a “burst o f energy” by Herman Cohen in his memoirs
on his time working with Africa issues.

This increased interest culminated in a move

69 Interview with Walter Kansteiner, National Security Council Africa Desk Officer, March 29, 1999.
Western. 134.
70 Poole. 12-13.
71 Kunder, James. “Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
African Affairs.” September 16, 1992.
72 Livingston and Eachus. 425.
73 Cohen. 208.

122
by the administration to encourage the UN to markedly increase the number of
peacekeepers allocated to Somalia by 3500, up from the 500 currently allowed.
From August onwards, the administration’s focus was dominated by the 1992
presidential electoral campaign, which the Bush administration lost by the largest margin
o f an incumbent president since 1912.74 The campaign saw the challenger, William
Clinton, repeatedly accuse the administration o f complacency for its failure to act in
either Bosnia or Somalia.75 While Bush continued to show interest in the Somalia crisis,
it was not until after the election that his interest returned and indeed peaked, and within
days after the polling ended Bush increased the frequency and intensity o f his questioning
and directed his staff to come up with viable options to ease the suffering.76 This level o f
planning for action would primarily take place at the Pentagon, which, for reasons o f
bureaucratic structure, was pushed down to a secondary level (being handled at first by
SOLIC, the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict directorate), which
recommended that any action be done as part o f the UN mandate and not as a unilateral
U.S. action.

77

This recommendation, in modified form, influenced the decision to couch

the U.S. intervention strictly in terms o f the UN mandate. However, reporting from the
CIA warned that a UN only approach was not feasible due to the high vulnerability o f
lightly armed UN forces to lethal attack from the forces o f the warlords.78 This meant
that better armed U.S. forces would be required at some point.

74 Greenstein, Fred I. The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style fro m FDR to Barack Obama, 3 rd ed.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. 169.
75 Oakley and Hirsch. 35.
76 Interview with Richard Clarke, NSC head o f international programs on July 16, 1994, in Rutherford. 66.
77 Coll, Alberto R. The Problem s o f D oing Good: Som alia as a C ase Study in Humanitarian Intervention.
Washington, D.C.: Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Institute for Study o f Diplomacy
Publications, Georgetown University, 1997. 4.
78 Lofland. 59.
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Public Opinion and the Somalia Intervention

Direct comparisons were made between the unfolding humanitarian disaster in
Somalia and the other major concurrent international issue, the devolution o f Yugoslavia,
and in particular the privations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

70

It must be kept in mind that the

Somalia intervention, unlike the other case studies, took place without significant
coverage by public opinion surveys and polling, particularly during the initial decision to
intervene, although that would change near the end o f the operation.80

Television

coverage o f the conflict in Somalia was non-existent into the first quarter o f 1992, while
Q1

newspaper coverage among the major papers was also extremely limited.

Media interest

in Somalia remained slight until mid-summer, when it increased in intensity and
frequency o f coverage.

From June 1992 on, however, print coverage steadily rose, and

by August, over 100 articles per month were appearing, along with twenty to twenty five
television news pieces.
Louis Klarevas notes that the decision by Bush to start the airlift raised public
attention somewhat during the fall, but also said that news coverage peaked only twice,
once in December, 1992, when the intervention began, and once near its end after the
Battle o f Mogadishu in October, 1993.83 This polling data puts further lie to the idea that

79 Robert Gallucci, Assistant Secretary o f State for Political Military Affairs, said that “The memo said:
Somalia - Low Risk, High Payoff, Bosnia - High Payoff, in an interview with Rothkopf, David. Running
the World: The inside S tory o f the N ational Security Council an d the Architects o f American. N ew York:
Perseus Group, 2005.
80 Klarevas, Louis J. “The Polls-Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia.” Public Opinion
Q uarterly Volum e 64, 2000: 523-540. 524.
81 Livingston and Eachus. 419.
82 Ibid.
83 Klarevas. 524-525. Limited polling performed in September, 1992, revealed that only 11% o f the polled
audience follow ed Somalia closely, and a combined 35% showed any interest at all in the crisis. Kiarevas
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the media created the main pressure for the intervention, in spite o f the statements o f
some analysts, such as George Kennan, to the contrary.84

After the election in

November, 1992, and Bush’s defeat, the drumbeat for intervention focused on the need to
act before the inauguration o f William Clinton as President in January.85 Was there an
effort by the administration to build a frame for the public in support o f intervention?
One would expect there to be, particularly since, as stated by Martin Linsky and Jonathan
Moore, government leaders consider the media to be central

in both policy

o/

implementation and agenda stetting with the public.

The media therefore inform an

audience which cannot possibly be fully informed on all issues, and policy makers must
take account o f the opinions o f the audience and the various tools for reaching those
audiences.

87

Based on the records o f media coverage on Somalia and the key media pieces
mentioned in this case study, it does appear that the U.S Government was able to
successfully dominate the discourse on its intervention in Somalia, particularly when
broadcast news is considered, at the outset o f the crisis, although there is no evidence that
it purposefully did so. The true deluge o f broadcast news stories about the events in
Somalia followed, rather than led, significant government decisions. This was not the
case with print media, however. In the case o f Somalia, in many instances the media
relied on government for key information based on initial ignorance o f the press corps,
529. Livingston noted that these numbers steadily increased through the fall, but did not exponentially rise
until after the announcement o f intervention after Thanksgiving, 1992. Livingston and Eachus. 420-422.
84 Livingston and Eachus. 413. Kennan (1993, September 30) is quoted as saying that there is no doubt
that the media and images o f suffering were the primary motivators.
85 Bell, Peter. “The Tragedy in Somalia can’t wait for Clinton.” The N ew York Times, Novem ber 5, 1992.
A note from the chairman o f CARE, posted in the N ew York Times, noted that waiting until January might
cost the lives o f 100,000 Somalis.
86 Linsky, Martin, Moore, Jonathan, O ’Donnell, Wendy, and Whiteman, David. Impact, H ow the Press
Affects F ederal Policy Making. N ew York, W.W. Norton, 1986. 7.
Ibid. 11.

125
ao

and the public writ large, on the region and the issues.

A lack o f diplomatic

representation in the country helped to keep background interest low, since journalists
relied on such sources for access and information.89 However, as public attention to the
crisis grew, the lawlessness which was at the core o f the problem in Somalia made basic
access to the country by third parties, such as the media and humanitarian aid agencies
significantly easier than was the case in besieged Bosnia. This meant that it was possible
for these agents to report more directly on issues in Somalia, and to, especially in the case
o f the aid agencies, eventually become agents o f change in their own right.90

Models and the Somalia Decision Process

Writing about the Persian G ulf War, Yetiv notes that the Rational Actor Model
could not adequately explain some things, such as how President Bush would, on certain
issues, act out seemingly impetuously in response to actions by Saddam Hussein.91 It
appears that Bush’s decision to intervene in Somalia, and the Pentagon’s switch from
refusal to acceptance o f the mission, should be seen in this light as well. Indeed, if one
takes the position, as Bush and DOD did through November 1992, that armed
intervention in Somalia (or, for that matter, Bosnia) was an irrational act, then further
evidence, both o f Bush’s centrality to the decision making process, and the non
rationality o f the decision to intervene, is the result.92 From a perspective o f national
security, the decision is not rational, since the events in Somalia, as they were known at

88 Livingston and Eachus. 415.
89 Ibid. 417.
90 Western. 124.
91 Yetiv. 8.
92 Ibid. 9.
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the time, did not impact the vital security o f the U.S.93 It is the impact o f personal
politics that makes Bush’s actions rational.

The airlift decision, when placed in the

context o f the political campaign, and falling as it did immediately before the Republican
convention, is rational in that light. The final intervention decision, taken by a defeated
president choosing to take on an operation that seemed achievable (Somalia) versus one
that did not (Bosnia) is also a rational decision. DOD’s seeming flip flop in support for
the operation was a result o f the power o f the president, and the congenial relations
between the senior Bush leaders described above.

Powell knew his boss well, and

reacted to his desires as a good subordinate does.

Once divining the commander in

c h iefs intent, the Joint Staff then offered a series o f approaches, from minimalist to
maximum effort, and it was the maximal option that President Bush chose, while also
agreeing to Powell’s suggestion that former Ambassador to Somalia Robert Oakley be
recalled to lead the diplomatic side o f the operation.94
Furthermore, the Governmental Politics Model appears to be in operation
throughout the Somalia decision making process.

As could be expected, the DOD

officials took a similar, common stance on intervention, as detailed in the description of
the Powell Doctrine, which Somalia most definitely did not fit. This view changed as the
key defense leader in the case, Colin Powell, began both to believe the mission was
achievable, and that there was solid political benefit in doing so 95 The National Security
Advisor adhered to the desires o f his boss, the president. OFDA and USAID favored
intervention, as one would expect given the institutional mandates o f their organizations

93 Cohen. 201.
94 Poole. 20.
95 Lofland. 59. Powell had visited Somalia in October, and this may have also impacted his thinking,
although he him self does not comment on this in his memoirs.
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to provide aid and humanitarian assistance to those in need, regardless o f danger. The
Department o f State response was subdivided by relevant section, with those leaders and
offices directly involved in Africa in favor o f intervention, and some o f those with other
or wider foci against, which does affirm the GPM in which what leaders say and do
depends upon which agency they come from more than any other factor.
In terms o f the question o f government framing o f the crisis, during the summer
debates and leading into the fall, there is limited evidence that either pro or con
intervention forces attempted to use the media to frame the debate.96 There were some
exceptions, including Natsios, who did turn to the media in an effort to secure funding
and support for interventions. This, o f course, does not apply to outside o f government
figures.

Secretary

General

Boutros-Gali

and

representatives

from

numerous

humanitarian aid organizations turned to the media, particularly the editorial pages o f the
major papers, in an attempt to influence the debate.97 By fall. 1992, Boutros-Gali was
pushing for a U.S. or international intervention under the auspices o f Article VII o f the
QO

UN Charter.

Natsios openly believed that government framing was needed in order to

secure intervention and he actively courted the media, being quoted over 50 times over
the course o f 1992." Up until the switch by DOD, then the GPM seems to hold, but then
it fails to provide a satisfactory result, such result which can only be applied by
examining the role o f the powerful actor to sway decision making and opinion. In this
case, it happened that the powerful actor also happened to be the most powerful actor,
President Bush.

96 Livingston and Eachus. 422.
97 Ibid.
98 Cohen. 210.
99 Livingston and Eachus. 424.
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From the time o f the airlift decision in August, 1992, the Bush administration,
with increasing pressure from within, in the form o f continued and increased meetings
and statements from Department o f State and USAID leaders, and from outside, in the
form o f Congressional and UN statements, began to push for more international support
for a larger intervention. Both relief agencies and foreign governments asked for U.S.
support to move supplies and peacekeepers in in accordance with UNSC 767, while the
U.S. sought the assistance and involvement o f other major powers, particularly the UK
and France. 45,000 metric tons o f relief supplies were delivered over the course o f the
airlift, but the reports from the media, NGOs, and fact finding missions continued to paint
a bleak and monetarily costly picture o f Somalia.100
Meanwhile, the U.S. media, which had been remarkably quiet on the Somalia
issue, began to make itself heard, particularly with a New York Times piece on July 31
which detailed the failure o f the UN to adequately deal with the food crisis.101 Other
New York Times pieces that week specifically called out the administration and began to
demand action. Media interest and pressure dovetailed with increasing demands from
NGO’s for assistance with the mission.102
Decision making for intervention now fell to a traditional interagency process,
chaired by the National Security Council, with a Deputies Committee chaired by Admiral
Jonathan Howe in his role as Deputy National Security Advisor. In the meetings which
followed, each deputy brought his own department’s plans and options to the table, in

100 Sommer. 22-23.
101 Rutherford. 45. The article, from the N ew York Times, was entitled “U.S. Says Airlifts Fail Somali
N eed y .. . ”. Up to that time, the author notes that the major television networks only mentioned Somalia 15
times in the first half o f 2014, and most o f those mentions were brief. That would change in the second
half o f the year.
102 Ibid. 67.
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accordance with Allison’s models.

In this case, however, Howe was able to override

departmental prerogatives and develop a unified strategy.103 This was, in part, because o f
a turnaround in the position o f the Department o f Defense on the intervention, especially
given that the conditions that General Powell and the Department o f Defense laid down
as essential for a successful intervention, namely that the mission be well defined, were
no closer to being met than they had been throughout 1992. A formal working group on
Somalia was established under Ambassador Brandon Grove, which came to the rapid
conclusion that a forceful, armed intervention would be required in order to provide the
relief that Somalia needed.104
Building on what it claimed were its keys to victory in the Persian G ulf War,
meaning a tightly defined mission, with a solid timeline for implementation, the
Department o f Defense resisted efforts to push for an armed humanitarian intervention in
Somalia on the grounds that the mission was ill defined and had no definite timeline. The
main point o f the argument was that the issue in Somalia was a lack o f a solid political
basis for decision making or consensus building.

By definition, this would create a

situation where, if U.S. troops did intervene, one side or the other o f the political
continuum would resist, forcing the Coalition to choose sides in a mission that was
supposed to be about feeding people.105 This combined with difficult terrain features
(interesting for an armed force that had, a year prior, successfully completed full combat
operations in far worse terrain in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq) and a perception that it
103 Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey, Somalia and the Future o f Humanitarian Intervention. Foreign
Affairs, March/April 1996. http://www.foreignaffairs.eom/articles/51844/walter-clarke-and-jeffrey-herbst.
73. Members o f the Committee included: Howe as Deputy National Security Advisor, Wisner and Cohen
for the DOD. The Department o f D efense sent Admiral David Jeremiah, V ice Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs
o f Staff. The O ffice o f Foreign Disaster Assistance sent its director and senior staff.
104 Natsios, Andrew. “Humanitarian R elief in Somalia: The Econom ics o f Chaos.” In Clarke and Herbst,
1997. 78. Natsios was present when Bush related this information.
105 Interview with Kansteiner, 1999. Western. 116.
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would be very difficult to distinguish friend from foe in an environment where the
combatants did not wear uniforms.

The DOD remained the main hold out against

intervention, not wanting to have to “fix the civil war,” as its senior leaders believed they
were being told to do by the N SC.106 As late at the 20th o f November, the Deputies
meeting on Somalia paid lip service to intervention while focusing on providing
monetary and logistical support, but not military assistance, to the small cadre o f UN
peacekeepers on the ground in the country.107
The deputies meeting on 21 November, 1992 became pivotal for the decision
making process. Admiral Jeremiah, speaking for his lead, Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs
o f Staff Colin Powell, switched the Pentagon’s former position, stating that his
department was capable o f accomplishing the food aid and relief mission if so
requested.108 The caveats were that there be no mission creep beyond the food operation
and that the operation be short in duration, given the doctrinal mission o f the forces to be
used (The M arines).109 Furthermore, Powell sought to explicitly opt out o f a Bosnia
intervention in return for acceding to the Somalia intervention.110 At this time, three use
of force options were provided by the Pentagon, with each recommending a greater
military footprint. With this advice given, President Bush decided to act two days later,
and to select the option that utilized the strongest military force recommended.111
The DOD switch had come after the election, when, concurrent with a return o f
focus by President Bush, Scowcroft, Cheney, and Powell began discussions to reverse the
106 Oakley and Hirsch. 37.
107 Interview with Herman Cohen, March 30, 1999. Western. 136.
108 Oakley and Hirsch. 43.
109 Cohen. 211-212. Cohen remembers that the strongest choicer was selected because the intermediate
option, a UN led operation, would have taken six months to implement.
1 0 Strobel, Warren P. Late Breaking Foreign Policy: The News M edia's Influence on P eace O perations.
Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute o f Peace, 1997. 139.
111 Clarke and Herbst, 1996, 9.
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DOD policy, in coordination with General Hoar, at that time Commanding the relevant
regional combatant command, US Central Command.112 CENTCOM, as part o f its
doctrinal planning process, had already developed some plans for interventions in the
Horn o f Africa region, and had gone so far as to designate the First Marine Expeditionary
Force (I MEF) based in Camp Pendleton, California, as the primary unit for potential
armed humanitarian interventions.113
Given that Bush is reported to have made his decision to intervene after a briefing
of under an hour on 23 November, 1992, the question o f why the change o f position must
be asked. Several reasons reveal themselves. While not a factor in his August decision
to start the airlift, media pressure, in the form o f television news footage o f the victims o f
starvation in Somalia, is cited as a reason for Bush’s November decision both by acting
Secretary o f State Eagleburger and by Colin Powell.114 Political pressure from Congress
and from liberal activists in the lower tiers o f the administration is one reason, along with
pressure from the UN, the NGO community, and increasingly by the m edia.115 Another
is that the Bush administration, in seeking to establish its legacy in the aftermath of
electoral defeat, wished to go out with a positive act on the world stage. Jon Western
noted in an interview with National Security Advisor Scowcroft that Bush became more
and more personally effected by the reporting coming from Somalia.116 Beneath the
fa?ade o f the Cold Warrior, Bush was actually predisposed to action by events in his vice
112 Oakley and Hirsch. 42. A note on Combatant Commands. At this time military oversight o f U.S.
affairs in Africa was divided, with Africa outside o f the Horn o f Africa falling under command o f U.S.
European Command, based in Germany, w hile the Horn o f Africa, which included the countries relevant
here, namely, Somalia and Kenya, fell under U.S. Central Command, which had a as its primary interest the
Middle East.
113 Ibid.
"“ Powell. 564.
115 Natsios. 44. The author reports that when Bush addressed the nation announcing the operation, he held
in his hand “a letter signed by eleven U.S. based NGOs imploring him to act.”
116 Interview with Brent Scowcroft, April 29, 1999. Western. 136.
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presidency under Ronald Reagan.

During the Sahel crisis o f the early 1980s (made

famous in part by the “We are the World” USA for Africa fundraising effort), Bush
visited a CARE camp attempting to feed the dying, and he witnessed the suffering and
death of victims in very similar circumstances to those reported to him from Somalia. In
a more pragmatic vein, intervening in largely Muslim Somalia would allow him to reject
pressure to do so in Muslim Bosnia coming from the Arab world, particularly Saudi
Arabia. Similar pressure was exerted over the race o f the victims in Somalia, allowing
the administration to deflect cries o f racism and differential treatment o f white Europeans
in Yugoslavia over black A fricans.1,7
Another concern for Bush was that the incoming president would be little inclined
to act with decisiveness abroad, so that getting the intervention going before he took
office would lock him into continuing it. On one hand, this seems to be disputed by
Bush’s statement that the intervention would be wrapped up by inauguration day, and by
the statement he made to Powell that “I don’t want to stick Clinton with an ongoing
1 1Q

military operation.”

On the other hand, Powell, Scowcroft, and Cheney all replied that

there was little chance that the intervention could be wrapped up in such a short time,
with Bush agreeing to the operation regardless.119 With the decision to act somewhere in
mind, there were two choices for action, Bosnia and Somalia. To paraphrase a statement
by later Secretary o f Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Bosnia was a “known known,” and what
was known was ugly.

Bosnia was guaranteed to be a quagmire in terms o f money,

manpower, and national reputation. Somalia, although also known to have significant

117 Clarke, Richard, Director o f the DOD O ffice o f International Programs, interview with the authors. July
16, 1994. Clarke and Herbst, 1996. 78.
118 Powell. 565.
119 Ibid. 565.

133
problems, seemed to be by far the easier o f the two missions to accomplish militarily,
while also getting the benefit o f defusing the increasing calls from the UN and the media
for intervention somewhere. Some in the DOD may have thought that intervention in
Somalia would be cheaper, quicker, and less o f a burden than a similar intervention in
Bosnia.120
President Elect Clinton, whose own actions had helped to bring about his electoral
victory and increased pressure on the administration to act, continued that pressure after
the election, pushing for intervention in Bosnia but accepting o f the Bush decision to do
I |

so in Somalia.

This is all the more interesting since it marked a sea change in how

lame-duck presidents could be empowered to act.

In his own memoires, Clinton stated

that he did not feel that he had been entrapped, that “Bush had been very helpful,” and
I^

that “I felt that he wanted me to succeed as president.”

Given that Bush’s failure to act

in Somalia or Bosnia was a key facet o f Clinton’s campaign against him, he could hardly
have said otherwise when Bush did act.
On December 3rd, 1992, The UN Security Council enacted resolution 794, which
laid the framework for the establishment o f a multinational relief force under U.S.
direction.

The following day, President Bush congratulated Boutros Gali on the

resolution, pledged his support, and reiterated the humanitarian nature and expected short
duration o f the proposed U.S. intervention.124 Operation Restore Hope (The U.S. aspect
o f UNITAS) was also announced on December 4th 1992, and on December 9th, U.S. Navy
120 Talentino, 115.
121 Western. 136. Western notes that the Joint Chiefs very much wanted to avoid intervention in Bosnia,
and that P ow ell’s reversal cam e after a transition meeting with Clinton, and in part was the Pentagon opting
for what it thought was the lesser o f two evils.
122 Western. 135. Customarily, significant Presidential Activity ceased between the election and the
innaguration o f the incoming C hief Executive.
123 Clinton, William J. M y Life. N ew York: Knopf, 2004. 484.
124 Bush, 2012. 416.
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Seals and Marines landed on the beaches south o f Mogadishu, to a media circus, and
UNITAF, the United Task Force implementing the operation began.

As mandated by

UNSCR 794, U.S. forces assumed command o f the operation, and provided 25,000 out o f
37,000 personnel. In accordance with Bush’s planning guidance that the operation be a
coalition, 28 partner nations contributed to the effort. Within days o f the launch o f the
operation, Pentagon leaders were already mandating the seizure o f weapons and
disarming o f combatants.126
By March, 1993, UNITAF was converted into UNISOM II, ending the period of
the case study. Viewed purely in terms o f UNITAF’s mandate to alleviate starvation in
Somalia, the operation was a success, with approximately 100,000 lives saved by all
means deployed. But the fundamental issue o f a political settlement to underwrite the aid
was never adequately addressed. In another example in which the failure to plan for a
long term operation manifested itself, eight to ten reserve civil affairs units were to have
been deployed, but were cancelled because the operation was supposed to only last six
weeks.

177

Similarly, since food was the focus, there was no clear vision o f how

reconciliation should proceed.128 However, the lack o f a peaceful resolution to the
conflict led President Clinton to accept the transition to UNOSOM II, the force which
ultimately met its demise following the events portrayed in “Blackhawk Down,” in which
eighteen U.S. service personnel were killed a running battle with Aidid henchmen,

125 The Pentagon encouraged this as a follow up to P ow ell’s request to the White House to help build public
support for the operation. Interview with Kansteiner, 1999. Western. 138.
126 Sciolino, Elaine, “M ission to Somalia: The Big Job Ahead.” The N ew York Times, December 4, 1992.
A 23.
127 Clarke and Herbst. 1996. 77.
128 Ibid. 78.
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creating a media circus as their bodies were seen to be drug through the streets o f
Mogadishu. U.S. forces were withdrawn soon afterwards.

Conclusion

“The first step in planning for humanitarian peace-enforcement operations must
be the articulation o f an integrated humanitarian-political-military strategy that
responds to the immediate humanitarian crisis while outlining a longer-term
process designed to resolve the underlying political issues that may have brought
on the crisis in the first place. These actions must be consistent with international
values and standards o f conduct.”
Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, 1997.129

This case study set out to examine the decision to intervene in Somalia, with
several questions in mind. It laid out the timeline o f the crisis, to include its causes as
well as the key decision points, who made and influenced them, and how those decisions
played out in the final act, the intervention o f December 1992.

Although there was

significant action by lower level members o f the decision making cycle, in the case o f the
Somalia intervention, none o f them had the power to compel President Bush to act
singularly.

It is clear from the evidence presented, and from his known style o f

governing, that the decision to intervene came from the top, as only the president, at the
top o f the decision cycle, could have compelled a clearly unwilling Department o f
Defense to change its mind on intervention.

Even Powell’s apparent horse trade o f

Somali intervention with avoiding the same in Bosnia with President Elect Clinton came
after the election, at a time when Bush was already seriously considering an expansion o f

129 Clarke and Herbst. 1997. 4.
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the U.S. role in Somalia as it became clear that the airlift was not working as expected.
We cannot, o f course, know if his defeat impacted the decision making process, or if a
victorious Bush would still have decided for intervention, however, based on statements
by Powell and Eagleburger that it was pressure from the media and NG O ’s that prompted
Bush, it is reasonable to believe that he would have acted in the same way even if he’d
have won. If his reaction was purely to secure his legacy and to compel Clinton, then the
operation might have been different in time and scale if Bush had won, but it would
likely still have taken place. Further, if media and Congressional pressure were the key
drivers, then a returning Bush may have not been able to resist the mission creep and
change in focus that eventually doomed the operation.
In terms o f framing, the evidence presented shows that the media largely followed
the lead set by the government.

While some o f the key players used the media to

facilitate their own efforts to force decisions on key issues, such as the airlift decision,
there is no evidence that framing by the government was undertaken in a systematic way,
or that such decisions were an implicit part o f the decision making cycle for the decision
to intervene in Somalia. In spite o f the lack o f a conscious decision to frame, decision
makers did frame the media.

This took place more because o f the primacy o f the

government as an information holder and broker, and because o f the unique nature, and
high danger, o f the situation on the ground, which put the government in the position o f
having a monopoly on the information needed by the media to go to press in an accurate
fashion.
U.S. policy toward interventions changed as a result o f the perception o f failure o f
the Somalia intervention, with a significant reduction recommended for future
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interventions.130 Had Bush been reelected, and been able to resist the pressure to change
the initial mission, this might not have been the case. The first major intervention after
the Cold War lead to significant questions on what armed humanitarian intervention
meant, when they were appropriate, and what goals were appropriate for future efforts.
Gone was the idea that a large military force, intervening in a sovereign nation, could do
so in an apolitical fashion, without taking sides in the dispute at the heart o f the c risis.131
OFDA proposed that the U.S. aid community and the DOD develop an early warning
system for humanitarian crisis which might allow for pre-emption, an early U.S. move
toward what would later become the concept o f Responsibility to Protect.132 Even UN
Secretary General Boutros-Gali, in his "Agenda for Peace", published in 1995, showed
the negative impact of the failed mission in Somalia, with a dampened ardor for
intervention. Congress too had its enthusiasm for intervention dampened significantly,
with the total price in dollars, lives, and political capital lost proving to be more than
could be borne.
All of these factors would have repercussions for future interventions, most
particularly for the failure o f the international community to react adequately to a crisis
which was brewing south-west o f Somalia, and which in fact came to prominence just
days after the Mogadishu battle. The genocide in Rwanda, which began soon after the
end of the Somalia mission, would redefine the terms o f western armed humanitarian
intervention and shape future discussions o f state sovereignty, failed states, and human
security.

130 Clarke and Herbst. 1996. 70.
131 Ibid. 82.
132 Sommer and Collins. 4.
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To Intervene and Not Intervene - Clinton Studies: Rwanda and Kosovo
Mini Case Study - To Not Intervene: Rwanda and Its Impact on Humanitarian
Intervention

“It (The U.S.) led a successful effort to remove most o f the UN peacekeepers who
were already in Rwanda. It aggressively worked to block the subsequent
authorization o f UN reinforcements. And even as, on average, 8,000 Rwandans
were being butchered each day, U.S. officials shunned the term "genocide," for
fear o f being obliged to act. The United States in fact did virtually nothing "to try
to limit what occurred." Indeed, staying out o f Rwanda was an explicit U.S.
policy objective.”
Samantha Power, “Bystanders to Genocide (2001).” 1

Somalia, and the failure there, as described in the previous case study, burned the
Clinton administration badly. It was a foreign adventure that they had not chosen, but
had warmly supported, and when the mission failed the White House quickly withdrew
U.S. forces and sought to distance itself from the decision to intervene and from the
principle o f armed humanitarian intervention.

But the world had not changed, and

Yugoslavia, the mission that no one in the Bush administration wanted to tackle, still
loomed ever larger in the international calculations.

But before the Yugoslav crisis

reached its crescendo, there was a terrible international crisis which changed the way
interventions, national sovereignty, and human security would be seen in the future. The
genocide in Rwanda, which saw between half a million and a million Rwandans killed in

1 Power, Samantha. “Bystanders to Genocide.” The Atlantic Monthly, September, 2001.
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001 /09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/. A ccessed on April
20, 2014.
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the 100 day period between April and June 1994, and to which there was little western or
U.S. reaction, was the catalyst for change.
This section will discuss the non-intervention in Rwanda, with several objectives.
One is to show the negative impact o f the way in which the Somalia intervention ended
on decision making moving forward. Another is to introduce a new leadership team with
a quite different dynamic, both in relation to each other and to their outlook on decision
making, framing, acceptable use o f the armed forces, and humanitarian interventions in
general.

Yet another is to show how a different international environment, in other

words, more international involvement, might impact decision making and framing
efforts. Background information on the Rwandan genocide, the UN and U.S. response,
and the impact o f the Rwandan genocide on future thinking will be provided, linking this
shorter study to the larger study o f the Kosovo intervention which follows.

Rwanda and the World in 1994, Background to Non-Intervention

Rwanda’s ethnic divide, between Tutsi and Hutu tribes, had been a source o f
division and occasional violence since the departure o f the Belgian colonial regime in
1960. The Belgians had favored the Tutsi minority during the colonial era, which caused
indignation among the majority Hutu population.

A civil war between the Tutsi and

moderate Hutu peoples on the one hand and the hard line conservative Hutus on the other
had been underway since 1990, with a cease fire and power sharing agreement known as
the Arusha Treaty imposed by the international community in 1993 and the establishment
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of a UN peacekeeping force, (UN Mission in Rwanda or UN AMIR) in October, 1993.2
Unfortunately the force was lightly armed, had a disjointed command structure, was
undermanned, and in fact became victims o f the violence, with the Belgians, the best
armed, trained, and knowledgeable o f the various contingents, withdrawing early on after
they began to take casualties in the violence. A ceasefire in the civil war, agreed to by
the new President, Habyarimana, was viewed with skepticism and trepidation by Hutu
extremists, resulting in the shoot down o f the presidential aircraft on April 6, 1994, while
on approach to the airfield at Kigali, Rwanda. Although blamed on the Tutsi rebels, the
shoot down was undertaken by Hutu extremists in retaliation for the Habyarimana’s
relatively moderate stance toward the rebels. Notably, the area from which the pair o f
rockets which destroyed the aircraft was fired was controlled by the Presidential Guard,
which was in turn controlled by the extremists.3 Massacres o f Tutsi and moderate Hutu
elements began on the very next day, in what was clearly an orchestrated slaughter,
perpetrated at first by Hutu police and military leaders. The national identity card system
imposed by the Belgian colonial administration decades before became a chooser o f the
dead, as checkpoints were set up all over the country, and those with the wrong identities
were killed. By late April, 1994, the International Committee o f the Red Cross estimated

2 Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretary, a M emoir. N ew York, Harper Collins, 2013. 148. According to
a memo to the U S UN staff, the U.S. made it clear when it voted for the resolution, which took place two
days before the events in Mogadishu, that its support did not include the deployment o f U .S. forces.
Original Document from 15 April 1994 in Ferroggiaro, William, Ed. “The U.S. and Rwanda, 1994,
Evidence o f Inaction.” George Washington University.
http://w w w 2.gw u.edu/~nsarchiv/N SA EBB/N SAEBB53/ A ccessed on 14 October 2014. A collection o f
D eclassified Original documents on the information known and the decision making process.
3 United Nations. “Report o f the Independent Inquiry into the actions o f the United Nations during the
1994 Genocide in Rwanda.” December 15, 1999. www.un.org/news/ossg/rwanda_report.htm. A ccessed
on September 15, 2014. This and other reports were not available at the time o f the decision making in
1994.
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that up to a half a million people might have been killed in what many in the
humanitarian aid community were terming a case o f genocide.
The Rwanda crisis flared, and ended in catastrophe, within a three month period
from April to June in 1994, beginning when the ceasefire between the Tutsis and Hutus
ended, and ending when the Hutus completed their reign o f terror and re-established their
undisputed rule.4 While there were warnings and indicators that a crisis was brewing
before it began, this still represents a significantly shorter decision making time frame
than that for the Somalia and Kosovo case studies, and similar in length to the Libya
cycle. In terms o f the other cases examined, Talentino notes that there was at least six
months o f lead time for the Somalia intervention (and in that case the crisis was known
about for another 18 months before that) and two years o f decision making time before
the Kosovo intervention o f 1999.5
Furthermore, historical rivalries among the great powers involved clouded the
issue and delayed actions that might have mitigated the violence. Albright notes that the
French support o f the Hutu government and leadership went so far as to say that they had
been provoked into the violence by Tutsi and moderate Hutu reprisals after the
presidential aircraft shoot down, and included arms shipments before and during the
crisis.6 Herman Cohen was not as harsh, calling the French victims o f poor judgment in
continuing support o f the Tutsis, and focusing on perceived threats from nearby Uganda
rather than internal violence.7

4 Talentino, Andrea K. M ilitary Intervention After the C o ld War: The Evolution o f Theory an d Practice.
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005. 279.
5 Ibid. 279.
6 Albright. 150. See also Cohen, Jared. 100 D ays o f Silence: Am erica an d the Rwandan G enocide.
Lanham, Maryland, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2007. 2.
7 Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacem aking in a Troubled Continent. N ew York: St. Martin's Press,
2000. 179.
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In terms o f the UN Security Council, veto carrying members France, Russia, and
China came down on the side o f state sovereignty and declared the crisis an internal
matter. The U.S. also leaned in this direction, with a bias toward non-interference in a
sovereign state. Belgian efforts to cover their own failure to prevent the attacks, and
withdrawal o f their forces, by pushing for a complete international withdrawal also
helped to confuse the issue. Rwanda’s recognized government made no request for, nor
n

appeared receptive to, international intervention.

Given that the government was

dominated, and then fully taken over, by the conservative Hutu elements who perpetrated
the genocide, this is not surprising, but it meant that another voice which might have
urged intervention was silent.
Finally, there was a large scale information gap, both from intelligence,
diplomatic, and journalistic sources. With most embassies evacuated (The U.S. mission
was evacuated early in the crisis), the remoteness o f the country, and the level o f danger
involved, it was extremely difficult to ascertain the details o f events in country, and
therefore to formulate appropriate responses.9 Those who were expert on the ground,
such as Bushnell and other foreign service staff in the Africa Bureau, had become callous
about the numbers o f dead in various disturbances over the years. In the previous year’s
fighting in Burundi, for example, 25,000 had perished. Significant massacres o f Tutsi
and moderate Hutu had occurred on nine different occasions from 1990 to January 1994.
While these experts knew that something was wrong, they were shocked and numbed by
the enormity o f the unfolding catastrophe.10

President Clinton, who had more

8 W eiss, Thomas G. Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012. 7.
’ Albright. 149.
10 Power, 2001.
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information than most, said that “We did not fully appreciate the depth and speed with
which Rwanda was being engulfed by this unimaginable horror.” 11
In an effort to save face and cover up their own ignominious withdrawal, the
Belgians wished to see a complete withdrawal o f UN forces on April 20th.12 This was in
contrast to African members o f the UN Security Council, who according to US Mission
to the UN deputy David Scheffer, with a clarity provided by proximity to information on
the crisis, wanted UNAMIR to be reinforced.13

Belgium’s stance, which included

influencing the U.S. as a NATO ally, was a major factor in the U.S. decision to refrain
from intervening militarily in the Rwandan crisis, in spite o f efforts by Albright to alter
this stance.14

The Council, as a result, both ignored intelligence provided by the

UNAMIR commander, Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, warning o f the violence, and
minimized the circulation o f his early reports on the extent o f the massacres.15 In spite o f
his appeals for more troops and a stronger mandate, the strength o f the force he had was
cut down to nearly nothing, from 2700 to 250 personnel, and he was censured by the
Security Council for making the suggestion.16 As it happened, Dallaire actually kept
about 500 troops on the ground, and it is estimated that they were able to save
approximately 25,000 potential victims, a sign o f what could have been accomplished
had there been adequate international will power applied.17

11 CBS Evening N ew s. Text o f Clinton’s Rwanda Speech. March 25, 1998. C BSnews.com . A ccessed on
14 October 2014.
12 Albright. 150.
13 Scheffer, David. “Lessons from the Rwandan Genocide.” G eorgetow n Journal o f International
Relations, Summer/Fall 2004. 127.
14 Albright. 150.
15 Original January 11, 1994 in Ferroggiaro.
16 Okechukwu, Groupson-Paul. “Politics and Failures o f Ethics o f Humanitarian Intervention in African
Conflicts.” Journal o f Alternative P erspectives in the S ocial Sciences. Volume 3, No. 3, 2011, 581-606.
592.
17 Power, 2001.
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As was the case with the deterioration o f Somalia in 1991-1992, the world was an
ugly place, with a series o f other crises that Albright noted tended to drown out what
warnings there were about rising violence in Rwanda.18 Foremost among them was the
ongoing violence in Yugoslavia. In his memoirs, President Clinton noted that the NATO
bombing o f Bosnian Serb forces surrounding the ethnic Muslim city o f Gorazde began on
the same day as the Rwandan presidential aircraft shoot down, and absorbed his
attention.19 The U.S. was still heavily involved in operations in the Middle East, still
instigated by an intransigent Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Economic and political reform in
Russia still dominated the attention o f the U.S. at this time.

Another political and

humanitarian affairs distraction came in the form o f the U.S. response to political unrest
in Haiti. The U.S. reaction began with embarrassment but ended with an ouster o f the
dictator Raoul Cedras under the threat o f U.S. military force (The threat was real, as U.S.
forces were actually on the way to Haiti when the political deal took place).
The DOD, in the throes o f post Cold War downsizing, was still wedded to the
Powell Doctrine, all the more so after the tactics o f the “Blackhawk Down” incident
seemed to verify the Powell precept o f overwhelming force. In response to the debacle in
Mogadishu, the U.S. was in the midst o f developing a formal White House doctrine on
peacekeeping, under the leadership o f Richard Clarke, a special assistant to Clinton
known to be highly proficient in the bureaucratic maneuvering necessary for such a
position. The resulting Presidential Decision Directive, PDD 225, named sixteen factors
18 Albright. 19. Am ong them were numerous warnings from the UNAM IR commander, including the
January 1 1 ,1 9 9 4 memorandum already cited.
19 Clinton, William. M y Life. N ew York: K nopf Doubleday, 2004. 584. Specifically, Clinton says that he
was “Preoccupied with Bosnia.”
20 Halberstam, David. War in a Time o f Peace. N ew York: Scribner, 2001. 273. The embarrassment was
the turnaround o f a U.S. military ship carrying relief supplies to the country. The ship, the Harlan County,
was turned away by armed militants shouting taunts about Mogadishu to the U .S. Sailors and Marines
aboard.
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that policymakers needed to consider when deciding whether to support peacekeeping
activities: seven were linked to U.S. support o f UN votes to start operations, even if no
U.S. soldiers were involved. Another six, stricter criteria would limit the role o f U.S.
forces in such operations, while three more, stricter still, would limit combat roles. The
criteria were described as "zero degree o f involvement, and zero degree o f risk, and zero
degree o f pain and confusion."21 The implementation o f this peacekeeping doctrine in
May, 1994 would virtually guarantee that the U.S. would not get involved in Rwanda.
Senior U.S. leaders, stung by the failure in Mogadishu, simply did not wish to act;
even though a U.S. led international force may have been the only force with the
international respect to pull off an intervention.

Scheffer told reporters in October,

1993, that “We should not rush into each and every humanitarian affairs catastrophe,
deflecting thoughts o f an early involvement in the crisis.23 Albright notes that the lessons
o f Somalia, and o f other African crises such as violence in Burundi in 1993, were simply
not applicable to the situation in Rwanda, and that sticking to those lessons led to
inactivity in the face o f levels o f violence which were extreme and unexpected.

New Players: The Clinton Decision Making Team and New Directions in Foreign
Policy

If the administration o f George H.W. Bush was one o f the most prepared for
foreign policy decision making in the history o f the Republic, than that which followed,
the William (Bill) Clinton administration was nearly exactly the opposite.
21 Congressman David Obey, Quoted in Power.
22 Albright. 152.
23 Scheffer. 123.
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foremost, the new group o f leaders was not a team, as such, at the outset o f the
administration. Unlike the Bush cabinet, the new group had not all worked together in
the past, and because o f this were not accustomed to how each worked, or how changes
in hierarchy might change the dynamic o f their relationships. The new administration
brought with it both a new outlook on decision making and foreign policy, but also a new
team with a new outlook on what the U.S. role in the world should be. There was a
significant discussion in the Clinton Administration over what direction U.S. policy
should take in a post-Cold War era. In spite o f this, they did build on some Bush team
practices, with a sense that U.S. power should be used in accordance with U.S. Allies and
interested parties, and where possible under the auspices o f the United Nations.
Clinton himself had received an education which exposed him to foreign policy
matters, having studied them at Georgetown’s School o f the Foreign Service before
spending time as a Rhodes Scholar and as a staffer on then chairman o f the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, William Fulbright.24 Balancing this, he was highly risk
averse, and desired actions that could be guaranteed to succeed rather than potentially fail
and cause a loss o f popularity for him and his administration.25 In contrast to Bush’s
passionate focus on foreign policy (to his political detriment) Clinton’s entry argument
for his presidency was that he would take direct control o f the domestic agenda, and in
particular the economy, while allowing expert foreign policy staff take care o f the
international issues to be faced.

"J(\

This approach was criticized by Cold War historian

John Lewis Gaddis, who said that Clinton was “ ...at fault for allowing an illusion of

24 Hyland, William. Clinton's World: Remaking Am erican Foreign P olicy. W estPort, CT: Praeger, 1999.
15.
25 Ibid. 203.
26 Halberstam. 193. The author claims that Clinton saw Foreign policy as “an inconvenience” which
would get in the way o f his true passion, domestic affairs.
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safety to produce a laissez-faire foreign and national security policy.”27 Criticism aside,
this mindset can be clearly seen in the foreign policy team he assembled in 1993.
As a result, Clinton tapped the foreign policy leaders o f past Democrat
administrations.

Twelve years separated his administration from the last Democrat,

Jimmy Carter.

Nevertheless, second tier Carter veterans formed the first cadre o f

Clinton’s foreign policy leadership team.

Warren Christopher, who had served as

Deputy Secretary o f State under Carter, is the chief example o f this.

Les Aspin, the

incoming Secretary o f Defense, seemed to be the one example o f a purely political
choice, although his knowledge o f defense issues was widely known.29 His replacement
after Mogadishu by William Perry meant that an untried, if capable leader, would be in
charge of the Defense Department during the Rwanda crisis.

In a continued role o f

prominence, Colin Powell remained as Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff until the end
o f his nominative term o f office. None o f these leaders were strong activists for U.S.
military intervention, which left those initiatives to other administration personalities. In
that regard, this is not significantly different from the way the Bush team had looked two
years earlier on Somalia, with deputies and department heads rather than principals
taking first note o f critical events.
One significant change in the power o f the foreign policy leadership team was the
return o f the U.S. Embassy to the U.N. to a seat on the cabinet. Having served in that
position, George H.W. Bush had demoted it for the course o f his presidency, but it was
returned to prominence by Clinton, and the person appointed to the job, Madeleine

27 Gaddis, John Lewis. Surprise, Security, an d the Am erican Experience. Cambridge, Massachussetss:
Harvard University Press, 2004. 77.
28 Hyland. 18. Hyland notes that Clinton specifically avoided senior cabinet officers in favor o f their
deputies to avoid having them overshadow his own presence.
29 Ibid. 19.
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Albright, would rise to prominence in the second term o f the administration.30 Albright,
along with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, and Strobe Talbot, who served as
special Ambassador to Russia, provided the intellectual guidance for the administration’s
foreign policies.31

Unlike Scowcroft and the Bush National Security Council, the

primary drivers for the new team were to craft strategies that attempted to solve Clinton’s
political needs and desires, while avoiding a new Vietnam-like (or Munich, in the case of
Albright) entanglement.32

The team, however, did keep the basic processes o f its

predecessors, in that Lake met with the Clinton daily, and the Principals and Deputies’
Committees continued to function. However, according to Rodman, the president’s role,
which he described as “unstructured” meant that both groups were weaker than they had
been under Brent Scowcroft’s guidance.
As noted by Hyland, the new team inculcated the administrations polices with a
set o f key tenets, namely that: Balance o f power politics were outdated; in their place,
the U.S. needed to pursue more noble, humanitarian goals; that the use o f force should be
used to these ends, and that the best test o f the validity o f a policy lay in the support that
could be gathered for it both domestically and internationally.34 The first two o f these
goals were a definite change in outlook from the Bush administration. This leadership
team would bring about a changeover toward a Wilsonian worldview, pressing for a
much broader set o f collective security solutions to international problems under UN

30 Hyland. 19.
31 Ibid. 20.
32 Rodman, Peter. Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making o f Foreign Policy from
Nixon to George W. Bush. N ew York: Alfred A Knopf, 2009. 206.
33 Ibid. 208. On page 209, Rodman quotes Clinton as directly saying that he did not wish to be “confined
by formal structures,” preferring to “forage around him self.”
3 / Hyland. 21.
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leadership.35 The new leadership team and their new outlook set the stage for significant
changes in how the U.S. would operate, and this would be seen in the Haiti intervention
o f 1994, and later in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. But first, the Rwandan tragedy
would strike, and in response, the new team would d o ... nothing.

Who Is Behind the Wheel? Drivers fo r Non-Intervention

Deputy Assistant Secretary o f State Prudence Bushnell was one o f the first to
send up warning signals immediately following the plane crash which killed the Rwandan
and Burundian Presidents, claiming that “widespread violence” could follow, an opinion
which was supported by Rwanda observers outside the government, most especially the
group Human Rights Watch and other non-governmental organizations.36 This was
supported by the intelligence community, which continued with its routine missions in
spite o f the difficulties in information gathering in the region. By April 26, only weeks
into the genocide, elements o f the intelligence community identified the planned nature
o f the atrocities and the names o f the perpetrators. This was reinforced by a Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) report from 9 May on the directed nature o f the attacks, using
the term genocide to describe the events.37 There is, however, no evidence in the
literature examined that the various intelligence agencies as a community took a stance

35 Hyland. 23.
36 Interview with Bushnell from Power. Her Original report is included in Ferroggiaro.
37 April 9 Report is included in Ferroggiaro.
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on intervention. Cohen describes executive level intelligence reporting as being designed
more to cover the agencies equities than to encourage action.38
Following the evacuation o f the American Embassy, official U.S. notice o f events
faded quickly. According to National Security Advisor Lake, Haiti and Bosnia were his
primary foci for the period.39 In an interview to Ivo Daalder, he said that “it was almost
literally inconceivable that American troops would go to Rwanda.”40 The Principals
committee of the NSC never met to discuss Rwanda. Thus Lake, who was an Africa
expert, was not engaged, whereas his deputy, Clarke, crafter o f the non-interventionist
intervention policy, was most closely connected with events, followed a predictably non
interventionist course.41 The Deputies Committee did meet to discuss the situation, as
did a series o f interagency working groups and task forces, which were dominated by
Clarke and his staff. Familiar faces, such as Frank Wisner, represented the DOD in the
Deputies group, but Wisner had already been prepped by his staff in an April 11 memo
which stated clearly that there would be no U.S. involvement on the ground until after the
end o f the conflict.42 Much like Sate Department Leaders, he had juniors, such as Donald
Steinberg, the Africa desk officer, who were knowledgeable, but he did not avail himself
o f the advice offered. Congress similarly maintained its distance. Democrats, while in
the majority, were on the defensive against a resurgent Republican party with a dominant
domestic agenda. No one wanted to go near a situation which might turn into another
Mogadishu during a congressional election year. An examination o f the Congressional
38 Cohen, Jared. 100 D ays o f Silence: Am erica an d the Rwandan G enocide. Lanham, MD: Rowan and
Littlefield, 2007. 29.
39 Interview with Anthony Lake, 2001, in Power.
40 Anthony Lake interview with Daalder. Ivo, and Destler, I.M. In the Shadow o f the O val Office: Profiles
o f the N ational Security Advisors an d the Presidents They S erved - fro m JF K to G eorge W. Bush. N ew
York: Simon and Schuster, 2009. 241.
41 Power. 2001.
42 Original memo in Ferroggiaro.
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Record for the time frame in question, September 1991-May 31, 1992 (this date was
selected because after this point the bulk o f the atrocities had already been committed),
shows much less interest than had been the case with Somalia. During this time frame,
the 103rd Congress had 44 events, hearings, or resolutions mentioning or related to
Rwanda, and o f those, only five o f the events (hearings in this case) specifically
discussed the ongoing atrocities there.43 On 13 May, Senators Jim Jeffords o f Vermont
and Paul Simon o f Illinois sent a letter to Clinton urging an arms embargo, sanctions, and
an increase in the strength of UNAMIR, however, did not request the involvement o f
U.S. forces.44
Madeleine Albright, who at the time was the U.S. representative to the United
Nations, summed Rwanda up with the sad, but accurate statement that “I had become
defensive and cautious about UN peacekeeping in general and didn’t see any practical
way for the UN to restore order at that point.”

45

According to Albright, the Pentagon was

against an intervention, arguing first that it would be impossible to create a coalition with
the requisite resources to intervene, and then that the logistical difficulties o f intervention
in a land locked country were too high.

Ultimately, she says, military leaders “said

bluntly that they were not prepared to do it.”46 While these debates raged, both in
Washington and New York, the killing and dying continued.
On 22 April, 1993, the White House Press Secretary released a statement noting
the survival o f a prominent Rwandan Human rights monitor, Monique Mujawamarija,
who had previously met with President Clinton, and about whom he had specifically
43 Congressional Research Service. Congressional Record o f the 103rd Congress.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/thom as2. A ccessed on 9 October, 2014.
44 Original letter in Ferroggiaro.
45 Albright. 150.
46 Ibid. 153.
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asked as the news o f the slaughter became known.47 The statement also called on a
return to cease fire negotiations, and for the leaders o f the Rwandan Army to end the
violence in the country, and called for the continuation o f the UNAMIR mission,
although not the strengthening o f the mandate o f UNAMIR or the forces assigned to i t 48
This statement was the most significant U.S. effort to respond to the crisis, and its impact
was minimal. Equally ineffective were contacts made by Bushnell to contacts in the
Rwandan Defense Ministry on 27 April.

She noted that the “world did not buy” the

official line, that the killings had been started by Tutsis, and appealed personally to the
Rwandan Defense Cabinet Director to “do the right thing” and stop the violence. This
lower level effort also failed to achieve results.49

Public Opinion and the Rwanda Non-Intervention

Beginning immediately after the start o f the massacres, the media began to cover
events, mainly based on eyewitness accounts from contacts on the ground.

Notable

coverage included front page stories in the April 9th and 10th editions o f the Washington
Post, one on the 10th in the New York Times citing a Red Cross source that "tens o f
thousands" had died. Other front page stories appeared on April 14th' 19th, and 24th. The
April 19th report, which cited information from Human Rights Watch, specifically called

47 Original document from Ferroggiaro.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
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for use o f the term "genocide."50 Meanwhile, the Washington Post Editorial Board had
spoken against U.S. intervention, in effect towing the government line on the issue.51
The Rwandan crisis happened at time when foreign policy was on the decline as a
point o f interest for the American public and media. According to James Lindsay, a 50%
drop in major network coverage o f international stories occurred between 1985 and 1995,
but this trend was starting to reverse itself by the time o f Clinton’s reelection.52 The
Rwandan crisis would engender a similar response. In June, even after the details o f the
killings were well known, CBS public opinion polling, asking the question “In order to
stop the killing in Rwanda, do you favor or oppose the United States sending in ground
troops?” revealed only 28% in favor and 61% against such action.53 This fits with
Entman’s proposition that a split in public opinion over an issue will serve to generate
opposition to action among elites and decision makers.54
The Rwandan genocide followed shortly after the inglorious retreat from Africa
which followed the Battle o f Mogadishu and the withdrawal o f U.S. forces from Somalia.
This left a bad taste in the mouth o f policymakers and an unwillingness to commit forces
to a part o f Africa that was even more remote and unstable than coastal Somalia. Media
coverage o f the crisis was evident, but since there was no decision to intervene, there was
no ready government source o f information, and the media reporting was not desirous of
action in the way that it had been in the case o f Somalia.55 Since the crisis area was so

50 Power, 2001.
51 The Washington Post Editorial Board. “One, Two, Many Rwandas.” The Washington Post, April 17,
1994. A 15.
52 Lindsay, James. “The N ew Apathy.” Foreign Affairs 79, N o. 5, September/October 2000. 2-8
53 Wittkopf, Eugene. The D om estic Sources o f U.S. Foreign Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 2004. 103.
54 Entman, Robert M. Projections o f Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy.
Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 2004. 18.
55 Talentino. 40.

154
remote, this meant that information was simply unavailable to the media, and therefore
the public, which meant that there was no public groundswell o f support. For example, in
the most dangerous week of the massacres (and most crucial decision making in the U.S.
and the UN), only one question was asked about Rwanda during the Department o f State
daily briefing.56

Models and the Rwanda Decision Process

According to Cohen and Power, there was never a pivotal moment, a debate, an
argument about intervention.

Lake, Christopher, and Perry never met with President

Clinton about it.57 The failure o f the outside world to intervene in the Rwandan genocide
was not only a failure of U.S. policy makers to act. In each o f the earlier interventions o f
the decade, Somalia, and Haiti, the U.S. had acted under a firm UN mandate, even if the
U.S. took on a disproportionate role or command o f the interventions. A key failure, and
one which influenced others in the case o f Rwanda was that o f the United Nations to
reach a consensus on intervention in a timely fashion. Given that the U.S was not, under
the George H.W. Bush or Clinton White Houses, inclined to act without UN authority in
these cases, this was a critical failure.58 According to Hehir, this was a result o f a
conscious decision by the P5 (The five permanent members o f the UN Security Council;
the U.S. UK, France, Russia, and China).59 That failure, while a significant factor, still

56 Albright. 154.
57 Cohen. 5.
58 Hehir, Aidan. The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Future o f Humanitarian
Intervention. N ew York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 30.
59 Ibid. 31.
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allows for a discussion o f the decision making processes which kept the U.S. to its
position to act multilaterally if at all (In this case, to not act).
In his memoir, Bill Clinton reiterated that there was simply little interest in an
overseas deployment o f U.S. forces to central Africa in 1994. Clinton later expressed
deep regret for this, but he reiterated that due to domestic pressure against deployments,
and the other world issues pressing at the time, he and his team were “inadequately
focused” on the possibility of sending troops to stop the atrocities in Rwanda.60 Decision
making for the non-intervention seemed to follow the bureaucratic Governmental Process
Model o f Allison.

Institutional interests and bias were the order o f the day when

determining the fate o f Rwanda. The DOD stuck its prevailing doctrine, and since it was
not ordered to change its stance by President Clinton, it did not do so.61

At the

Department o f State, Secretary o f State Christopher knew so little about the area that an
atlas was required to bring him up to speed, and he showed a general lack o f interest in
the issue.

62

Naturally, the specific bureau o f interest, the Africa Bureau, brought key

knowledge to the table, but, as had been the case with Somalia, were unable to overcome
the biases o f their organizational leaders. Unlike Somalia, however, no one at the senior
cabinet level, least o f all President Clinton, was willing to take on the cause and push
through and frame an intervention, and little domestic pressure existed to overcome the
fact that administration leaders simply did not perceive Rwanda as a national security
priority. With that in mind, the administration can be said to have acted rationally in
deciding not to intervene.

60 Clinton. 584.
61 This was confirmed by the Joint Staff in an interagency conference on the situation on 11 May. Original
notes in Original document from Ferroggiaro.
62 Power, 2001. The author quotes the Belgian Foreign Minister W illie Claes, who was infamously told by
Christopher that "I have other responsibilities" when discussing the situation.
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There is, interestingly, evidence o f framing as part o f the justification for non
intervention in Rwanda. This can be found in part in the staunch refusal o f the Clinton
administration to use the term genocide in identifying the crisis.63 Not only did the
administration not want to act, since it would be obligated by the 1948 Genocide
convention to do so, but it did not want to be seen as calling out an aggressive act without
being willing to do anything about it. 64 The resultant potential loss o f legitimacy
weighed heavily on the minds o f Department o f State lawyers and NSC staffers such as
Susan Rice, who openly questioned the impact o f using the term might have on the
upcoming mid-term elections.65 The U.S. did not, in fact, even hint at genocide in a
general fashion until May 21, six weeks into the crisis, and well after most o f the killing
had taken place.66 This was a result o f a series o f consultations involving the Africa
Bureau, the International Organizations Bureau, and the Legal Department at State,
which approved the statement that “Acts o f genocide had occurred,” even though those
acts were still ongoing at that date.67 As late as June 10th, a Department o f State
spokesperson still refused to openly use the term, and it was on that date that Secretary o f
State Christopher finally used the term publicly. Thus, the only significant framing o f the
crisis was to actively frame the effort not to respond to the crisis in Somalia. To be fair,
however, this appeared at the time to be a bold move, considering that the UN itself did
not refer to the situation in Rwanda as genocide until over a month later, in July.68

63 Talentino. 127.
64 Halberstam. 273.
65 Rice quoted in Power, 2001. Although she later denied memory o f the statement, it was corroborated by
other members o f the working group on the conference call.
66 Power, Samantha. A Problem From Hell: America and the A ge o f Genocide. N ew York: Harper
Collins. 2002. 366.
67 Original M emo in Ferroggiaro.
68 Sheffer. 130.
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Conclusion

“America's new peacekeeping doctrine, o f which Clarke was the primary
architect, was unveiled on May 3, and U.S. officials applied its criteria zealously.
PDD-25 did not merely circumscribe U.S. participation in UN missions; it also
limited U.S. support for other states that hoped to carry out UN missions. Before
such missions could gamer U.S. approval, policymakers had to answer certain
questions: Were U.S. interests at stake? Was there a threat to world peace? A
clear mission goal? Acceptable costs? Congressional, public, and allied support?
A working cease-fire? A clear command-and-control arrangement? And, finally,
what was the exit strategy?”
Samantha Power, 2001.69

No senior leader wanted intervention in Rwanda strongly enough to force the
issue.

This was true from the UN to the U.S. and its allies.

As the springtime o f

slaughter continued, there was simply no leadership provided by the White House, and no
member o f the top foreign policy hierarchy was motivated enough to bring their political
cache to bear on the Rwanda issue. As then Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, who was
working on policy issues at the Pentagon put it “The Pentagon is always going to be the
last to want to intervene. It is up to the civilians to tell us they want to do something and
we'll figure out how to do it."

7ft

While this opinion is not always true, what is the case is

that with no senior leaders arguing for intervention, the next tier down, the deputies and
department heads, were not going to stick their own necks out in favor o f a troop
deployment into combat operations in the middle o f Africa.
reigned supreme.

69 Power, 2001.
70 Clark interview with Power, 2001.

And so, the status quo
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The findings in the Rwanda case can be simply stated. In terms o f the process
used in decision making, the models provided by Allison and Yetiv stand up well.
Cabinet departments defaulted to their institutional positions, and no senior leader chose
to break the deadlock.

In fact, the institutional biases, and that o f President Clinton,

against action were so strong that no serious effort was made to have the senior level
discussion that might have led to action. Due to this, the idea o f the powerful individual
is negatively verified, in that, lacking a strong, well placed motivator or spokesperson, no
intervention took place.

Similarly, other than the discussion and debate on using the

word genocide, there was no attempt to frame an intervention, rather the opposite, as
events in Rwanda were repeatedly downplayed by government spokespersons.
Unfortunately for the people o f Rwanda, the arithmetic was quite simple. No consensus
and no framing meant no intervention.
This mini case study described the genocide in Rwanda and the decision not to
intervene. It noted the new set o f personalities and different decision making dynamic o f
the first Clinton administration, and the impact o f a perceived failure in the Somalia
intervention on the possibility o f involvement in the Rwandan Civil War and genocides.
This study stands as a stark example o f a situation in which no powerful decision maker
is motivated to force government decision making and framing efforts for armed
humanitarian intervention.

Without either, there was no motivation among key

stakeholders, namely Congress and the American public, for intervention. Ultimately,
the genocide in Rwanda would spark a discussion on human security and the meaning o f
state sovereignty when human rights and security were endangered.

The resulting

thought process in the international community was that states which did not adequately
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address human security needs might have their sovereignty abrogated by the international
community, the core o f the idea that would become the doctrine o f Responsibility to
Protect (R2P).

That discussion would help to fuel future armed humanitarian

interventions, most particularly the remaining two case studies, the Kosovo intervention
o f 1999 and the Libya intervention o f 2011.

Case Study: Kosovo - Madeleine’s War: March, 1999

“The Balkans produce more history than they consume,” Winston Churchill1
“Ambassador Frank G. W isner... laments that the U.S. Department o f State has a
“very thin” understanding o f history’s role in shaping politics and state policies in
Southeast Europe.”2
“Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative.” President William J. Clinton, March
2 4 ,1999.3

The U.S. led NATO military intervention in Kosovo began on March 24, 1999. It
continued through June, consisting primarily o f an increasingly intense series o f airstrikes
intended both to convince Serbia to cease its internal persecution o f Kosovar Albanians
and to materially degrade its capability to do so.4 According to Houghton, approximately
1,000 aircraft, mostly American, flew 38,000 combat missions as part o f the

1 Phillips, David L. Liberating Kosovo: C oercive D iplom acy an d U.S. Intervention. Cambridge, MA:
Belfer Center, 2012. 3.
2 Excerpt from interview with Frank Wisner, August 31, 2010. Phillips. 4.
3 Clinton, William J. “Excerpt from transcript o f the President’s Address.” University o f Virginia, March
24, 1999. http://millercenter.org.scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3932. A ccessed October 15, 2014.
4 Clinton. William J. M y Life. N ew York: Knopf, 2004. 941.
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intervention.5 This included contributions from 18 o f the 19 members o f NATO at the
time.6 The decision to intervene in Kosovo has its roots both in the early incidents o f the
Yugoslav Civil War from 1991-1996 and the interventions and non-interventions which
preceded it, including the Somalia intervention and the Rwanda non-intervention.

It

came at a time when the international community, stung by its failure to prevent the
massacre in Rwanda, began to seriously discuss human security and its relevance, and
potential dominance over traditional concepts o f state sovereignty.

This would

eventually lead to the development o f the concept o f Responsibility to Protect (R2P),
which will be discussed more fully in the context o f the third case study, the Libya
intervention.7 In fact, the air campaign in Serbia and Kosovo marked the first time that
an armed humanitarian intervention would take place in an internationally recognized,
undisputedly sovereign state, a fact in which it differs from the Somalia case study.8
This case study will examine the historical precedents for the intervention, noting
the historical factors which caused the crisis and the intervention. It will also examine
the changes in the second Clinton administration which helped to facilitate the
intervention. One notable leader and two strong supporting actors took the lead both in
the process. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, special envoy Richard Holbrooke,
and General Wesley Clark acted as powerful leaders in pushing the decision making
cycle, and as powerful spokespersons in the framing process for the intervention. The
study will also examine the role o f President Clinton and presidential politics (in
5 Houghton, David P. The D ecision Point: Six C ases in U.S. Foreign P olicy D ecision Making. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013. 195.
6 Greece was the only holdout. A lso noteworthy is that the operation saw the first participation in external
operations by the German Air Force since the end o f the Second World War.
7 Hehir, Aidan. The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Future o f Humanitarian
Intervention. N ew York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 30.
8 Talentino, Andrea K. M ilitary Intervention After the C o ld War: The Evolution o f Theory a n d Practice.
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005. 242-243.
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particular, ongoing effort to impeach Clinton over the Monica Lewinsky scandal), the
UN, Congress, NATO and the media both on the decision making process and as each
was impacted by the decision making and framing processes.9 Significantly, alliance
politics were present in Kosovo in a way that they were not before, and the role o f a
powerful international ally, the UK, will be considered.

Lessons learned from the

intervention, including how the Kosovo intervention impacted future humanitarian
interventions, will also be discussed.

Kosovo and Yugoslavia, J 989-1999 Background to Intervention

Through the early and late 1990s, Yugoslavia and the deteriorating situation there
were at the forefront o f world politics. As noted, the brief, bloody interlude in Rwanda
did little to distract from concurrent events in the Balkans. And it was the failure to
intervene in the African nation which would ignite a renewed discussion o f intervention,
and a greater readiness on behalf o f the international community and the U.S. to militarily
intervene in humanitarian affairs crises in the future. 10 The NATO intervention in
Kosovo would be an example o f this increased zeal. By 1998, Kosovo remained as one
o f the last unresolved ethnic disputes resulting from the breakup o f Yugoslavia." With
two million inhabitants, it was, although nominally a part o f Serbia, 90% Albanian in
ethnic makeup.
9 Rothkopf, David. Running the World: The inside Story o f the N ational Security Council an d the
A rchitects o f Am erican P ow er Public Affairs. N ew York: Perseus Group, 2005. 373.
10 Talentino. 127.
11 The other remaining flashpoint in Serbia is the Hungarian dominated province o f Vojvodina, north o f
Belgrade. The remaining disputes focus on outside claim s to various pieces o f former Yugoslav states, and
semantic issues such as the name o f Macedonia, which is disputed by Greece. Hill, Christopher R.
Outpost: Life on the Frontline o f American Diplomacy - a memoir. N ew York: Simon and Schuster,
2014. 448.
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Serious persecution of the Kosovar Albanians had commenced with the ascension
to power o f Slobodan Milosevic in 1987, and continued with increasing severity
throughout the period of the breakup of Yugoslavia, an event which overshadowed it in
the eyes o f the western media.12 The primary pro-Kosovar leader, Ibrahim Rugova, had,
since 1992, led a non-violent campaign on behalf o f his people, but he was increasingly
sidelined as Serb hostility bred a hostile Kosovar response.

Kosovar Albanians were

surprised by their seeming abandonment by the west, as their leaders had expected the
negotiations which led up to the Dayton Peace Accords in 1996 to include favorable
resolutions to all remaining territorial disputes, including their ow n.13 According to
DiPrizio, this occurred as an implicit tradeoff to Serbia on Bosnia, since the Serbs would
never have agreed to a linkage between the two issues.14 On the other hand, Albright
notes that the Kosovar Albanians were well aware that they were nearly alone o f
Yugoslavia’s ethnic groups in not achieving independence from Serbia.15
In the spring of 1998, an extensive, systematic attack on Kosovar Albanians
began, with two results. The first was a wave o f thousands o f refugees, eventually rising
to 750,000, which fled to whichever country would accept them .16 The second was an
increase in the power, and effectiveness, o f the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Since
its inception in November, 1997, The KLA eschewed the non-violent means o f Rugova,
and actively sought the means to retaliate against the Serbs in any way it could,

12 Independent International Com mission on K osovo Report. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. 3839.
13 Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War. N ew York: The M odem Library, 1999. 273.
14 DiPrizio, Robert C. A rm ed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions fro m Northern Iraq to Kosovo.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. 218.
15 Albright, Madeleine. M adam Secretary, A M emoir. N ew York: Harper Collins, 2013. 383.
16 Blair, Tony. A Journey: M y P olitical Life. London: Knopf, 2010. 252.
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eventually be classified as a terrorist organization by the U .S.17 Following economic
unrest in Albania in 1997, the KLA received, through theft and direct aid, enough
Albanian military weapons to seriously destabilize the situation.18 Its actions caused a
violent thought loop by blurring the nature o f the Serbian response between legitimate
police and counter terror action and its own barbarous acts.19 The U.S. envoy, Robert
Gelbard did not help the situation by quickly branding the KLA as a terrorist group,
which could be seen to legitimize the Serb response.

By summer, 1998, attacks on

ethnic Albanians had escalated to the point that U.S. interest began to peak, with a pivotal
report by Julia Taft, Assistant Secretary o f State for Population, Refugees, and Migration.
Discussing a recent investigative mission to Kosovo, she notably described a region on
the precipice o f genocide.21
Given the general consensus not to involve ground troops in the intervention, the
administration decided to press on the diplomatic front.

The lead negotiator for the

region, Gelbard, proved to be incapable o f dealing adequately with Milosevic.22 In
October, 1998, therefore, Richard Holbrooke, although not currently holding an
appointed government office, was therefore sent to Belgrade to negotiate on Kosovo,
armed with the threat o f air strikes.23 Christopher Hill, the American Ambassador to
Macedonia, was sent to accompany him due to his expertise in the region and the fact that
17 Zenko, Micah. “C oercive Diplomacy Before the War in K osovo, Case 252.” Washington: Georgetown,
Walsh School o f the Foreign Service, 2001. 3.
18 Hill, Christopher R. Outpost: Life on the Frontline o f American Diplomacy - a Memoir. N ew York:
Simon and Schuster, 2014. 101.
19 Albright. 389.
20 Hill. 104.
21 Department o f State N ew s Briefing, Julia V. Taft, Assistant Secretary o f State, Bureau o f Population,
R efugees, and Migration, and Eileen M alloy, Deputy Secretary o f State for European and Canadian Affairs,
September 9, 1998. Included in Zenko. 3. Her exact description was “An Erie Landscape, teetering on
the brink.”
22 Hill. 100. Gelbard was see to be “T oo honest and blunt” for the job, treating Serb leaders as though
there were Latin American crime lords as a result o f previous work in that region.
23 Clinton. 940. He notes that air strikes were threatened by NA TO on 13 October.
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Holbrooke had been a private citizen and uninvolved in the peace process since Dayton.24
Their efforts seemed to be successful in the short term, but the Racak massacre proved
that Milosevic’s promises were not trustworthy. Much as the loss o f the 1992 election
served as the catalyst for President Bush’s volte face on Somalia, Racak proved to be the
turning point on intervention in Kosovo.

By late January, 1999, the impeachment

proceedings were over, and while the Clinton White House certainly lost some moral
authority as a result, the end o f the trial meant that Clinton could not look on Kosovo
with an undistracted eye. With this in mind, Albright personally galvanized her fellow
cabinet members into action, particularly over a 4 day period beginning on January 19th.25
Even though they were known to be opposed just weeks before the start o f operations,
Albright’s rhetoric drug her peers along.26 Keeping the aversion to ground invasion in
mind, she convinced Defense Secretary Cohen, National Security Advisor Berger, and
Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs Air Force General Hugh Shelton to agree on a set o f guiding
directives for negotiation and intervention.27 These were agreed to by the main players,
and consented to by a newly interested Clinton.
This agreement, to back diplomacy with the threat o f force, to include NATO, and
to force the two parties to meet under the auspices o f the International Contact Group,
which included the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. The meeting, which
occurred under British and French leadership at Rambouillet, began on February 6, 1999,
and lasted for a month, but neither the Serbs nor the Kosovar Albanians could be made to
accept mutually agreeable terms, in spite o f a renewed embargo on Serbia, and the threat

24 Hill. 104.
25 Albright. 397.
26 Gellman, Barton. “The Path to Crisis: How the United States and its A llies Went to War.” The
Washington Post, 18 April 1999, A l.
27 Ibid.

165
o f a naval blockade o f the Albanian ports through which the Kosovar Albanians imported
the majority o f their military supplies.28 Morton Halperin, Department o f State Director
o f Policy Planning, noted that as the negotiations drug on, U.S. intelligence services
noted a significant buildup o f Serb forces in and near Kosovo, after pressuring the
removal o f the observer team provided by the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), the Serbs launched an ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo.29
In direct terms, the failure to reach an agreement on the status o f Kosovo at the
Rambouillet conference led to the U.S. led military intervention in Serbia, although key
leaders such as Albright, Clark, and Solana expected both the diplomatic failure and the
subsequent intervention.

Serbian intransigence at the negotiating table strengthened

western resolve to act, and to follow the lead o f a U.S. government that, due to Albright’s
efforts, already say military intervention as the only way to compel compliance from
Belgrade.30 The conference ended on 18 March, the final foreign policy meeting, at
which the definitive decision for intervention was taken, occurred on the 19th, and the
bombing began one week later.31
The European members o f NATO, having concluded the rest o f the Yugoslav
Civil War, and having endured a series o f public embarrassments, such as the failures to
protect Muslim minorities in Srebrenica and Gorazde, had little stomach for further
conflict with Serbia, and would have to be led into any intervention by the United States.
Tony Blair, the UK Prime Minister, worked hard to personally change this stance from

28 Clinton. 940. The Albanians eventually agreed to terms, but they were not accepted by the Belgrade
government. Clinton thought that he could work with Rugova, but not the KLA.
9 Halperin, Morton. “ Winning the Peace, ” from Buckley, William Joseph. Kosovo: C ontending Voices
on Balkan Interventions. Grand Rapids, Ml: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000. 227.
30 Talentino. 261.
31 Clinton. 940. Clinton emphasized that he approved o f the Airstrikes.
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January, 1998 onwards, and during the intervention would work closely with Clinton,
splitting the duty o f coalition cheerleader.

Furthermore, with NATO forces already on

the ground in Bosnia as a result o f the Dayton Accords, where they would be vulnerable
to Serb reprisals, it was unreasonable to expect there to be no NATO voice in decision
making.33
Notably among the cases examined, and in U.S. post-Cold War interventions in
general, there was no specific guidance, in the form o f a resolution, from the United
Nations Security Council on the events in Kosovo. The U.S., and NATO, would, in
effect, be acting bilaterally on the issue. This was due to the question o f Russia and how
it perceived the intervention in Serbia.

Historically, Russia had seen itself as the

protector o f the Slavic peoples. This feeling was so powerful that in 1914, Russia had
mobilized its army against the Austro-Hungarian Empire in retaliation for Austrian
attacks on Serbia, an act which helped bring about the First World War. U.S. envoy to
Russia Strobe Talbot called the Kosovo decisions and intervention “the most severe,
dangerous, and consequential crisis in U.S.-Russian relations in the post-Cold War
period.34

Russia’s stance, according to Talbot, was that western involvement in a

traditionally Russian sphere o f influence would critically damage pro-western reform
efforts in the country.35 Twice, during the October threat o f attacks that led to the final
Holbrooke agreement, and once, in late March, 2008, the Yeltsin government threatened
the U.S. over Kosovo.

It was Serbian intransigence, and continued flaunting by

Milosevic o f attempts to negotiate, that allowed Moscow its way out, and there was a

32 Blair. 252.
33 Gellman. A l.
34 Talbot, Strobe. The Russia Hand: A M emoir o f P residential D iplom acy. N ew York: Random House,
2003. 334.
35 Ibid. 348.
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tacit agreement that Russia would not bring the intervention to the UN Security Council
because o f this.36
The United Nations, unlike previous humanitarian interventions in the 1990’s,
was not a leading player in Kosovo, in part because Serbia’s patron, Russia, sat on the
UN Security Council ready to use its veto to protect Belgrade. Sanctions and projects for
humanitarian assistance, but not intervention, were approved by Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1160 in March, 1998.37 The strongest UN statement on the issue
came in September 1998, with Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1199.

The

resolution did recognize the threat that Kosovo posed to “peace and security in the
region,” but went no farther, and did not authorize action.

A follow on measure,

UNSCR 1203, passed on October 24th, 1998, led to the OSCE support o f the Kosovo
Verification Mission, which was supposed to monitor the ceasefire that Holbrooke had
brokered, but the mission was ill defined and coordinated, and in any case the ceasefire
that it was supposed to monitor was tenuous at best.39 As part o f the deal, Milosevic also
pledged political conciliation and the chance for displaced persons to return to their
homes, but these agreements were never kept.

36 Talbot. 348.
37 United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 1160.” N ew York: March 31, 1998.
http://unscr.eom/en/resolutions/l 160. A ccessed on October 16, 2014.
38 United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 1199.” N ew York: September 23, 1998
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1199. A ccessed on October 16,2014.
39 University o f the West o f England. “K osovo Documents.” Bristol, UK.
www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/kosovo/kosovo-docum ents7.htm . A ccessed on October 16, 2014.
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The U.S. and the World in 1999, Context fo r Intervention

In every case o f foreign policy decision making, the decisions made have to be
taken in the context o f the broader state o f the U.S. and the world at the time o f the crisis.
For the Clinton administration, the implosion o f the Russian economy and the economic
collapse o f the Asian Tigers was a number one priority for attention and effort.40 Within
months, the economies of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Hong Kong,
and South Korea spun out o f control, undoing years o f double digit growth, and dragging
Russia along with them. Similarly, the rise o f China as a serious economic competitor
was underway. Clinton would fly to China in 1998, followed by visit by the Chinese
premier Zhu Rongji to discuss Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization. Details
such as arranging for Clinton to avoid Tiananmen Square, the site o f the brutal 1989 civil
rights crackdown, absorbed time and attention.41 Meanwhile, North Korea demonstrated
its capability to launch a multi stage rocket, increasing its ability to threaten U.S. interests
in East Asia.42 Further south, India shocked the world by conducting a nuclear test which
was mirrored weeks later by Pakistan.43
Perennial problems in the Middle East and Africa continued. The death o f King
Hussein o f Jordan caused concern over the succession to the Hashemite throne, while the
Middle East peace process was at a standstill.44 Saddam Hussein continued to cause
trouble for the U.S., while in Africa, war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and
ongoing civil wars in Zaire and Sudan also competed for attention. Al Qaeda inspired

40 DiPrizio. 135.
41 Daalder. 251.
42 Albright. 354.
43 Clinton. 867.
44 Ibid.
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attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania occurred, and taken with the decision
making surrounding the retaliatory cruise missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan, this
served to push events in the Balkans further to the back burner o f public awareness.45
Cuba was in the news, according to Albright, when a Papal visit to the communist island
state raised the possibility o f political change there, and with that possibility came
attention from the administration.46
Europe provided a positive glimmer, but the source o f the good news was not in
the Balkans, or in Russia, but rather in violence plagued Northern Ireland. According to
Clinton, the negotiation o f the Good Friday Agreement in May, 1998, largely ending
three decades o f sectarian violence in the province, drew considerable attention just as the
conflict between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians was entering a deadly phase.47 Events in
Russia, which was still in the throes o f unrest in Chechnya tempered this positive news
and created more work for the Clinton Administration. Russia came to see the Kosovar
Albanians as Serbia’s version o f the Chechens, and, given its violent response to Chechen
rebels in 1995, Moscow’s tendency was to let Belgrade deal with the Kosovar Albanians
in a similarly brutal fashion.48
Domestically, a primary, and, indeed, overwhelming preoccupation o f the
administration was the Monica Lewinski affair and the impeachment proceedings which
stemmed from it. From August, 1998, when Lewinski testified to a grand jury on the
president’s sexual activity, to January, 1999, when the impeachment ended, the affair

45 Albright. 363. She described the day o f the attacks, August 7, 1998, as the “worst day o f her life.”
46 Ibid. 334-336.
47 Clinton. 867.
48 Talbot. 348.
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dominated the attention o f the media and the White House.49 Ivo Daalder cites the
combination o f the end of the Lewinsky affair, and its coincidence in time with the Racak
massacre, as the two events which brought Clinton fully on board intellectually with the
Kosovo intervention discussions, which had hitherto been handled nearly exclusively by
Berger (to the dismay o f Albright).50 Furthermore, a pre-election financial scandal, the
Whitewater affair, was nearing its own completion and this also absorbed presidential
attention.

Ken Starr, the independent prosecutor assigned to the case, was publically

tracking down leads throughout 1998, and is frequently mentioned in the Clinton
memoirs.51 A glimmer o f redemption and relief on this issue would not come until the
acquittal o f Susan MacDougal, one o f the defendants, on April 12, 1999, in the midst o f
e'y

the Kosovo War.

These pressures forced Clinton, who had grown considerably in his

effectiveness as a foreign policy president, to return to the strategy o f his first years in
offices, in other words, to let his delegates handle international crises. This would not, at
first, bode well for Kosovo.

The Clinton Administration in Its Second Half, Leadership, Processes, and Strong Voices

1994 was a key year for the administration.

The Republican congressional

victory in November o f that year brought the administration under repeated attacks from
key opposition leaders on the direction, or lack o f direction, that administration policies

49 Albright. 352.
50 Daalder. Ivo, and Destler, I.M. In the Shadow o f the O val Office: Profiles o f the N ational Security
Advisors an d the Presidents They Served - fro m Jfk to G eorge W. Bush. N ew York: Simon and Schuster,
2009. 254.
51 Clinton. 920.
52 Ibid. 942.
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undertook.53 While his chances for a second term were in question after these mid-term
elections, Clinton beat Senator Robert Dole handily in 1996, and became the first
Democrat president to be reelected to a full term since Franklin Roosevelt.54 While the
Dayton Peace Accords o f 1996, which brought an end to the main actions o f the breakup
o f Yugoslavia, gave the administration a solid foreign policy victory on which to hang its
reputation, the rhetoric o f weakness continued and would be a factor in future
administration decision making.55
The years between 1994 and 1998 saw significant changes both in the outlook o f
the Clinton Administration and in its leadership. In terms o f personal growth, the events
in Somalia, Rwanda, and elsewhere had taught President Clinton that he could not simply
delegate foreign relations to his subordinates, but would have to take a steady, consistent
role in the national security decision making process, and he became more comfortable
doing so.56 Clinton had also emerged as one o f the world’s senior statesmen, not only in
the obvious power o f the U.S., but in terms o f his own time in officer and personal
growth in that office.

en

According to Henry Kissinger, Clinton and many on his staff

were still too keen to conflate foreign and domestic policies, and to see the former as an
£D

extension of the latter.

At his core, he remained far more pragmatic and less moralistic

than his subordinates, particularly Madeleine Albright, who was now Secretary o f State.59

53 Hyland. 139.
54 Daalder. 251.
55 Hyland. 145. In the fall elections, the Republicans took control o f the U.S. House and Senate for the
first time since 1952.
56 Houghton. 201.
57 Albright. 350.
58 Kissinger, Henry. “K osovo and the Vicissitudes o f American Foreign policy. Doing Injury to History.”
N ewsweek, April 15, 1999. From Buckley. 296.
59 Houghton. 213.
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Albright, the first female Secretary o f State, brought a strong awareness o f the
need o f her new role, having moved up from her previous position as Ambassador to the
UN. Her formative years were dominated by experiences surrounding the Second World
War, and the parallels she drew to the situation in the Balkans referred back to Hitler,
Munich, and appeasement. By 1998, Albright had been part o f the leadership team since
the beginning o f the administration, and was a powerful advocate for a number o f causes,
one o f which became Kosovo. She distinctly lamented the failure to act in the Rwandan
genocide, and was quick to use her position o f new found importance to ensure that
neither another Rwanda nor another Munich or Auschwitz would happen on her watch.60
Completing the diplomatic side o f the leadership trio which pushed for
intervention was Richard Holbrooke. Holbrooke had a deep history in the Department o f
State going back to the Vietnam War, 'and an equally deep commitment to the concept o f
Atlanticism and the value o f maintaining peace in Europe.61 While he saw the need for
UN approval for interventions, he was also willing to press for armed humanitarian
interventions without the UN if need be.62 Holbrooke brought with him a close working
relationship with two people who would prove to be critical in the Kosovo crisis. The
first was Slobodan Milosevic.

Holbrooke had forged a relationship with and

understanding o f Milosevic which made him the go to diplomat for dealing with him, as
well as the acknowledged expert on how to deal with him. Second was Wesley Clark,
who worked with him on the negotiation o f the Dayton Accords and with whom he

“ Albright. 386. She pointedly reminded Berger when discussing M ilosevic in April, 1998, that she was
Secretary, not Ambassador, and could not be dismissed now as she had been previously.
61 Chollet, Derek, and Power, Samantha. The Unquiet American: R ichard H olbrooke in the World. N ew
York: Public Affairs 2012. 165.
62 Holbrooke, Richard. “Speech at the National Press Club, Novem ber 2, 1999.” From Chollet and Power.
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would work on both the diplomatic front o f the Kosovo crisis as well as pressing for
military intervention when those negotiations failed.63
With the departure o f Anthony Lake, his deputy, Sandy Berger took his place.
Berger’s primary goal was to provide advice that fit his intense awareness o f Clinton’s
political needs at a given moment.64 However, Berger was positively described as being
highly analytical, incisive, and working well with the other members o f the cabinet, as
well as having near identical feelings on events as his presidential supervisor.65 Albright
describes their relationship, which would be central to the successful push for
intervention, and not always perfect, but better than it could have been, and they were in
frequent communication.66
Berger’s style was a significant, but logical changeover from that o f Lake. He
established strong rules for behavior, emphasizing the need for team work, and
particularly by avoiding “policy debate via press conference.”67

According to Ivo

Daalder, he made better use o f the Principal’s committee on the NSC to generate well
thought out and debated recommendations for President Clinton to consider. Very little
actually reached him without having been considered in this way.68 Furthermore, he gave
voice to key leaders, such as Holbrooke, CJCS Shelton, and CIA chief George Tenet by
having them join the senior group for meeting twice a week. This came to be known and
the ABC lunches, with the acronyms standing for Albright, Berger, and Cohen.69
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Like his predecessors, Les Aspin and William Perry, William Cohen, the new
secretary o f defense, was not inclined to fight against the customary uniformed military
reluctance to use force.70 Having voted against the interventions in Bosnia which led to
the Dayton Accords, Cohen now sought to protect U.S. forces there by staying out of
further military entanglements with Serbia.71 Furthermore, the uniformed leadership o f
the military, even six years into the administration, still bore a fundamental mistrust of
Clinton and his senior cabinet officials, a mistrust that was largely reciprocated by the
civilian leadership in the White House.72 In contrast to the earlier interventions, in which
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs took the lead, however, the
key mover in breaking the deadlock in the Department o f Defense turned out to be the
commander on the ground, General Wesley Clark, the NATO and U.S. European
Command leader who described him self as “a greater activist than most o f the people in
the military.”73 Clark had been closely connected with Holbrooke, working with him in
the negotiation o f the Dayton Accords in 1996.74 Like Albright, his view o f Milosevic
and the threat he posed to the peace o f Europe was harsh.75 Wearing, as he did, two
military hats, that o f a U.S. regional commander and that o f a NATO coalition
headquarters, Clark was uniquely situated to understand the impact o f action, or inaction,
on the alliance, which would be engaging in what was only its second combat operation
in the fifty years o f its existence.76 Unlike his military peers, he dealt with civilian
leaders with some level o f comfort, if not ease, and was therefore trusted by them, while
70 Rodman. 208.
71 Zenko. 5.
72 Halbertsam. 418.
73 Blumenthal, Sydney. The Clinton Wars. N ew York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2003. 640.
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on the other hand many o f his military peers found him to be abrasive and a source o f
resentment.77 Like Albright, he was willing and able to establish direct linkages to the
president and to the National Security Advisor rather than have his role be limited by his
direct superior, Cohen.

-»o

He was regularly in contact with Berger directly, a fact which

actually stiffened the bureaucratic stances o f his DOD leadership, such as Chairman
Shelton, against him and against the intervention.79
The Clinton team, having now been together, by and large, for six years by the
time Kosovo became a critical issue, had indeed gelled and matured in a way that was not
true during the Rwandan Crisis. However, it would never be the type o f team that the
George H.W. Bush had led during his Presidency. Indeed, such a team would have been
impossible to create, given Clinton’s path to the White House from a small state
governorship. Further, its focus on domestic policy and partisan combat were in stark
contrast to the Bush administration (who, it must be countered, lost their bid for
reelection in part because o f the lack o f domestic focus.) However, it was at least a team
experienced with the hard knocks o f foreign and domestic policy, and o f partisan politics.
It was also a team that, according to Albright, was friendly and socially active with each
other.

RA

In Berger, Clinton had a perfect foil, and well understood the capabilities and

foibles o f his senior cabinet team, most particularly Albright.
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Who Is Behind the Wheel? Drivers fo r Intervention

“When we were fighting against Hitler, it wasn’t just Hitler; it was fighting
against fascism... and when w e’re dealing with a now indicted war criminal such
as Milosevic, it isn’t just him. It is struggling against a concept, which is that it is
not appropriate, possible, or permissible for one man to uncork ethnic nationalism
as a weapon.”
Secretary o f State Madeleine Albright, 10 June, 1999 interview on MacNeil
Lehrer News Hour.81

Before the Dayton accords in 1995, Bosnia stood out as a symbol o f failure for the
Clinton administration’s foreign policy initiatives, and NATO credibility became an issue
just as important, if not more, than the situation on the ground in Kosovo.82 NATO
intervention and the positioning o f U.S. forces in Bosnia helped to secure the region and
limit the ability o f Serbia to continue aggressive acts there.

Kosovo, however, was a

different case, as the embattled region was a province o f Serbia itself, and not a separate
region o f the former Socialist Republic o f Yugoslavia.

The province, which was

overwhelmingly populated by ethnic Albanians, held a central position in the Serbian
psyche because o f the battle which was fought there against the Ottoman Empire on June
28, 1389.83
As early as December 1992, then President Bush had warned the Belgrade regime
that the U.S. would not tolerate a Serb crackdown on Kosovo, in what was known as his
“Christmas warning” .

The newly elected President Clinton confirmed this warning,

81 Albright interview on the McNeil/Lehrer Newshour, 10 June 1999. From Schnabel, Albrecht and
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following which Kosovo promptly dropped off the international or domestic U.S. radar
screens, since it was an internal matter, and seemed to pale in significance compared to
other issues, such as Somalia, Rwanda, and nearby Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.84 In
1996, Kosovo, which had heretofore emphasized non-violent action to achieve
independence from Serbia, began to see an uptick in armed resistance. The U.S. seemed
to reinforce this in tacit ways, for example, by opening a U.S. Information Agency
information center in Prishtina, the capital o f Kosovo, in July, 1996, which was
considered to be a de-facto embassy in the province.85

By spring, 1998, with the

aforementioned events having been resolved, the western governments began to focus on
the Kosovo issue, although the fact that there had been no game changing event, such as
the Siege o f Sarajevo, or the destruction o f Srebrenica, to galvanize around, not would
there be until the Racak massacre in January, 1999.86 Racak proved to be the game
changing moment that allowed Albright to bring her full persuasive power to bear on the
situation. William Walker, head o f the OSCE Verification Team, who called Racak a
crime against humanity in a Prishtina press conference that was not approved by the
White House, while an aide remembered that Wesley Clark said that, as a result o f Racak,
he “had them where he wanted them,” meaning that force would now be on the table.87
Madeleine Albright emerged as the most senior, and powerful administration
voice in favor o f military intervention in the Balkans in general and in the Kosovo crisis
in particular, in this they were joined by the Vice President, Al Gore.88

Richard

Holbrooke became assistant secretary o f state for European affairs, and special envoy to
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the Balkans. It was his efforts which brought about a successful conclusion to the Dayton
Peace Talks and put him in a key position to influence the Kosovo intervention.
Holbrooke was trusted by U.S. leaders for his seeming ability to force Milosevic to
comply with their demands, similarly, the Serbian leader seemed to respect Holbrooke as
OQ

a negotiator.

He had arranged a meeting between Milosevic and the Kosovar leader

Rugova which took place in May, 1998, but nothing meaningful came o f the event.90 A
meeting between the two in October, 1998, led to a ceasefire, but this had little meaning
since the KLA were thereby emboldened to increase their attacks on Serb forces, which
simply encouraged greater Serb intervention and an intensification o f the spiral o f
violence.91 Furthermore, the negotiations had been explicitly underpinned by a NATO
threat to begin air strikes within four days if no agreement was reached.92 Clinton made
his decision to approve intervention when Serbia failed to sign on the Rambouillet
proposals.93 When Holbrooke returned to Belgrade in March, 1999, after the failure at
Rambouillet, his presence was more o f a last ditch effort to inform Milosevic o f the threat
o f force than a serious peace m ission94 This is the one example from the case studies
that seems to fit with the “implemental mindset” discussed as part o f Dominic Tierney’s
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“Rubicon Model” meaning that there was not going to be a backing down from attack by
that point.95
Albright continued in her role as the hawk in terms o f NATO intervention in
Kosovo, and she was skeptical that any diplomatic course that was not backed by force
could be ultimately successful.96 Her position became so outspoken that Berger, now the
National Security Advisor, frequently prevented communications from her reaching
President Clinton, a situation which remained nearly constant until the Racak massacre.97
In congressional testimony on the intervention given approximately one month after it
began, Albright laid out the reasons for the U.S. actions. She noted historical importance
o f the Balkans as a cultural and religious crossroads remembering that the First World
War started there. She noted the proximity o f the region to key U.S. Allies such as old
NATO members Greece and Turkey, and new ones such as Hungary and the Czech
Republic. She emphasized that the intervention allowed the U.S. and NATO to live up to
their “highest ideals, and hoped that the intervention would become “a turning point in
no

European history.”

In stark contrast to the decision making process for the Somalia

intervention, the Principal’s committee in the NSC repeatedly deadlocked on the issue,
with the Departments of State and Defense at loggerheads over the potential responses.99
Racak, and the Serbian slaughter o f 45 ethnic Albanians there broke the political
deadlock and set U.S. leaders onto the path o f intervention and allowed Albright,
Holbrooke, and Clark to sway the other key decision makers.100 Over a four day period,
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from January 19 to January 23, 1999, the Principals Committee engaged in the debate
that would ultimately set the U.S. on the path to intervention. As described by Albright,
she convinced the other Principals that a further ultimatum, backed by the threat o f force,
should be placed on the table, and it was this threat which brought about both the peace
conference at Rambouillet and the armed humanitarian intervention which followed.101
During the October crisis, Clark had developed an air campaign which was never
implemented, and proposed a similar military response now .102 Nevertheless, neither
President Clinton nor his Vice President, Albert Gore were interested in deploying troops
into Kosovo, although the events in Rwanda and Bosnia seem to have convinced them
that some military action could w ork.103 They seemed to collectively forget that the
supposed effectiveness o f air strikes in compelling Serbia to negotiate at Dayton failed
was explicitly linked to ground offensives into the region.104
In contrast to the Somalia intervention, in which pressure from Congress was
directly cited as a source o f pressure to intervene, there was little outright support for
military coercion o f Serbia. Albright noted that key leaders, such as Senators Biden and
Lugar, from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Speaker o f the House Dennis
Hastert, were in general support of the air strikes, and that the vote in the Senate
supporting them was respectable, at 58 in favor, 41 against, while the vote in the House
o f Representatives was 219-191, both indicators o f bipartisan support for the air
strikes.105 However, Congressional leaders were strongly opposed to the possibility o f
the use o f ground forces in Kosovo, a fact which significantly influenced the decision to
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intervene and the planning for the implementation once intervention was agreed upon.
The Kosovo crisis covers two Congresses, the 105th and 106th. The 105th Congress,
which lasted from January, 1997 to December, 1998, mentioned Kosovo 461 times, with
seven hearings specifically focused on intervention, and one, that o f 5 October 1998
specifically enjoining the U.S. not to intervene. From January to April 28, 1999, there
were 42 Congressional events about or mentioning Kosovo, with a pivotal hearing
recommending against the use o f ground forces on March 10th 1999.106 Neither Clinton
nor his political allies wished to embark on a major invasion while the presidency was
under attack, with impeachment proceedings underway following the Monica Lewinsky
sex scandal.107 Furthermore, they did not want an extended campaign, particularly a
ground campaign, to last into the fall, when it would potentially cause problems for Al
Gore’s campaign for president.108
Congress came to support the attack decision, but was unwilling to commit
ground forces. This is reflected by two key votes which took place on the first day o f the
air strikes. According to Clinton, the Senate voted 58-41 in support o f the air strikes.
The House also supported them, but was careful to place limits on them. Voting 219191, the House stated that ground troops could only be used in Kosovo after a cease fire,
and only with Congressional approval.109 So throughout, Congress remained reluctant on
a total combat solution to the problem. In April, as pressure to introduce ground forces
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grew, Congress again voted to deny their use.110 Congressional reluctance transferred
itself over to Secretary o f Defense Cohen, who had come to his position directly from
Capitol Hill, voted against action in Bosnia, and now felt caught between the activists and
the non-interested.111
The Pentagon, as it had been in previous cases, was against the intervention and
particularly against the deployment o f ground forces in Serbia and Kosovo, with one
study estimating that 100-200,000 troops would be needed to properly enforce NATO’s
will on the Belgrade regime, and the CIA noting that ethnic cleansing had already begun
I*

there.

'j

Clearly these forces would be primarily supplied by the U.S., something which

the Pentagon was unwilling to do. Buckley notes the dichotomy that, nearly to a fault,
the players pushing for military interventions were all civilians whose outlooks were
shaped by the Vietnam War, while the military, also remembering Vietnam, were by and
i i •>

large against intervention.

Support was bipartisan, according to Hill, with key

conservative figures such as Paul Wolfowitz, a neo-conservative and later an architect o f
the U.S. Global War on Terror, in support o f U.S. efforts to resolve the Kosovo issue
forcefully.114 In a manner reminiscent o f the Vietnam Era, once the bombing began,
Clinton insisted on personally signing off on targets, a process which would limit the
flexibility and effectiveness o f the attacks.115

110 Clinton. 942.
'"R odm an. 226.
112 Harris, John F. “A dvice did not sway Clinton on Airstrikes.” The Washington Post, 1 April 1999. A l.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/april99/clinton040199.htm . A ccessed on 16 October
2014.
113 Buckley. 266.
114 Hill. 108.
115 Houghton. 202-203. President Johnson had adopted a policy o f personally clearing attacks in North
Vietnam, in an effort to avoid antagonizing the Soviet Union and Communist China. Clinton is known to
have been deeply impacted by Vietnam.

183
The most significant international leader pushing for intervention in Somalia had
been UN Secretary General Boutros-Gali, but there was no UN pressure for Kosovo, as
has been discussed.

Instead, international pressure for intervention in Kosovo would

come from two key sources. One, very public voice, was the UK Prime Minister Tony
Blair. In response to the events which led to the fall, 1998 Holbrooke mission, Blair, in a
speech to the UN General Assembly, called the situation in Kosovo an “Impending
humanitarian affairs disaster.” 116 Blair notes that what he calls his “political awakening”
over Kosovo came over the course o f 1998, fueled by UK intelligence reporting over the
rising death toll in the province.117 Blair had developed a close working relationship with
Clinton, which he says was put to the test, particularly over the issue o f ground
intervention, o f which Blair was outspokenly in favor.118 But Blair also understood that
there could be no NATO intervention without the U.S., which would bear 85% o f the
military burden o f the intervention. The relationship stood the test, and the “political soul
mates” continued their collaboration afterward.119
The other, who exerted pressure primarily through NATO military commander
Clark, was that organization’s Secretary General, Javier Solana. Solana was supremely
aware o f the need for successful operations in building NATOs reputation after the Cold
War. One o f his first directive to Clark was to absolutely ensure that the NATO piece o f
the effort which brought Serbia to the table at Dayton succeeded.120 He carried that
determination forward into the Kosovo planning, imploring Clark to make sure that
116 Blair, Tony. “Address by Tony Blair to the United Nations General Assem bly, 21 September 1998.”
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whatever operation be carried out be done under NATO auspices, particularly after
NATO was shut out o f a role in the enforcement o f the October agreement in 1998.121 In
common with the White House, the overwhelming preference for NATO was that there
be an air component o f the operation with no NATO ground forces until after a peace
deal had been forced.

This was in contrast to the view o f military leaders in the

Pentagon, who questioned the utility o f an air only operation, while simultaneously
strongly resisting the idea o f putting boots on the ground.
Support among the NATO allies was varied. UK support for air operations stayed
in the 60-70% range through the conflict, as did the French, with the French showing a
similar taste for ground operations.

In the UK support for ground operations never

rose above 50%. 124 In Germany, on the other hand, support never rose above 30%.125
According to Blair, Solana and Clark welcomed Blair’s assistance in gathering support
for the intervention, which he was happy to give.126 He also helped to deflect calls for an
early cease fire, particularly from the Italians and Germans.127 In Germany, a political
upheaval had just occurred, with incoming Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, a Social
Democrat, leading the first non Christian Democrat (Conservative) government since
1982. The leaders o f the new government, in particular Schroeder and the Green Party
foreign minister, Joschke Fischer, openly supported the operation, and decried Milosevic,
but Schroeder was well aware that the German people were not prepared at first for entry
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into a conflict.128 With this in mind, Schroeder deployed German military forces into
frontline combat operations for the first time since the end o f the Second World War,
saying that the operation was “not a war, but the imposition o f a peaceful solution” to the
crisis.

1?Q

Germany was also keen to reassure its allies that a Social Democrat Germany

could be a reliable military partner.130 However, the bombing campaign revealed a rift in
the German left between those in the former West Germany who supported the military
operation, and those in the former East Germany, in particular members o f the PDS, the
former German communist party, who were decidedly against the intervention, noting
that it had no UN mandate, threatening to break apart the new coalition government and
return the Christian Democrats to power.131 As a result, Schroeder later used his position
as the rotational president o f the EU council to help broker an end to the conflict.132
As Wesley Clark described it, there were four agreed to objectives for the air
offensive with the overall goal o f halting and reversing the ethnic cleansing campaign
and facilitating the return o f the refugees who had already fled. First, it should be as near
to casualty free as possible. Second, it should be focused on the Serb forces who were
actively engaged in ethnic cleansing. Third, following from the second, was the principle
of minimal collateral damage.

Fourth, targets would be chosen with the aim o f

maintaining the alliance’s cohesion.133 With this latter, the credibility o f NATO would

128 Schroder, Gerhard. Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in Der Politik. Hamburg: Ullstein, 2006. 85.
SchrOder, Gerhard. “Erklarung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard SchrOder zur Lage im K osovo.”
Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, March 24, 1999. 41.
130 SchrOder, Gerhard. “Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik an der Schwelle des 21. Jahrhunderts', Rede von
Bundeskanzler SchrOder vor der 35. MUnchener Konferenz zur Sicherheitspolitik.” 6 February 1999, in:
Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik. February 1999. 2 5 ,2 8 .
131 Economist, The. “Germany and Kosovo: The War D ivides.” April 22, 1999.
http://w w w .econom ist.com /node/201137. A ccessed on 28 November 2014.
132 SchrOder, Gerhard. War and Peace, http://gerhard-schroeder.de/en/war-peace/. A ccessed on Novem ber
20, 2014.
133 Clark, W esley. “The Strength o f an A lliance.” September 17, 1999. From Buckley. 253.

186
be protected and enhanced.

Though the initial agreement was for a few nights of

bombing at most, once the campaign began it proved to be easier to continue it than it had
been to negotiate it in the first p lace.134

Public Opinion and the Kosovo Intervention

There was little press coverage o f the Kosovo issue before the Racak massacre in
January, 1999, according to Holbrooke.135

In September, 1998, for example, the

Washington Post reported on the growing number o f refugees in the region, noting that as
many as 300,000 people had been displaced internally by Serb actions.136 The American
public was largely focused on the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and remained largely
uninterested in the events in Kosovo, although this did change somewhat after Racak. As
had been the case with Rwanda, there was little public pressure on the media, Congress,
or the president to act. The Rambouillet conference and the lead up to the intervention in
Serbia saw an uptick in U.S. support for operations.

A Gallup Poll taken twice, on

February and March 19-21, 1998, showed a 3% increase in participants who supported
military operations if no agreement was reached, from 43-46% .137 Similarly, respondents
increasingly conflated Kosovo with U.S. security, and between 19 February and 25
March, the number o f respondents who thought that acting in Kosovo protected U.S.
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interests increased by 6%, from 37 to 43% .138 A summary o f the polling data on the issue
o f U.S. intervention in Kosovo is shown below in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Key polling data on Intervention in Kosovo, February-May 1999

Polling Question: Should the U.S. intervene, or have intervened in
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Source: Polling Report on Serbia and Y ugoslavia139

What is most noteworthy about this collection o f polling data is that support for
intervention grew only slowly through the course o f the Rambouillet peace talks, peaking
only once intervention had actually begun on March 24, 1999. While Kosovo benefited
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from a lengthy period o f framing, this did little to increase enthusiasm for the operation
before it actually began.
The White House first commented on Kosovo in the context o f the intervention
crisis in March, 1998, but it did not emerge in presidential communications as a
standalone issue until June, when Clinton specifically mentioned Milosevic during a joint
statement he gave with Russian President Yeltsin.

From September 1998 onwards, a

series o f communications began to clarify the situation and to frame the intervention,
specifically naming Milosevic and his actions as the problem in the region.140 By early
March, as the negotiations in France were failing, presidential statements increased in
stridency and directly hinted at the air campaign which would follow if negotiations
failed.

Throughout, and throughout the actual bombing campaign, the messaging

remained consistently focused on Milosevic personally and the need to correct his
regime’s “evil.” Indeed, 45% o f Administration speech acts on Kosovo were focused on
the terminology “evil” and aimed at Congress and other government level decision
makers, while 44% focused on justifying “intervention” and were aimed at the media and
the public.141
One part o f the framing effort for intervention was bitterly contested between
supporters and detractors o f the president’s decision making and framing o f the
intervention.

Clinton’s announcement o f the commencement o f bombing attacks, on

February 24, 1999, provided the context o f the intervention to the American people,

140 On October 12, Clinton famously said “Balkan Graveyards are filled with President M ilosevic’s broken
prom ises,” at a fundraiser for Senator Charles Schumer o f N ew York. From Butler, M ichael J. Selling a
'Just' War: Framing, Legitimacy, an d U.S. M ilitary Intervention. N ew York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
146.
141 Ibid. 175.
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framing Milosevic’s actions and explaining the increase in atrocities in Kosovo.142
Clinton also made specific and repeated references to putting troops on the ground. With
his clear statement, “I do not intend to put our troops on the ground in Kosovo to fight a
war,” Clinton sent very mixed signals to the Serb leadership, which military leaders
credit with lengthening the conflict, since it gave them the impression that the
administration was not serious in its intent.143 Clinton’s instinct domestically, however,
appears to have been correct. In Fox News polls in May and June, 1999, specifically
asking about sending ground troops into Kosovo, the results were nearly identical, with
27% in favor and 59-60% against.144 Given the timing o f the polls, this result seems to
be a result o f successful framing o f the issue by the president. In any case, Clinton was
adamant, and claimed throughout, and afterwards, that the introduction o f ground force
into the conflict would ended up claiming more innocent lives than might have been
saved.145
The dueling narratives o f the planning effort turned out to be between the world
views o f the two age groups represented in Clinton’s cabinet. Like George H.W. Bush in
the case o f Saddam Hussein in 1990, Albright was quick to seize on the Munich analogy,
conflating Slobodan Milosevic with Hitler, and strongly urging that he not be appeased
over Bosnia and Kosovo as Hitler had been over the Sudetenland in 193 8.146 Either way,
action was preferred to inaction, regardless o f which imagery was used to appeal to
which audience. Thus avoidance o f Munich and the perceived appeasement o f a new

142 Clinton. 940.
143 Halbertsam. 423.
144 Fox N ew s “Poll o f June, 1999, with the question “Should the U.S. lead ground forces into combat
against the Serbian Army in K osovo?” From Wittkopf, Eugene. The D om estic Sources o f U.S. Foreign
P olicy. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004. 103.
145 Clinton. 941.
146 Halberstam. 261-265.
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Hitler was the primary narrative coming from the Department o f State, while avoidance
o f a Vietnam like quagmire was the mantra o f other governmental departments and the
large cadre of Vietnam veterans serving in the administration and Congress, such as John
McCain, the powerful Republican member o f the Foreign Relations and Armed Service
Committees in the Senate.147 This group also includes Cohen and the senior uniformed
leaders, with the exception o f Clark.

Models and the Kosovo Decision Process

The Kosovo intervention shows in clear focus the role o f the powerful individual,
or group o f individuals, in the decision making process. Madeleine Albright was at the
center o f the process, to the point that the Kosovo conflict was often called “Madeleine’s
War” by her detractors. Holbrooke had a role as well, building on his central role as a
Milosevic expert in the Dayton Peace Accords. Clark’s role was highly significant, as in
spite o f the fact that he did not lead his organization, he was important enough o f a player
to have an independent, and important voice.

President Clinton’s main focus was on

Congressional and public acceptance o f the w ar.148 Outside leaders, particularly Tony
Blair, were also significant to the process, as was the key organizational player, NATO.
Clinton would not have been pushed to agree to intervention without the U.S. trio o f
Albright, Holbrooke and Clark, with Blair thrown in from the outside.

147 Ash, Timothy Garton. “The N ew A d olf Hitler.” Time, 5 April 1999.
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLlTICS/time/1999/03/29/hitler.htm l. A ccessed on 10 October 2014.
D iscussed in Schnabel and Thakur. 349-350.
148 Redd. 7.
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With the exception of Clark’s role, the Governmental Politics Model holds true
for the decision making and framing processes for the Kosovo intervention. Since this
intervention was not in response to a basic humanitarian need such as for food, shelter, or
reconstruction, the agencies focused on those activities, such as OFDA and USAID had
no role in the discussions. This was very much a Defense and Department o f State show,
with the intelligence agencies in a supporting role.

As could be expected, with the

interesting caveat on civilian versus military views on the use o f force, the Department o f
Defense came down in general against involvement, while the Department o f State came
down in favor.
In terms o f framing, this is the first case studied in which a planned framing effort
leading to an intervention took place, indicating the decide/explain/act model in
operation.

Secretary o f State Albright led a deliberate effort to frame the debate on

Kosovo, even pre-empting official statements from the White House and her fellow
cabinet leaders.149 Immediately after the Racak massacre, Albright, then in Moscow,
issued joint statement with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov decrying the event.150 This
was one o f a series o f statements designed to ratchet up the pressure on all parties to act.
However, there is little evidence that there was a government wide effort to frame to
intervention to the public until immediately before the beginning o f combat operations at
the end of March. Efforts to influence the public included use o f Albright’s former boss
at the NSC, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who wrote for the Wall Street Journal supporting an
intervention days before it began. His argument, specifically calling for a massive air

149 DiPrizio. 136. The Author terms it “Leading through Rhetoric” and notes that Albright was targeting
all o f her audiences, including allied governments, the public, and her own cabinet partners.
150 Lippman, Thomas W. M adeleine A lbright an d the N ew Am erican D iplom acy. Boulder, CO: W estview
Press, 2000. 252
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assault on the Belgrade regime, echoed plans and orders that were already being
circulated for implementation.151 The themes were consistent, and delivered at all levels,
from the president down to staffers: Protect human rights, defuse war in the powder keg
o f Europe, and strengthen NATO.152
Tony Blair noted that there was “No direct U.S. interest, no public appetite for
action, in Kosovo,” other than that Europe should take care o f the problem itse lf.153 This
begs the question o f whether the intervention was a rational choice for the Clinton
administration. The rationality o f the Clinton decision to intervene comes not from a
direct threat to the security o f the United States, but from the need to preserve NATO and
prevent strife in Europe.154

An undercurrent from the various political memoirs

examined is the need to prevent another Rwanda or Somalia, both for the political threat
that an additional failure could cause, but also from some sense o f moral outrage against
such events in general. In this, Clinton was thinking o f his legacy, in a way similar to the
way that George H.W. Bush was thinking o f his when he intervened in Somalia in 1992.

Conclusion

According to the Czech President, Vaclav Havel, the Kosovo intervention was the
“first war that has not been waged in the name o f ‘national interest,’ but rather in the
name o f principles and values.” 155 David Gibbs counteracts this idea, claiming that the

151 Quoted in Buckley. 318.
152 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. “In K osovo, U.S. Cannot Stand A lone.” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1999.
Printed in DiPrizio. 141.
Blair. 252.
154 Ibid.
155 Talentino. 255.
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Kosovo intervention was an act o f nearly pure national interest on behalf o f the United
States, which was intent on reaffirming its leadership over Europe and redeeming its
military credibility after failures over the course o f the decade.156 Gibbs focused on the
role o f Holbrooke in what he calls false negotiations, noting in particular the final
Holbrooke trip to Belgrade in March, which he calls simple coercion rather than
diplomacy.157 However, this seems unfair considering the events o f the summer and fall,
1998, in which Holbrooke genuinely tried to negotiate, and the very real massing o f
Serbian forces for ethnic cleansing operations in Kosovo which have been related in this
case study.
At first, the bombing campaign in Kosovo served to intensify Serbian atrocities in
Kosovo, but as the air campaign intensified, Milosevic eventually surrendered to NATO
and allowed NATO troops to enter Kosovo in June, 1999. As Blair related it, Clinton’s
increasing openness to the idea o f a ground war after May 27th was mirrored in the
“crumbling” o f Milosevic’s resolve, in that the more Milosevic appeared to weaken, the
more open to ground troops Clinton became.

I ^R

This led to confrontation with the

Russians, who wished to further their own political in the region, but this was resolved
diplomatically, and the whole affair was given legitimacy by the UN through UNSCR
1244.159

While improving the situation in Kosovo, it also indefinitely delayed a

permanent resolution to the problem, since Russia would be able to block any further
changes in Kosovo’s status through use o f its veto in the Security Council, a situation
which has changed little to the time o f writing.

156 Gibbs, David N. First, D o No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention an d the D estruction o f Yugoslavia.
Nashville: Vanderbuilt University Press, 2009. 171.
157 Clark. 148.
158 Blair. 266.
159 Talbot. 348.
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Kosovo, and its demonstration that major powers were willing to ignore the
sovereignty o f other nations in furtherance o f humanitarian goals, ignited a major
discussion on the future of such interventions.

In response to a series o f man-made

humanitarian disasters after the end o f the Cold War, the principal arose that the
international community has a responsibility to protect the lives o f citizens whose
sovereign governments were unable or refused to do so. Kosovo joined Rwanda, Bosnia,
and the ongoing Darfur crisis in inspiring the discussions.160 A codification o f the
principal o f humanitarian interventions came about as the result o f the 2000 UN
Millennium summit, and the subsequent International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS) which officially coined the phrase “Responsibility to Protect”
(R2P) in its final report o f the same name.

R2P was accepted by the UN General

Assembly in 2005, with the implicit agreement that individual security stand equal to or
above the long cherished Westphalian order, which was based on belief in the primacy o f
the state.161

The UN Charter already provided foundations for R2P, including it’s

outlawing o f war in Article 2 as well as its desire for the protection o f human rights in its
1st, 55th, and 56th articles.

I f\7

On the other hand, the charter’s support for the sovereign

rights o f its member states in Article 2 created a tension between realist and utopian
tendencies that R2P could potentially bridge.
R2P calls for UN members to intervene either to prevent serious suffering, stop
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, or to rebuild societies which have been

160 Bellamy, A lex J. "The Responsibility to Protect," in Security Studies: An Introduction.
Routledge, 2008, 422-37. 423.
161 Bellamy, 424.
162 Ibid. 424-425.

N ew York:
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devastated as a result o f such actions or failures.

1A3

In the case o f Libya, prevention o f

serious suffering and war crimes are the most compelling o f the reasons provided for R2P
intervention. Under the terms o f R2P, states which fail to offer adequate security to their
citizens would forfeit the right o f sovereign non-interference as set down in Article 2, and
be subject to intervention by the international community. As previously mentioned, the
ICISS report even went so far as to place human security higher than that o f the nation
state.164 This utopian desire, however, was not specifically endorsed by the UN Security
Council, in part because o f its implied “Responsibility to Prevent,” 165 abridgements of
human security rather than simply reacting to their occurrence.166 This move, as well as
others, reflect an overarching problem for R2P; the lack o f ability to agree on core
definitions at any level o f the discussion, from the definition o f a major crisis to that o f
what an intervention seriously damaged the original, neo Kantian intent o f the R2P
proposal.167 As R2P moved from proposal stage to a vote, it was significantly watered
down, creating very high thresholds for action and with upholding the power o f the
Security Council to decide if a situation was serious enough to warrant intervention.
Thus, the Security Council retains the right to authorize interventions, keeping them
subject to the whims o f the permanent/veto wielding members o f the council.168

163 Pape, Robert. "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard o f Humanitarian Intervention." International
Security, Summer, 2012: 41-80. 51. Further tenets for justifiable intervention were that the m ission must
be achievable, and be as small (tailored) as possible in its execution.
164 The ICISS states that, after the host country, the Security Council has the primary responsibility to act.
Sovereignty, International Convention on Intervention and State. The Responsibility to Protect. Final
Report, Ottawa: Published by the International Developm ent Research Centre, 2001.
165 Responsibility to Prevent, although presented as a subset to R2P, actually goes beyond it, stating that the
International Community can act against perceived humanitarian affronts, in other words, crimes which
have not yet occurred.
166 Bellamy. 426-427
167 Pape. 51
168 The ICISS report suggested that the permanent members agree in advance to forgo a veto in cases o f
R2P interventions, but this was never agreed to, nor was the proposal that R2P cases could be sent directly
to the General Assem bly in such cases. The Responsibility to Protect, Final Report. 2001.
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This case study focused on the decision making processes o f the second term
Clinton administration, specifically the case o f the armed intervention in Kosovo from
March-June 1999. It examined the context for intervention from a historical perspective
in Yugoslavia, as well as a political perspective in Washington DC.

It noted the

influence o f a small group o f powerful leaders, namely Albright, Holbrooke, and Clark,
who were in positions o f influence, and, motivated to use that influence to drive decision
making toward intervention.

Furthermore, it discussed bi-lateral and multilateral

relationships, with the UK and NATO, that impacted the operation and the decision
making cycle significantly, and differently, than the UN had done in the previous cases.
It addressed the role o f a hostile great power, Russia, which also impacted the situation
significantly, and in contrast to the way great power politics operated in the previous
cases.

Finally, it discussed the new thinking on state sovereignty, humanitarian

interventions, and human security which resulted from the cumulative effects o f the
series o f humanitarian interventions, armed and unarmed, which took place in the 1990s.

Case Study 3: Obama and U.S. Intervention in Libya, 2011

Spring 2011 will likely forever be known as the Arab Spring - a sequence o f
popular uprisings which overturned the established political order in several countries.
Starting with an incident in Tunisia, the Arab Spring rapidly engulfed Egypt and spread
to points east and west. While revolts were crushed in the gulf state o f Bahrain, they
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flared in Syria. By February, 2011, Libya, which had undergone a remarkable, if cynical
transformation from enemy to ally o f the west in the early 2000’s, was perched on the
edge. As rebellion threatened in the eastern part o f the country, Muhammar Gaddafi,
ruling from Tripoli in western Libya, preached the status quo and commenced a policy o f
brutal retaliation.
The U.S. and the international community generally took a wait and see approach
to the initial events o f the Arab Spring. However, when the Libyan situation showed
signs o f disturbance, political elites in the region and Europe and the U.S. cried for
intervention rather than support Gaddafi and the status quo. The U.S. and key European
allies assembled a coalition for intervention, and were able to exert pressure on UN to act
in favor o f intervention.

This was facilitated by the Arab League and the G ulf

Cooperation Council, which were dominated by conservative Arab States which were
simultaneously cracking down on protests in Bahrain. Thus, a coalition o f members o f
both regional organizations and NATO launched what the U.S. called “Operation
Odyssey Dawn” to enforce a no fly zone and later to provide air support to Libyan rebels.
In March and April 2011, this amounted to some 100 cruise missile attacks and 1,900
aircraft sorties.

From enforcing a no-fly zone, support grew into a full spectrum air

offensive against pro Gaddafi Libyan forces, eventually enabling the rebel movement to
expand its operations westward and overthrow the dictator, with an additional 24,000
sorties flown under NATO leadership through October 2011. In the end, Gaddafi was
hunted and died during capture, and a largely Islamist and anti-western coalition has
taken over the country.
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Intervention in Libya was achieved through a variety o f methods and channels,
most innovative and notable o f which was the invocation o f the new UN doctrine o f
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The purpose o f this case study is to look at the Libya
intervention as a decision making process, both in terms o f the deployment o f forces, and
in the framing effort in support o f the operation and against Gadhafi. R2P features in the
study as a framing device for encouraging the decision to intervene and in the
justification o f the intervention to relevant audiences. The study will review the history
o f the crisis in Libya as well as how that crisis fits into the overall world situation in
2011, continuing to examine the key players in the decision making process and the
method by which the decision to intervene was made and framed to the American public.
Research reveals that intervention was made possible through the pressure o f a few key
leaders in the Obama administration. Those leaders, most notably Ambassador to the UN
Susan Rice and National Security Council staffer Samantha Power were both relatively
junior in the positions they held in the administration, but their unique ties the president
facilitated both access and influence.

With the eventual turnaround in support by

Secretary o f State Hillary Clinton, to their cause, they were able to encourage President
Obama to decide in favor o f intervention.

Having decided on intervention, the

government then rapidly launched a broad framing effort, including leaders who had been
against the decision to intervene, in an effort to build support for the operation.
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Libya and the Arab Spring 2010 - 2011 - Background to Intervention

Over the course o f the early 2000s, Libya achieved a remarkable rapprochement
with the west, largely undoing the enmity brought about by a series o f confrontations
with the U.S. in the 1980s, culminating with the Lockerbie bombing o f Pan Am Airlines
flight 103 in 1988.1 Through destruction o f extant stocks o f weapons o f mass destruction
in 2003, and the foreswearing o f efforts to obtain nuclear weapons, as well as the
negotiation o f a series o f oil and other trade deals, Gaddafi achieved through diplomacy
what aggression could not:

A Libya that was seen as a lucrative trade partner and

potential ally in northern Africa.

'j

Libya’s leader Gaddafi, always eccentric, was

increasingly seen as a continental player in Africa through his efforts to influence the
African Union coupled with Libya’s immense reserves o f oil (largest in Africa and the
fifth largest in the world with 76.4 billion barrels in 2010) gave it a strong strategic and
economic position.3
There was more to Libya than met the eye, however.

Money tended to be

concentrated in Gaddafi’s home city o f Sirte, and westwards in his capital, Tripoli.4
Libya is a highly tribalized society, with government working as a function of deals the
Gaddafi family made with the other tribes for various services. The growing interest and
efforts o f U.S. and European multinational corporations (beyond the obvious oil linkages)
served to add a veneer o f legitimacy to Gaddafi’s rule, a reign which was becoming ever

1 Chorin, Ethan. Exit Gaddafi: The Hidden H istory o f the Libyan Revolution. London: Saqi Books, 2012.
5-6.
2 Chorin. 182.
3 Administration, U.S. Energy Information. Country: Libya. June 2012.
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=LY. A ccessed April 15, 2013.
4 Prashad, Vijay. Arab Spring, Libyan Winter. Baltimore: AK Press, 2012. 119.

200

more authoritarian and removed from reality.5 The disparity in economic wellbeing and
religious beliefs between eastern and western Libya was stark. A clear cultural divide
existed between east and west, with the traditional capital city o f Tripoli dominating the
largely pro Gaddafi west, while Benghazi, largest city in the east, and long considered to
be anti-regime, was touted by the regime as a symbol o f the improvements Gaddafi
promised.

But infrastructure improvements could not change the fact that the most

effective regime opponents were clustered in Benghazi and its hinterland. Eastern Libya
was already known for the higher than average number o f its young men who had gone to
Iraq to take part in the resistance to the U.S. efforts there.6 This was in part because o f
religious fervor and in part because o f poverty and political disenfranchisement at home.
The first major blow to this reinvigoration o f U.S./Libyan ties occurred as a result
o f the wiki leaks scandal, which broke in fall 2010. Many o f the leaked documents were
highly personal observations o f Gaddafi and his family by embassy and other Department
o f State officials, describing the inner workings and inner peculiarities o f the regime.
This was seen as a shock and an insult by the U.S. to the Libyan leader and his family, to
the point that U.S. diplomatic efforts and personnel were shut out and the Ambassador
eventually withdrawn, just before what would prove to be a significant crisis for Libya
and the whole region, the Arab Spring.7
The direct events leading to the Arab Spring began in December 2010, in Tunisia,
with the protest suicide o f a street merchant claiming to have been abused by the
government.

Fanned by new media and by the mainstream A1 Jazeera network, the

protests forced Tunisian leaders to flee the country by mid-January 2011. Egypt was next
5 Chorin. 169-170.
6 Prashad. 119.
7 Chorin. 171.
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to experience unrest as a result o f what was then seen as an Arab uprising, and by the end
o f January the Gaddafi regime was already censoring foreign media websites and trying
to control as much o f the information flow from outside as it could.8

The U.S.

intelligence community had been predicting political change in the Arab nations, but was
caught by surprise by the scope and speed o f the events o f the Arab Spring in 2011.9
Egypt, the centerpiece o f U.S. efforts to stabilize the Middle East since the Camp
David Peace Accords brought peace with Israel in 1979, appeared to be tottering,
potentially nullifying those thirty years o f intense diplomatic and political labor, and
exposing U.S. partner Israel to threat.10 Furthermore, significant oil contracts between
the U.S. and Libya, recently rekindled following Gaddafi’s “About Face,” were at
stake.11 Fears o f the unrest cutting off a key supplier o f oil to Europe led to negative
expectations for further oil trade with Libya, another possible cause for intervention.12
Thus, the three pillars o f U.S. policy, oil, stability, and the protection o f Israel, loomed
large in the minds o f leaders in Washington. There was more than one set o f messages
being transmitted, however, in what amounted to a series o f dueling narratives. But on
February 4, 2011, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pronounced an “Islamic Awakening”
across the entire Middle East, including Libya.13 The U.S. and international response

8 Chorin. 190-191. Unlike its neighbors, internet and advanced cell phone communications were rather
limited in Libya, particularly in the east, so that the traditional media bore the main load in informing the
public and fanning the flames o f revolution.
9 Panetta, Leon. Worthy Fights. N ew York: Penguin Press, 2014. 277.
10 Prashad. 38-39.
" Ibid. 45.
12 Copeland, Dale. "Economic Interdependence and War." International Security, 1996: 5-41. 39.
13 Prashad. 31.
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was characterized by what Maximilian Forte called the “ongoing militarization o f U.S.
foreign policy and the rise o f the new military humanism.” 14
On February 14, 2011, the Arab Spring threatened the Arabian Peninsula for the
first time, with the “Day o f Rage” protests in Bahrain, and popular unrest growing in
Yemen. With U.S. support, Saudi Arabian forces assisted the Bahraini government in a
brutal crackdown which ended open dissent in the country.

The Arab Spring was

increasingly on the radars o f the G ulf states, and they would lead the way in pushing for
ever stronger responses to events in Libya.15 On 15 February 2011, in an effort to diffuse
protest, Gaddafi ordered wide scale arrests around the country.

These arrests failed,

however, and the net result was that significant protests broke out just two days later, on
the 17th.16 In a cascade o f violence, Gaddafi ordered further crackdowns in response,
culminating in the arrest o f resistance leaders and their representatives including Fathi
Terbil, a lawyer who had represented earlier victims o f regime violence. Fathi’s arrest
turned out to be the catalyst which set Benghazi onto the path o f rebellion.17 By February
20th, events in Benghazi were spiraling out o f control, and, following a poorly executed
conciliatory speech by Gaddafi’s son Saif, major demonstrations spread for the first time
to Tripoli, and thus to the dictators very doorstep.18 This was followed by one o f the first
international actions o f the drama, when, on 21 February 2011, the UN representatives
for Libya joined the rebels, declaring their support for them and

entreating the military

and other leaders o f the government apparatus to do the same.19

14 Forte, Maximillian. Slouching Towards Sirte: NATO's War on Libya an d Africa. Montreal: Baraka
Books, 2012. 9. A lso seen in President Obama’s efforts to restrain Mubarak from attacks on Egyptians.
15 Gates, Robert M. Duty, M em oirs o f a S ecretary at War. N ew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 515.
16 Gates. 510. According to Prashad, this was the so called “Days o f Rage” protest. Prashad. 95.
17 Chorin. 193.
18 Ibid. 199.
19 Ibid. 200.
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Meanwhile, the Libyan government’s threat to its citizens was growing. Unlike
Egypt, whose army largely refused to fight its own civilians, the Libyan military, largely
made up o f foreign mercenaries who were loyal to the Gaddafi government first and
foremost, had no qualms about employing violence.

"J(\

By this time, over 75% o f Libya’s

population center had already fallen away from government control.21 In a February
22nd speech, Gaddafi himself promised to “cleanse Libya inch by inch”, and began
deploying significant military forces to the eastern part o f the country.22 This increase
and threat o f violence triggered the humanitarian crisis which would later be used to
justify intervention. Libya had long relied on outside labor for many o f its industries,
including oil, and for its army, and now all o f these people, as well as foreign government
officials and Libyans fleeing persecution, were trying to leave at once.23 On the same
day, the UN retaliated by condemning the use o f force against civilians, while the Arab
League supported this action by suspending Libya’s membership in it.24

The U.S. and the World in 2011 - Context fo r Intervention

Although the Arab Spring came to dominate the attention o f the media and the
Obama administration, there was a litany o f other problems in late winter, 2011. Asia
was the preferred focus area of the administration, and the decline o f Japan coupled with
the rising economic power of China and its tacit challenge to U.S. and allied power in the
20 Clinton, Hillary R. H ard Choices. N ew York: Simon and Schuster, 2014. 364.
21 Pape, Robert. "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard o f Humanitarian Intervention." International
Security, Summer, 2012: 41-80. 62.
22 Chorin. 202. In Benghazi alone, this threatened over three quarters o f a m illion lives.
23 Chorin. The austhor notes that 15,000 Chinese laborers were evacuated to Crete by boat, this is just one
example o f private individuals, to which must be added thousands o f em bassy and other government
officials from around the world.
24 Gates. 510.
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Pacific area were major concerns.

This coincided with calls among the Muslim

population in China for a “Jasmine Revolution” o f pro-democracy rallies modeled on the
Arab Spring. Although there were assemblies in approximately a dozen Chinese cities,
no popular uprising took place.
Japan was also a growing source o f concern during this period. In late February,
its credit rating was downgraded because o f the increasing level o f government debt.
Then, on 11 March, a series o f earthquakes hit northern Japan, culminating in a tsunami
and which led the Fukushima nuclear reactor, located on the coast to flood and meltdown,
instigating a massive U.S. military evacuation and assistance effort there. At $235 billion
in damage, the Fukushima earthquake was the most expensive natural disaster in history,
and further crippled Japanese efforts to re-assert itself economically and politically.26
As noted previously the wiki leaks scandal, which had broken in 2010, continued
to cause embarrassment to the U.S., around the world, and to specifically impact U.S.
perceptions in and o f the situation in Libya.

Over 250,000 documents, many o f the

classified Department o f State cables, were periodically released over the period of
January - May 2011.

Wikileaks information on wide scale state o f corruption in the

Tunisian Government is credited by some with instigating the Arab Spring protests.27
Protests in Tunisia eventually led to the overthrow o f that country’s President, Zine Ben
Ali, in January 2011.

25 Fitzgerald, David and Ryan, David. Obama, U.S. Foreign P olicy and the Dilem m as o f Intervention.
N ew York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 88.
26 Kim, Victoria. “Japan damage could reach $235 billion, World Bank estim ates.” The Los Angeles Times,
21 March 2011. Retrieved 10 October 2014.
27 Dickinson, Elizabeth. “The First WikiLeaks Revolution?” Foreign P olicy, January 13, 2011.
http://foreignpolicy.com /2011/01/13/the-first-wikileaks-revolution/. A ccessed on October 27, 2014.
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Elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa, spring 2011 saw a series o f failed coups
in Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic o f Congo, while an offensive against AlQaeda backed militants in Somalia resulted in hundreds o f casualties.

Two Iranian

warships transited the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean Sea on February 22nd, the first
time that this had occurred since the 1979 revolution which overthrew the Shah o f Iran.
On February 5th, Prime Minister David Cameron o f the UK said that multiculturalism had
failed and that the country needed to restore a strong national identity at a security
conference in Munich. This same meeting sparked the ire o f Palestinian leaders, since
their call for statehood was not accepted by those present. Further tensions were fanned
when the new Egyptian government decided to re-open crossings into the Gaza strip at
Rafah. In East Africa, Somali piracy continued to be a major concern, with a series o f
incidents showing the growing response o f the anti-piracy coalition. The U.S. was in
negotiations with Iraq for what forces it would be allowed to keep in that country after its
planned withdrawal in December, 2011. Operations in Afghanistan were still ongoing,
with increasing concerns about the corruption o f the government o f Hamid Karzai.
General David Petraeus, who had taken over command in the country from General
Stanley McChrystal, was in the process o f revamping counterinsurgency strategies there,
as violence continued.28
In economics, German and French leaders met to try to save the European
currency, the EURO, from a series o f shocks, including the economic implosion o f
Greece and the ongoing impacts o f the World Financial Crisis which had begun in 2007.
The state o f the world and U.S. economies was the only issue which came near to

28 McChrystal was relieved follow ing negative comments on administration key leaders in interviews
provided to Rolling Stone Magazine in July, 2010.
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occupying public attention in the way that the Arab Spring in 2011. Gas prices reached
their highest level in two years, in excess o f 107 dollars per barrel, because o f the
uncertainty caused by the events in the Middle East. In domestic politics, increasingly
bitter partisanship marked votes to limit collective bargaining and union power in
Wisconsin and Indiana, and both became national news stories, with Republican leaders
prevailing in both cases.

A budget crisis and threatened government shutdown were

averted at the last minute by what would become the sequestration process o f deferred,
but forced, budget cuts, particularly in the defense field, while the disestablishment of
U.S. Joint Forces Command and the re-apportionment o f that commands training and
support duties was causing re-adjustment through the Department o f Defense.
This case study differs from the others examined in one key way. Whereas each
o f the other crises, in Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, took place along with or as
background to more significant world events, in Spring 2011, the Arab Spring and the
various protests and uprisings associated with it were they number one story and priority
on the minds o f decision makers. In the next section o f the case study, those leaders and
their decision making processes will be examined more fully.

The Obama Administration, Leadership, Processes, and Strong Voices

“He (Obama) genuinely believes that he was elected to get America off its war
footing that his legacy is to get the U.S. away from its over reliance on the
military instrument.”
Julianne Smith, advisor to Vice President Joseph Biden.

29 Fitzgerald. 671.
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O f the three men leading the U.S. in the armed humanitarian interventions
covered in the case studies, Barack Obama was, on the face o f it, significantly less
qualified for a foreign policy role than either George H.W. Bush or William Clinton.
This is based both on his academic background and his career before he assumed the
Presidency in 2009, and in spite o f his claims that living and travelling abroad at various
points in his life made up for the lack.30 Upon winning a U.S. Senate seat in 2004, he set
about remedying this lack with a reading plan on foreign policy issues and experts, and
by contacting and learning from a series o f experts, including Anthony Lake, Susan Rice,
and Samantha Power, the latter two o f who would be among his most trusted foreign
i j

policy advisors.

Obama’s personal leadership style and decision making techniques

were significantly different from the other leaders examined in the case studies. He is
known to have limited his suit choices down to two types for his term in office so that he
could focus more time on critical decisions than on minor ones.

Gates noted that that

Obama was the “most deliberative president” that he had served, and “relished the
•
1"!
exercise o f his authority.” Moreover, he expected strong advice from his senior cabinet
members, and when that was unavailable or perceived to be lacking, he was more than
willing to ask second tier advisors for their advice, and to have the advocates for various
responses to an issue argue out their stances in front o f him, as would be seen in the

30 Lizza, Ryan. “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Barack Obama’s foreign policy.”
The N ew Yorker, May 2, 2011. http://www.newyorker.com /m agazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist.
A ccessed on 10 Novem ber 2014.
31 Lizza, 2011.
32 Staff, NPR. “Inside Obama’s D ecisions, from Libya to Lunch.” NPR interview with Michael Lewis,
Presidential Biographer. http://www.npr.Org/2012/09/l 1/160898373/inside-obam as-decisions-from -libyato-lunch. A ccessed on 21 Novem ber 2014.
33 Gates. 296.
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Libya decision making process.34 Obama did not seek an “honest broker” in his National
Security Advisor, but often preferred to fill that role himself as a means o f centralizing
decision making power in himself, a process which often led to lengthy deliberations and
long decision cycles.35 In terms o f what he sought as goals for his White House, more
Middle East time was not high on the list at the beginning. He believed that the U.S. had
been over focused on the region since 9-11, and that a rebalancing would be necessary to
rebuild America’s reputation there.36 In spite o f this desire, it is said that the enemy
always gets a vote, and the Middle East would not easily pass from center stage. Still, the
desire to shift focus lead to some criticism, particularly after the White House failed to
react to the political upheaval in Iran from 2009-2010 which had the potential to
overthrow the hostile Ahmedinejad regime if care and attention had been given.37 Obama
thus personally entered the Arab Spring crisis stung and vulnerable to criticism, and
potentially more willing to act than before.
According to the memoirs o f then Secretary o f State Hillary Clinton, President
Obama sought to emulate President Abraham Lincoln, whose cabinet included serious
political enemies, including his Secretary o f State, William Seward, who became a close
ally. This was the driving force behind the “Team o f rivals” approach to development o f
the Obama cabinet.38 Based on his own experience, and memory o f the effectiveness o f
successful national security teams such as that o f George H. W. Bush, Secretary o f
Defense Bill Gates recommended that Obama have a team that was a “complete package”

34 Pfiffher, James P. “D ecision making in the Obama White House.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no.
2 ,2 0 1 1 . 244-262. 247
35 Ibid. 244, 247.
36 Lizza, 2011. Interviews with Thomas Donilon and Benjamin Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor.
37 Lizza, 2011. 17-18.
38 Clinton. 13.
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o f members who got along with each other. To that end, he pledged to Obama that he
would, in spite o f his different political leanings, never undertake a separate political
agenda from the president.39 In spite o f that advice, the Obama team never came together
in the way that was seen in the George H.W. Bush or second Clinton administrations.
In spite o f Gates’ recommendation, the team that President Obama actually
assembled were not a “complete package” and in many cases did not know one another.40
There were several reasons for this. One is that it had been eight years since the last
Democrat administration, and there was somewhat o f a passing o f the torch in terms o f
age and experience. The senior statesmen such as Warren Christopher and Madeleine
Albright o f the Carter and Clinton years were gone, both because o f simple aging and the
considerable acrimony that existed between the Obama and Clinton camps, based on the
bitterness o f the struggle for the nomination o f the party. With some exceptions, such as
John Podesta (who headed the Obama transition team, but then stayed out o f decision
making until taking a position as Counselor to the President in 2013) and Leon Panetta
(Who headed the CIA and then the Department o f Defense after the departure o f Gates in
fall, 2011), senior Clinton leaders did not flock to Obama, nor were they welcome in the
leadership, in spite o f the personal rapprochement between Obama and Hillary Clinton
culminated in her becoming Secretary o f State.41 Nevertheless, the gap between the
members o f the two teams remained an issue.
The President’s immediate followers and advisors were also significantly
different in personality than their predecessors. When briefing Gates, Podesta termed the

39 Gates. 272.
40 Ibid. 275.
41 Ibid. 287.
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incoming team “control freaks.”42

Gates described the political leadership team as

“Smart and educated, but with no experience in governing.43 Furthermore, they reflected
a far more partisan era than that in which Gates had matured as a leader.

For him,

bipartisan approaches to foreign policy issues were central, whereas they had become
anathema to the later generations o f political and foreign policy leaders.44 Foreign policy
decision making was further complicated by the fact that there were many on the Obama
staff who advised him directly on foreign policy issues, but independently o f the
associated senior cabinet members or the National Security Staff (NSS).45

Rahm

Emmanuel, the White House Chief o f Staff, Robert Gibbs, the spokesman, and special
advisors Valerie Jarrett and David Axelrod, none o f who held foreign policy portfolios,
frequently offered their advice.46

While Jim Jones was the first National Security

Advisor, he estimated that at least six people had better contact with President Obama on
national security issues than he did. His departure may have improved matters by 2011,
since his successor, Thomas Donilon, was one o f those who had regularly done end runs
around him to the president.47 Donilon had served as Chief o f Staff to then Secretary o f
State Warren Christopher,48 and he turned out to be a better fit than Jones had been, and
had much better access to Obama, continuing the practice o f having the NSC Principal’s
meet once a week to discuss issues for presentation to the president.49 According to

42 Gates. 276.
43 Ibid. 287. On Page 288, Gates describes his first situation room with the new set o f advisors, in which
nearly half o f the attendees had their cell phones with them, and on, a major security violation and
indicative o f their lack o f exposure to high level defense and foreign policy processes.
44 Ibid. 288.
45 The name was changed at the beginning o f the administration to “National Security S ta ff’ so as to
incorporate the Homeland Security S taff and Council.
46 Gates. 291. Clinton noted that Emmanuel had a “forceful personality and vivid language.” 23.
47 Ibid. 291.
48 Clinton. 24.
49 Ibid. 18.
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Lizza, Donilon explixitly sought to restore the Brent Scowcroft Model o f how the NSC
should run.50
Gates described Secretary o f State Clinton as the only real independent center o f
power in the foreign policy decision making team, noting that she was “unfireable.”51 He
and Clinton formed a power center together, at least until the Libya intervention, over
which they came to disagree. However, all members o f the cabinet who were not core
Obama staffers had one attached, and Hilary was no exception. James Steinberg, who
frequently disagreed with Clinton was appointed Deputy Secretary o f State without her
endorsement Clinton, and furthermore, was allowed seats both on the Principal’s and
Deputies Committees on the National Security Council.52 With the departure o f General
Jim Jones from the position o f National Security Council in fall, 2010, the national
security team lost its only leader with significant military experience, although the factors
mentioned above, it is unlikely that this would have made a difference in the decision
making for Libya.53
Gates himself might have suffered a similar fate, however, his role and approach
were quite different. He was already known as someone who had been brought in by
Bush to restore the Department o f Defense after the perceived damage o f the Rumsfeld
years. His retention was recommended by many on both sides o f the political spectrum,
including senior Democrat party statesmen like former National Security Advisor
Brzezinski.54 Gates described his relationship with Obama as “ ...close, but always
focused on business,” noting that the new president was “ ...pragmatic and open to

50 Lizza, 2011.
51 Gates. 288.
52 Ibid. 289.
53 Gates. 290.
54 Ibid. 259.
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compromise,” as he was to demonstrate during the Libya decision making process. On
their first meeting, Gates noted that Obama was far more passionate about the prospect o f
the repeal o f the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t tell” policy on homosexuals in the military
than he was about foreign policy concerns or the combat capacity o f the armed forces.55
Vice President Joseph Biden followed the so called “Cheney” activist model for
his role, in spite of advice proffered that a more supportive and less activist role might be
more appropriate.56 While Gates thought Biden incorrect on most o f his major foreign
policy ideas, Clinton noted that he had a “wealth o f international experience.”57 Activism
was further implied by the White House decision to appoint a series o f special envoys to
key regions o f the world such as the Middle East, Pakistan/Afghanistan, and Sudan.58
This may have been an effort to leverage administration stalwarts into key positions in
Hillary Clinton’s Department o f State, although Richard Holbrooke’s appointment to the
Pakistan/Afghanistan position until his untimely death would seem to belie this.
Holbrooke played an additional role that would be critical to the Libya decision making
process.

He had become a mentor to journalist cum human rights advisor Samantha

Power, and as a mutual friend smoothed over what had been a problematic relationship
between her and Hillary Clinton.59 The elevation o f the post o f Ambassador to the UN
back into the cabinet also created friction, since Susan Rice, who had criticized Clinton

55 Gates. 298.
56 Ibid. 288. This refers to the highly involved and operational role V ice President Cheney took in the
administration o f George W. Bush from 2001 -2009.
57 Ibid. 288., Clinton. 22.
58 Gates. 295.
59 Stolberg, Sheryl Gay. “Still Crusading, but N ow on the Inside.” The N ew York Times. March 29, 2011.
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openly during the campaign, would now both be Clinton’s subordinate in the Department
o f State and her equal on the Principal’s Committee.60
Samantha Power’s career led her to be a hawk on humanitarian intervention in
general and in the Libya operation in particular. Her work as a journalist covering the
Yugoslav Civil War led to books both on that subject and on the failure to intervene in
Rwanda, and the conclusion that “politicians shy away from humanitarian intervention
because they see too much domestic political risk with little payoff for saving foreign
lives.”61 After reading her book, then Senator Obama recruited her for his staff. She then
served as a foreign policy advisor to the Obama campaign, famously attacking Hillary
Clinton and her campaign, and marrying Obama confidante Cass Sunstein.62 Returning
once the election was over, Power served as Special Assistant to the President and Office
o f Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights Senior Director on the NSC.

For Power,

prevention o f genocide was a U.S. strategic, if not national security interest, so it was no
great leap for her to support the Libya intervention. In a later interview, She said that
“failure to intervene in Libya would have been extremely chilly, deadly, and indeed a
stain on our collective conscience.

AT

Power also shared a strong conviction on the

applicability o f R2P to the situation in Libya, noting that it was becoming a popular and

60 Allen, Jonathan. “Susan R ice’s Walk on the Mild Side.” P olitico, January 3, 2014.
http://www.politico.com /story/2014/01/susan-rices-walk-on-the-m ild-side-101705.htm l. A ccessed on
October 10, 2014.
61 Talev, Margaret. “Samantha Power: The V oice behind Obama’s Libya action.” McClatchy
Newspapers, March 25, 2011. http://w w w .m cclatchydc.com /2011/03/25/111084/human-rights-advocatesamantha.html. A ccessed October 27, 2014.
62 Stolberg, 2011.
63 Klein, Edward. The Amateur: Barack O bam a in the White House. Washington, D.C.: Regnery
Publishing, 2013. 58.
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accepted international norm, especially in the European countries which were calling for
intervention.

64

With a career in national security going back to the 1990s, and her position as an
assistant to Richard Clarke on the National Security Council and protege o f Secretary o f
State Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice had significant foreign policy
experience as well as exceptional access to President Obama. She was heavily influenced
by her time in the Clinton White House, specifically in the decision making process
which led the U.S. to stay out o f the crisis in Rwanda, in part at her urging, as noted in
the Rwanda case study. After time at the Brookings institution during the first term o f
President George W. Bush, Rice became a senior foreign policy advisor to the John Kerry
presidential campaign in 2004, and was one o f the few senior policy leaders to sign on
the Obama campaign in lieu o f that o f rival Hillary Clinton, a fact which gave her access
to and clout with President Obama.

Rice was a strong advocate o f the concept and

application o f R2P, and carried with her memories o f her stance on the Rwandan
atrocities, as noted in the previous case study.65

Her management style was gruff and

potentially off putting, as when she famously threw a particular insult at Richard
Holbrooke during the Clinton administration, and she was known to be difficult to work
with.66
Having led the agency himself, Secretary Gates was uniquely placed to offer
comment on the incoming CIA director, Leon Panetta. Panetta was one o f the few top
tier Clinton era leaders who joined the administration, and although he had not served in
the intelligence community in the past, Gates noted that this was not unusual, and that
64 Klein. 25.
65 Ibid. 217.
66 Allen. 2014.
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most directors had been appointed from the outside.67 Panetta’s skill as a manager, and
the general proficiency and history o f the CIA put him in stronger stead with Obama than
his nominal superior, Dennis Blair, the Director o f National Intelligence.

Blair, like

Jones, was a senior military commander who had significant difficulty adjusting to the
world o f politics and since he only associated with Gates, Mullen, and Clinton o f the
other senior advisors, it was certain that Panetta would have more leverage with the
zo

Obama.

Panetta, who did not have a seat at the decision making table, did support the

president’s decision to intervene, calling the case for Libya “compelling” while noting
that “Obama was tom about it, and did not desire another war in the Middle East.”69
As the crisis in Libya unfolded, Obama utilized his team o f rivals, but overall the
inner core group that came into power with him had the most access, and influence, over
his decision making. To the chagrin o f outsiders such as Clinton, Gates, and Jones, this
was the central fact o f the Obama administration’s decision making processes.

This

would become evident in the decision making process which led to the intervention in
Libya.

Who Is Behind the Wheel? Drivers fo r Intervention

“The world is watching the situation in Libya with alarm. We join the
international community in strongly condemning the violence in Libya. Our
thoughts and prayers are with those whose lives have been lost, and with their
loved ones. The government o f Libya has a responsibility to respect the universal
rights o f the people, including the right to free expression and assembly. Now is
the time to stop this unacceptable bloodshed. We are working urgently with

57 Gates. 292.
68 Ibid.
69 Panetta, Leon. Worthy Fights. N ew York: Penguin Press, 2014. 349.
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friends and partners around the world to convey this message to the Libyan
government.”
Secretary o f State Hillary Rodham Clinton, February 21, 2011.70

The decision to intervene in Libya has its roots in discussions o f the situation in
Egypt.

On 28 January, the Principal’s committee met to discuss the situation, with

Clinton, Gates, Donilon, and Biden urging extreme caution over the response.71 That
day, Obama called for Hosni Mubarak, the President o f Egypt, to step down, sending
Department o f State Africa expert Frank Wisner as a special envoy to the opposition
groups, but did not directly intervene there. The establishment and discussions o f R2P
encouraged the idea that force should be used to protect civilians from harm, even if the
when and how remained in flux.

These ideas would be tested by the Libyan crisis.

However, it would take time for the world to decide exactly what the crisis was, and how
to react. Following the basic principles o f R2P, an intervention could have been utilized
as the engine for the support o f a protective action for eastern Libya not dissimilar from
many other peacekeeping operations (albeit smaller in scale) in Africa and around the
world. But the will and the plan to intervene would have to be constructed by powerful
spokespersons.

Based on the January 28th meeting, those spokespersons were not yet

motivated. Through February, discussions continued as the situation in Libya continued
to deteriorate.

On February 17th, Libya was removed from the UN Human Rights

Council at the urging o f the U.S., and through the efforts o f Clinton and Power.72 On

70 State, U.S. Department of. “Press Statement by Secretary o f State Hillary Rodham Clinton.” February
21, 2011. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm /20111021156836.htm . A ccessed on October
15,2014.
71 Clinton. 339.
72 Lizza, 2011.
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February 23rd, President Obama again spoke to the crisis, pledging U.S. support to the
democratic aspirations o f Libyans. This did not, however, lead to intervention.73
While the UN deliberated and U.S. leaders debated, others did not wait to provide
humanitarian support, with France sending relief supplies to Benghazi as early as
February 28th. France may have been compelled to act first because o f the intimate ties
the Sarkozy government had with Gaddafi, which made early repudiation o f those ties
crucial.74 On the same day as the French acted, the U.S. stepped up the rhetoric, in the
form o f a call for Gaddafi to leave office by Secretary Clinton.75 Other international
organizations served as vehicles for discussion. Hillary Clinton used the Group of 8 (G-8)
meeting on March 14th 2011 to discuss responses to the Libyan situation with key
economic allies.

At this time, French President Nicholas Sarkozy, whom Clinton

believed was moved primarily by the suffering in Libya,76 pushed the strongest for a
military response before government forces could reach the town o f Benghazi.
The French stance was based on several factors.

Sarkozy was losing political

popularity rapidly, and keen to continue his repeated practice o f using foreign policy to
buck up domestic poll numbers.77 In the face o f right wing opposition, he was keen to be
seen taking a strong leadership role, particularly in a situation in which the U.S. did not
appear willing to do so.

73
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This stance was also aimed at convincing European partners,

Biden, Joseph R. “Obama on Rebellion in Libya.”
http://www.history.com /topics/joe-biden/speeches/obam a-on-rebellion-in-libya. A ccessed on 27 October
2014.
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76 Clinton. 368.
77 Stratfor. “France and the UK have different m otives for intervening in Libya.” March 29, 2011.
http://www.forbes.com /sites/energysource/2011/03/29/ffance-u-k-have-differing-m otives-for-interveningin-libya/. A ccessed on 18 Novem ber 2014.
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particularly Germany, that France still led Europe in terms o f foreign and military
policy.79 Finally, the issue o f Muslim immigration was o f critical importance in France,
being another tocsin waved by the opposition especially that o f the right wing and the
situation in Libya threatened to spiral into a flood o f refugees across the Mediterranean.80
Clinton was unconvinced that intervention was needed.81 Sanctions and an asset
freeze by the UN Security Council were followed by the Arab League’s suspension of
voting rights for the Gaddafi regime.

O')

As March began, Secretary o f State Clinton noted

that no decision had yet been made by the U.S.83 Brutality and threat o f brutality was not
sufficient to warrant R2P invocation, with notable numbers o f leaders on both sides o f the
American political spectrum coming out against R2P and against intervention.84
Secretary o f Defense Gates’ position was that intervention in Libya was not justified,
since the American people were tired o f what was then nine years o f warfare, and that the
still ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan meant that the U.S. military was too
•

overstretched for yet another operation.

sc

The first suggestion for a U.S. action was a call

for a U.S. enforced no-fly zone over Libya.

Such calls began in February, but were

deflected by Gates, who warned o f the effort required, and the general futility o f no fly
zones in other cases, most notably over Iraq. Further, he pointed out that, unlike Iraq,
significant preparation o f the battle space would be required over Libya. These actions,

79 Stratfor, 2011.
80 Davidson, Jason W. “France, Britain, and the intervention in Libya: an integrated analysis.” Cam bridge
Review o f International Affairs, May 30 2013, 310-329. 316.
81 Clinton. 363.
82 Daalder, Ivo and Stavridis, James. "NATO's Victory in Libya." Foreign Affairs, 2012. 2.
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A ccessed on April 10, 2013.
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including the suppression and destruction o f the Libyan air defense apparatus, would be
needed before air patrols could even begin, and such actions would be tantamount to war.
In addition, experience in Iraq showed that a key ground attack and support asset, the
attack helicopter, was very difficult to interdict with a no-fly zone, so that the utility of
such a zone would be minimal even if it could be established.86 A tit for tat exchange
occurred on this issue in early March between the team o f Gates/Mullen and Arizona
Senator John McCain, most notably in a series o f statements and press conferences on 1
March.

General James Mattis, the general in command at U.S. Central Command,

supported the Gates/Mullen point o f view in testimony to the House Armed Services
Committee the following day.87
Clinton noted that as late as March 9th, the Principal’s committee had still not
embraced direct U.S. intervention in Libya.

The following day, she testified to a

Congressional hearing that no action should be undertaken without international
authorization, and that there should be no hurry to intervene.88 The very next day, the
authorization that Clinton needed began to take shape, with an Arab League request to
the UN for humanitarian action.89 On that day, General Wesley Clark, a Clinton ally,
wrote in the Washington Post that Libya did not meet the criteria o f threat to the U.S.
required for action.90 Although its own request did not mention military action, on
March 12th the Arab League threw its support behind a UK request for a no fly zone over
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Libya to protect the population,91 while Russia agreed to abstain from a Security Council
vote on intervention.92 The G ulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which saw its region
threatened by the Arab Spring, became a key player in the responding to it.93 On March
12th, the GCC joined the Arab League in calling for intervention to “stop the
bloodshed.”94 There was uncertainty about the reliability and motives o f some o f the
Libyan rebels, considering the large numbers o f them serving abroad with a range of
terrorist organizations.
Further pressure to act came as thousands o f guest workers, primarily from
neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, attempted to leave the increasingly violent situation in
Libya in February and March. Walking home was not an option due to the location o f the
workers and the harsh climate, and this, combined with continuing threats o f violence, led
to calls for an airlift to get them out o f the country. Demands for an airlift merged into
the growing calls for a no-fly zone and direct intervention, and brought some
administration officials to switch sides in the debate. Biden and Donilon now pressed
Gates to release aircraft for this purpose. Again, the Secretary o f Defense pushed back,
noting that with there were not enough aircraft or security forces available to do it at the
scale requested. According to Gates, Biden tried to order him to act, to which Gates
responded that the vice president was not part o f the chain o f command, but that he
would do whatever he was ordered to by the president.95
Decision recommendations to President Obama broke into two camps. Against
intervention (as compared in Biden’s case to the evacuation o f foreigners) were Vice

91 Prashad. 155.
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President Biden, National Security Advisor Donilon, Chief o f Staff William Daley, Joint
Chiefs Chairman Mullen, and Counter Terrorism lead John Brennan. Biden had spoken
in general favor o f human rights interventions, but not specifically on Libya, in a speech
in Israel on 24 February.96

Donilon’s opposition was based on the fact that an

intervention in Libya would violate all three tenets o f the “Obama Doctrine” which the
president had promulgated during his campaign. The first was that the U.S. would lead in
humanitarian actions.

The second tenet was that there would be no foreign military

actions that did not meet a specific challenge to U.S. national security. The third was that
there would be no invasion o f an Islamic country to overthrow an established
government, even a dictatorship.97
In favor o f intervention were Susan Rice and NSC staffers Powers and Ben
Rhodes.

Rhodes’ support is particularly noteworthy because o f his role in strategic

communication, messaging, and speech writing for the NSC, which would make him a
key framer for any operation.

Rice and Powers took the position that R2P provided

adequate justification for U.S. action.98 Gates noted that Hillary took a centrist position
at first, but gradually moved to the side o f the interventionists, specifically citing R2P
language as one o f the reasons for her eventual support o f operations in Libya.99 Gates
describes the tone of the deliberations as “blunt and stubborn, but not insubordinate.” As
is the case in the Kosovo intervention, those pushing hardest for military intervention
were those, particularly like Power, who were passionate about their issue, but had little
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knowledge o f military operations.100 The most significant non-administration player
continued to be John McCain, who continued his attacks on the White House for its lack
o f action.
According to Clinton’s memoirs, the use o f the Libyan armed forces by Gaddafi
to attack his own civilians is one o f the factors that drove her to decide in favor o f U.S.
intervention.

Her overall assessment was that Gaddafi had “Lost the legitimacy to

govern.” 101 In a speech to the UN Human Rights Council, she said that “The people o f
Libya have made themselves clear. It is time for Gaddafi to go, now.” 102

In contrast to

the Kosovo example, in which the Secretary o f State was the prime mover for
intervention, in Libya that push came from middling levels, meaning Power and Rice.
But once Clinton was convinced, she swung her vote and her leadership skills toward
intervention.
Hillary Clinton held the swing vote for intervention and took the lead in
convincing President Obama to act.103 Obama was convinced over a three day period to
switch his personal effort toward intervention, thus hastening the passing o f UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 within weeks, in contrast with similar efforts which
took months to construct, such as the G ulf War coalition o f 1990-1991.104 The final
decision to intervene in Libya took place on March 17th, 2011, and involved the
Principals, key deputies mentioned, and the president.105 The most noteworthy change in
the previously noted lineup for and against the intervention was that Secretary o f State

100 Gates. 512.
101 Clinton. 364.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid. 230-231.
104 Jones, Bruce. "Libya and the Responsibilities o f Power." Survival, May: 2011, 51-60. 53.
105 Gates, 2014. 518.
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Clinton, sensing the international support for the operation, had switched over from a
neutral stance to a decidedly pro-intervention, R2P driven stance.

She described her

changeover as having taken on March 14th. On that day, the Arab League requested
action, and Clinton met with, and was pressured by Sarkozy, UK Foreign Minister
William Hague, and leading Libya expert Mahmoud Jibril to support intervention.106
Clinton participated remotely in the March 17 meeting because she was still in the region
at the time.

10 7

Gates recalls that President Obama made his decision after an hour and a

half long meeting, and agreed to intervention with the caveat that no U.S. ground forces
would take part in the operation, other than those needed for search and rescue operations
|n o

in case of downed U.S. or allied aircraft.

Obama termed this decision a “51-49” vote,

reflecting the strong opinions on both sides.109 Edward Klein claims that some of
Obama’s resolve might have been fueled by allegations that his overall response to the
Arab Spring had lacked firmness, and was therefore an effort to regain lost credibility.110
Clinton noted that Obama’s guidance was to participate “in a limited way” with the
intervention, noting that it was “Unlikely to find a perfect George Washington waiting in
the wings,” and that the rebels would eventually become worthy partners for the U.S.111
Having made the decision, with no dissent, follow on actions would need to be taken
before intervention could begin.

In keeping with the absolute need for international

recognition for the intervention, Ambassador Rice set to pushing the relevant resolution
through the UN, something that she called “A near miracle” o f negotiation and tough
106 Clinton. 383.
107 Rogin, Josh. “How Obama turned on a dime toward war.” Foreign Policy, March 18, 2011.
http://foreignpolicy.com /2011/03/18/how-obama-tumed-on-a-dime-toward-war/. A ccessed on September
20, 2014.
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talk.112 In a press statement, Rice emphasized that the U.S. sought “actions that will
effectively protect civilians and increase the pressure on the Gaddafi regime to halt the
killing and to allow the Libyan people to express themselves in their aspirations for the
future freely and peacefully." 113
In Congress, the task was easier, significant bipartisan support for the intervention
in both houses, as long as no ground forces were involved.

The Senate unanimously

called for a no fly zone in Libya on the 18th.114 Congress had taken an early interest in
Libya, although notably not in intervention, with 148 mentions o f or events about Libya
in the Senate and House o f Representatives between January 1st and April 30th 2011, 89
o f which were in the month o f April, after the decision to intervene had been taken.115
Reflecting popular opinion, (which will be discussed in the public opinion section o f this
case study) Congress supported the human rights o f the Libyan people, while remaining
skeptical o f military support, ground intervention, and the potential to end the conflict in
a timely manner.
The media blitz to build and ensure support for the operation began on the Sunday
morning political talk shows on March 20th, with John McCain leading the way in
supporting the intervention.116

In this he was supported by Senator John Kerry,

Democrat from Massachusetts, who acknowledged that the intervention was not in U.S.
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vital national interest but urged it anyway.117 Former Secretaries o f State Baker and
Kissinger, and former National Security Advisor Brzezinski were notable in their support
o f the decision to intervene.

1 1ft

Brzezinski supported the effort particularly strongly in an

interview on March 24th.119 Joint Chiefs o f Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen and
Secretary Gates also provided support both through media interviews and Congressional
testimony explaining the relevance o f the Libya mission to U.S. national security and
emphasizing the coalition nature o f the operations and their expected limited duration.120
Between March 17th and 19th, Rice and Clinton, working with France and the UK,
and keeping Russian and China from using their Security Council vetos, negotiated and
enacted UN Security Council Resolution 1973. The resolution is central to a discussion
o f the Libyan intervention and the role o f R2P in it. As UN Secretary General Ki-Moon
stated upon its enactment:
“The Security Council today has taken an historic decision. Resolution 1973
affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s determination
to fulfill its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them
by their own government.” 12
The resolution, which had ten votes in favor and five abstentions, called for
intervention to protect the people o f Libya, in accordance with the principle o f R2P, but

117 Goodenough, Patrick. “Kerry in 2011: Military Intervention in Libya N ot ‘V ital’ to U.S. Security
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did not mandate assistance to the rebels or general attacks on government forces.122 The
African Union (AU) promulgated a “Roadmap for Peace” on March 25th, but this was
rejected, pushing the AU into an ambivalent stance toward the intervention thereafter.123
UNSCR 1973 allowed for “No Fly Zones” to be established by whatever member states
wished to intervene. But who would intervene? Clearly, the UN itself was not postured
to do so.
Meanwhile the growing rebel movement (The Libyan National Transitional
Council, or NTC) had no doubts what it wanted from the rest o f the world. In meetings in
mid-March 2011, rebel representatives requested specific airstrikes on military targets
from French President Sarkozy and Hillary Clinton. Further, they requested openly that
the west find a way to assassinate Gaddafi themselves.124 The leaders o f the growing
coalition were to a certain extent open to such ideas. Naming Gaddafi as the opponent in
the humanitarian effort help to complete a construction o f the Libyan dictator as a
murdering tyrant, a message that the U.S. in particular used to sell its operation at home
as well as the coalition abroad.

While France did not want NATO to lead the military

operation (NATO is not a regional arrangement empowered by the UN to act in its
stead)126, other NATO members insisted that it do so, even if, as in the case o f Germany,
they refrained from providing direct support.

127

Germany’s abstention seemed to be tied
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more to its own domestic politics, since, on the surface, Berlin’s insistence on a no fly
zone and regional support prior to an intervention were met by the Arab league m ove.128
In some ways, it was a case o f the wrong organization being called upon, since
Germany’s preference was that the EU, rather than NATO, be the leading organization
for the intervention.

17Q

In spite o f this, the Obama administration insisted that NATO be involved in
order to provide command and control capabilities to what was expected to be a wide
ranging coalition.130 This strategy came to be called “Leading from behind,” and ended
up coordinating the efforts of fourteen NATO member states as well as four partner
countries, including the United Arab Emirates, in the coalition.131 As the U.S. led from
behind, the French and others took on the mantle o f frontline leadership in the effort to
enforce the

UN mandated No Fly Zone enacted to protect civilians was under Arab

League auspices, pursuant to Article 51 o f the UN Charter.

Even if it was mainly

semantics, it was this taking on o f authority by the Arab league which helped enable
Russia and China to abstain on the 1973 vote, given their predilection toward support o f
regional organizations.

13 7

Military operations were scheduled to begin on March 21st (U.S. Operation
Odyssey Dawn), but the French commenced strikes nearly two days early, which threw
planning efforts into disarray.133 Every member o f NATO, at that time 28 nations, voted
for the military intervention in Libya. O f these, half provided material support, with the
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lion’s share o f the command and control being provided by the United States.134 Further,
military methodology took over the calculus o f planning for the intervention. Air strikes
require preliminary attacks to eliminate radars and surface to air missiles, for example,
and the preparatory strikes to achieve this end were an escalation which appears not to
have been part of the intent o f UNSCR 1973.

Public Opinion and the Libya Intervention

“W e’re protecting innocent civilians in Libya...” to prevent “a humanitarian
crisis...”

President Barack Obama, March 28th, 2011,135

From January to April, 2011, two issues dominated the U.S. media. One was the
U.S. economy, and the other was the Arab Spring, and increasingly the crisis in Libya. A
Pew Research report noted that 34% o f all mainstream media news coverage from 11
January to 6 March was on the Arab Spring, with an overwhelming focus after 15
February on events in Libya. By comparison, the economy, the second biggest issue,
received 20% o f coverage, and the threat of a federal government shutdown, the third
most important, received 3% .136 By the week o f the U.S. intervention, Pew was reporting
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that 47% o f news was focused on Libya, with the second issue, the Tsunami and nuclear
meltdown in Fukushima, Japan, receiving 15%.137
By invoking human rights in his March 28 speech and the need to act decisively
and powerfully in their defense, (although, notably, not R2P, an omission also notable in
a joint declaration prepared by the leaders o f the U.S., France, and the UK shortly
thereafter) President Obama provided the moral imperative by which other intentions,
even if driven by very realist power based motives, could be realized in terms o f
international protection and support for the Libyan people and the resistance
movement.138 Further statements by Ambassador Rice in the UN encourage this belief.139
Even though R2P was not specifically mentioned, its basic tenets were in effect.
Arnold Wolfers posited that it was only by identifying national entities as the
primary actors that a true study o f international relations (IR) could occur.140 IR realists
would posit that the GCC and Arab League maneuvers regarding Libya were done in an
attempt to gain their own control o f the escalating Arab Spring, a movement which was
sweeping toward their own borders. This view would continue that ultra-conservative
Arab interests were paired up with U.S. and European oil and security interests to bring
about the intervention.141 Secretary Gates confronted NATO Secretary General Anders
Rasmussen about this, both in stating that a UN Security Council Resolution would be
required for U.S. action in a NATO framework, and in directly asking why NATO
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countries were keen to intervene in Libya, and not elsewhere, unless oil were the
cause.142
R2P was invoked in Libya by Washington insiders who believed that “The will to
humanitarian intervention, destroyed by Bush Administration actions in Afghanistan and
Iraq, must be rebuilt.” Secretary o f State Clinton and Ambassador to the UN Rice bore
the burden o f selling R2P to the rest o f the world as a justification for intervention.143
The two were joined by National Security Council Directors Samantha Power and Gayle
Smith. In spite o f the nature o f their directorates (multinational engagement and global
development), they joined Rice and Clinton as the leading government hawks on
intervention, convincing others to fall into line both by using R2P and by noting the
benefits that intervention would provide to U.S. standing in the Arab W orld.144
Interestingly, they were joined by Senator John McCain, although McCain’s commentary
was primarily focused on support o f the N TC.145 O f note is this contrast between those in
less combative or force oriented positions favoring intervention, while military leaders
opposed the effort.
Public opinion o f the crisis in Libya and the need for, and nature of, a U.S.
response changed over the period from March - May 2011. The following graphics are
based on key polls involving approximately 1000 respondents from across the political
spectrum. The full list o f polls examined can be found in the Appendix.

142 Gates, 2014. 515.
143 Prashad. 176.
144 Chorin. 215 and 231. They became known as the “Warrior Women” as a result.
145 CNN. “Sens. McCain, Lieberman critical o f Obama over Libya.” February 27, 2011.
http://cnnpressroom .blogs.cnn.com /2011/02/27/sens-mccain-lieberm an-critical-of-obama-over-libya/.
A ccessed April 1, 2013.

231

Figure 6: Key Polling Data on Intervention in Libya, March-May 2011, Part 1

Poll Q u estion: Should th e U.S. Lead R esponse? Should
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100%
80%
60%
40%

20 %
CNN/Opinion
Corp.

Fox

CBS

USA Today/G allup

13-M ar

16-M ar

21-M ar

27-M ar

Yes

—— No

U nsure

Source: Polling Report146

Figure 6 shows responses on the question o f whether or not the U.S. should lead
or be involved in a response. It reflects a spike in support for military operations, which
began on 19 March, but shows a drop off in support in the days before President Obama’s
speech on the intervention on March 28th.

146 Polling Report. Accesed on 27 October 2014.
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Figure 7: Key Polling Data on Intervention in Libya, March-May 2011, Part 2
Poll Question: No Fly Zone? Approve of Military Actions?
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Figure 7 shows responses on the question o f whether or not a no fly zone or any
military action should be undertaken in regards to Libya. It shows a spike in support for
operations which dropped off, but then surged again after President Obama’s March 28th
speech explaining the operation to the American people. After the speech, support began
to drop off through April as the operation continued.

147 http://www.pollingreport.com/libya.htm. Accesed on 27 October 2014.
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Figure 8: Key Polling Data on Intervention in Libya, March-May 2011, Part 3
Poll Question: Is the President Handling the Situation
in Libya well?
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Figure 8 shows a presidential approval question, reflecting spikes in approval both
when military action began on the 19th, and when President Obama addressed the nation
on the 28th. Additional polls, taken on March 13th and 20th, and so covering the initiation
of combat operations, showed a wide scale negativity toward the deployment o f ground
forces, at a 80% against on the 13th, dropping to 72% on the 20th, and staying there
through April.
The polling data shown reveals several things about the public mood surrounding
the intervention. There is an uptick in support for the intervention once UNSCR 1973
went into effect, and when the air strikes began, supported by the aforementioned speech
acts in Congress and by cabinet members and key advisors such as Mullen and Power.

148 http://www.pollingreport.com/libya.htm. Accesed on 27 October 2014.
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Furthermore, there was wide scale support for the no fly zone, but not for direct ground
action in Libya. Finally, there was general, but not a majority, approval o f President
Obama’s decisions and handling o f the problem. Interestingly, this was true both before
the decision to initiate military action (when the support would presumably be for non
action) and after.

While the initiation o f combat saw an uptick in support, Obama’s

major address on the issue, on March 28th, did not lead to significant change.149 Overall,
the Libya intervention was the least popular, at 47%, o f any o f the interventions
examined. By comparison, Kosovo had 51% and Somalia 65% popularity.150 As had the
discussions and decisions on intervention, support for the operation was bifurcated, with
the same population supporting the protection o f civilians, but opposing military
action.151

Models and the Libya Decision Process

The decision to intervene in Libya shows evidence o f two models. The Allison
Governmental Process Model is exhibited in the stance o f the Defense Department
against intervention. This clearly reflected Secretary Gates acting as a representative o f
his cabinet agency. The same is true, at the beginning o f the discussion o f Secretary
Clinton. Gates, as the owner o f the intervening military assets, had significant coercive
power in the debate over intervention. However, he never threatened insubordination or
149 The Polling Report. “U.S. Intervention in Libya.” http://www.pollingreport.com/libya.htm. A ccesed
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not to act. In this, he stayed within an organizational model as predicted by Allison.
Gates noted that Obama himself had come a long way in his thoughts on intervention
from the candidate who specifically said that “The president has no power in the U.S.
Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve
stopping an action or an imminent threat to the nation.” 152
In terms o f rationality, a threat to U.S. national security had to be constructed
where it did not exist before, and this was the task o f the key leaders who pushed for
intervention. Libya also shows the power o f the powerful or well-placed individual in
bringing about decisions favorable to their wishes.

Ambassador Rice and Samantha

Power did not represent bureaucracies, but each brought their own personal histories to
the decision making process, and this combined with their unique access to and influence
on the president to enable them to push for action.

Furthermore, while there is no

evidence that Power or Rice personally convinced Secretary Clinton to change her stance
on intervention, it is clear that the growing international pressure for, and acceptance of,
intervention convinced Clinton that intervention was the best course o f action. Thus her
powerful swing vote came into play, and personal, rather than institutional prerogatives
triumphed, and intervention took place.
The strategic communication process provides a useful angle through which to
view the various messages coming from the diverse actors. For the U.S., the message
was that Gaddafi was a bloody tyrant who was about to launch a massacre on a part o f his
population.

At the UN, Libya’s failure to protect its people was a failure o f its

sovereignty that could only be rectified by the international community. The French and
the British used similar reasoning to the U.S., but with the added threat o f mass
152 Gates, 2014. 528.
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immigration which might have occurred if the massacre had been allowed to take place.
The Arabs and the Africans were public about the threat to stability posed by Gaddafi in
general and how that could be exacerbated by ongoing violence. The Libyan rebels fed
the U.S. argument, obscuring their ties to radical Islam and focusing on the tyranny o f the
dictator.
Strategic communication calls for synchronizing messages with deeds.153
Although the various messages o f the intervening or conceding states crossed a wide
gamut, as shown above, (and even an internal gamut, as shown by the gulf between the
statements o f the White House and the Department o f Defense as well as a bipartisan
group in the NSC, the Senate and the House who spoke out against the intervention)154
the deeds attached to them, the actions o f protecting the people o f Libya were consistent
with the majority o f statements made on the issue.155 UNSCR 1973’s appeals for a
ceasefire and discussions to peacefully end the crisis before things got any worse. The
resolution’s specific mention o f R2P was a critical measure o f its importance and the
future o f humanitarian interventions.156 In terms o f framing, the primary evidence for
framing the intervention to the media and the public came after the decision had been
made to launch the operation, with the coordinated media “blitz” mentioned above, which
included current and former cabinet members. Statements made before the decision to
intervene seem to be primarily and overwhelming directed at the Gadhafi government, in
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an effort to coerce the dictator into reversing course, rather framing the intervention to
U.S. audiences.
On the Libyan side, communications were used quite poorly. Given the recent
past, in spite o f superficial efforts at reform, it was difficult to undo the image o f Gaddafi
as a terrorist and a tyrant. Tripoli’s efforts to paint the rebellion as a threat to stability to
rival Iraq failed to draw their targets, the west, into the right conclusion, that the regime
needed support to crush the rebellion. Instead, that message was used as a justification
for the argument that the people o f Libya needed to be protected, from outside, against an
ineffective regime.

In her March 2 speech, Secretary Clinton noted her concern o f

“ ...Libya descending into chaos and becoming another Somalia.” 157
For the Arab League and the GCC, the deal was simple. In return for supporting
the Libya intervention, the GCC got carte blanche to operate against a threat far more
dear to it, Bahrain. GCC countries were enabled to crackdown on the Shiite Bahraini’s
with impunity, and prevent the spread o f the Arab Spring, which had caused unrest in
Bahrain, Oman, Iran, and Yemen by that point.158 The African Union also worked in
favor o f the intervention, although President Obama had to intervene personally in a
meeting with South African President Zuma to help sway the vote.159
The intervention in Libya was a successful example o f R2P, in the sense that the
human security o f the people o f Libya was successfully used as a justification for a
military intervention. However, since Libya lay outside NATO and the EU, the primary
intervening agencies, it cannot in that sense be called an act o f collective security.
According to constructivist theory, social structures are generated through understood
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definitions and knowledge.160 Based on its use in rhetoric and in the UN resolutions, R2P
has been constructed into an institutional norm, and one that has been used to undermine
the importance o f state sovereignty, a core tenet o f structural realism as a philosophy, as
well as the principles o f the Westphalian state system.

The Libyan intervention was

undertaken with raw power, in a manner consistent with UN authorities and powers
embedded in its charter, far predating the relatively recent discussion o f R2P.161
Nevertheless, the invocation o f R2P as a lever or justification for actions which might
otherwise not have been taken is a significant step toward a constructivist or
institutionalist theory for international politics. The Libya vote and intervention was a
crucial test for and affirmation o f the strength o f international norms, o f which R2P is a
part.162 This is notwithstanding the Obama administrations additional increased desire
for regime change in Libya.163
This is a clear question o f utopianism versus raw power politics.

In a realist

model, the U.S. and Europe acted to protect their dwindling stake in Africa, both
politically and economically, and the real enemy was not Gaddafi, but China and the
BRICs. Negative feelings on Libyan oil, fostered by interdependence in oil, particularly
with Europe, furthered the desire by the UK, and France, among others to secure the vital
material.164 This model has the French, British, and Italians removing Gaddafi because
o f his influence in the Pan African movement, while securing the oil for themselves.165
In this case, the fact that Obama invoked human rights was not relevant because he also
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cited the threat to “Interests and values” in his primary Libya speech.166 By doing so, he
was able to successfully frame a melding o f idealism and realism, the two sides o f U.S.
foreign policy thought for over a century.167

Conclusion

“NATO’s operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model intervention. The
alliance responded rapidly to a deteriorating situation that threatened hundreds o f
thousands o f civilians rebelling against an oppressive regime. It succeeded in
Protecting those civilians and, ultimately, in providing the time and space
necessary for local forces to overthrow Muammar al-Qaddafi. And it did so by
involving partners in the region and sharing the burden among the alliance’s
members.”
Admiral James Stavridis, Commander, U.S. European Command, 2 0 1 2 .168

For some months after the end o f the intervention in Libya, it was deemed a
success, as noted in the quotation above. Little treasure in terms o f financial cost or loss
o f military personnel for what appeared to be significant gain. The people appeared to
have been protected from the dictator. Viewed in light o f the events which followed it,
however, a far dimmer appreciation o f events is apparent.

President Obama would

eventually call Libya one o f the biggest mistakes o f his term in office.169 What should be
said is that, after months o f back and forth struggle through the summer o f 2011,
stalemate seemed to set in. However, as the rebels streamlined their leadership as a result
166 Hehir. 16.
167 Atlas, Pierre. “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests.” D igest o f
M iddle E ast Studies, Spring: 2012, 354.
168 Daalder and Stavridis. 1.
169 Friedman, Thomas L. “Obama on the World: President Obama talks about Iraq, Putin, and Israel.”
The N ew York Times, August 8, 2014. http://www.nytimes.eom/2014/08/09/opinion/president-obamathomas-l-ffiedman-iraq-and-world-affairs.html. Accessed on 28 Novem ber 2014. Obama said that he did
not regret the act o f intervention, but rather the lack o f follow up and management after the fall o f Gaddafi.
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o f the deaths o f some o f their key leaders, and airstrikes ramped up, the tide turned
decisively against Gaddafi.170 On October 20th, as the result o f disruption caused by a
NATO airstrike, the dictator was killed, execution style, as a result o f a combined attack
between NATO air forces and Libyan rebels on the convoy in which he had been
travelling near his hometown o f Sirte. Although some o f his family remains at large, the
Islamist rebel movement NTC claimed victory.
The purpose o f this research was to assess how the coalition for armed
humanitarian intervention in Libya was built. Without perfect vision o f future outcomes,
we cannot be certain whether or not R2P in Libya prevented a massacre, and without that
crystal ball, Libya joins the list o f armed humanitarian interventions o f the post-Cold War
era, potentially adding to what Robert Pape calls “modest” progress in the field.171
However, based on Gaddafi’s statements and actions leading up to the intervention, it is
reasonable to expect that a massacre in eastern Libya was in the offing. Compared with
previous disasters, such as Rwanda, in which over half o f the murdered had succumbed
before the international community even agreed that genocide was taking place, and
against who, the preventative nature o f the Libya intervention deserves praise.172
While oil, commercial interests, internal politics among the interveners, or a
simple loathing o f the dictator Gaddafi may have been the cause for intervention, it
appears that R2P and the humanitarian crisis Gaddafi started were the primary factors
which lead the U.S. to advocate military intervention and to see it through even when it
looked as though stalemate might be the result. For this reason, R2P can be seen as an
influential factor for intervention. Hence, the construction o f a new vision o f sovereignty
170 Chorin. 247-249.
171 Pape. 42.
172 Ibid. 47.

241
and the responsibility o f nation states to their citizens, as well as the use o f institutions
such as the UN both to enshrine that vision as an operating procedure, indicate that the
realist fundament o f raw power politics can at least be mitigated by both.
This case study reviewed the U.S. decision to intervene in Libya. It examined the
historical buildup to the Arab Spring and the Libyan crackdown, and how the pressure for
intervention built in the international community, which in turn enabled key leaders in the
U.S. foreign policy decision making process to push for intervention.

Further, it

examined the process by which the decision to intervene was framed to the media and the
American people, and that those efforts only marginally improved support for the
intervention.
policy.

The Libya intervention had significant consequences for U.S. foreign

Like the Somalia intervention, its aftermath soured the U.S. to further

interventions, which would have repercussions for other hot spots in the Arab Spring and
worldwide, most notably with the U.S. decision not to intervene in Syria from 2011 - Fall
2014, and the decision not to intervene in the growing humanitarian and military crisis in
Eastern Ukraine in Spring 2014.
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CHAPTER V

FINDINGS

The purpose o f this section o f the study is to synthesize the lessons of the case
studies into useable conclusions on the decision making and framing processes, and the
role o f the powerful individual in shaping decisions and framing efforts in the armed
humanitarian interventions and non-interventions discussed. The findings for this study
will be organized to shed light on a series o f questions. In each case, broad historical
similarities and differences will be examined to see if there are general situational themes
surrounding humanitarian interventions.

Next, the leadership teams o f the four

administrations involved in the case studies will be reviewed for similarity or difference
in order to explain how that organization and those changes might have impacted
decision making and framing. Then, the actual process o f the decision making will be
examined with an eye toward the validation o f the models o f decision making and
framing as set forth in the methodology section. Finally, framing will be examined as a
separate factor, with the process and differences in framing for each case discussed and
compared. Since these interventions took place in chronological sequence, the impact o f
each decision on follow on interventions will also be discussed.
Following a discussion o f the factors mentioned above, the applicability o f the
findings to a post-Libya case study, the Syria crisis o f 2013, will be examined.

The

purpose o f this mini case-examination is to see if the findings can provide a sound
explanation for why the U.S. chose not to intervene in Syria in August, 2013, after having
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intervened in Libya and tacitly agreed to repression in Bahrain in 2011. A summary of
this mini-study is that a combination o f different geographic and geo-political factors, the
strong ability o f the targeted state, Syria, to counter-frame an intervention using powerful
propaganda and social media tools, and the lack o f a powerful individual in the Obama
administration who was motivated to push for intervention meant that the U.S. failed to
do so after the August, 2013 gas attacks in Syria.

Armed Humanitarian Interventions

In each o f the cases examined, the definition established by the literature review
was met. To repeat, an armed humanitarian intervention is “A coercive action by one or
more states, in the legitimate context o f an international organization, involving the use
o f armed force in another state without the consent o f its authorities, and with the purpose
o f preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.”’

In Somalia,

military forces engaged in combat-like operations for the purpose o f providing
humanitarian assistance to a starving population. This involved coercive action to deliver
that assistance, and was envisioned as such during the decision making process. Rwanda
would have entailed the rapid deployment o f peace-keepers to literally stand between the
Tutsis and the Hutus to physically prevent slaughter before it was too late. Kosovo saw
the use o f air strikes to coerce the government in Belgrade from perpetuating genocide, or
at least a brutal repression, on a minority population, as was also the case in Libya.

' Pape, Robert A. "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard o f Humanitarian Intervention." International
Security 37, no. I (2012): 41-80. 44.
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In all o f these cases, there was either no central government to welcome or resist
U.S. involvement (Somalia), or the host government resisted or refused to work with the
international community to alleviate the crisis (Kosovo, Libya) or denied offers o f
assistance and intervention (Rwanda). In all o f them, there was the legitimating context
o f the support o f an international organization. In the cases o f Somalia and Libya, the
UN was the lead international actor, with NATO, the Arab League, and the G ulf
Cooperation Council as strong supporting actors. In the case o f Kosovo, the UN was a
player, but a secondary one to the primary regional actor, NATO. In the case o f Rwanda,
the specific lack o f a UN or other mandate helped lead to the decision not to intervene.
In each case, a humanitarian crisis was at the root o f the problem and the
intervention. For Somalia, the core purpose was to ease starvation, with attempting a
political settlement as supporting reason which ended up taking on primary importance
after the Bush administration left office. Rwanda would have been direct prevention o f
genocide, literally standing physically between murderers and victims.

Kosovo and

Libya were both efforts to stop the mechanisms o f genocide by use o f air power, both to
cause such pain to the existing government that it would no longer see the value in its
oppressive acts, and in physically destroying the capabilities o f the aggressive
governments to perpetrate those acts.

Comparing Contexts for Intervention, and Each Intervention’s Impact on Others

Each o f the interventions in the case studies took place in a unique time and place,
and was discussed and implemented by a unique and changing group o f decision makers
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and external change agents. However, there are some similarities between them. This
section will discuss the political and historical contexts for intervention, or non
intervention, and note those similarities and dissimilarities where they appear.
One o f the four case studies, that on Somalia, took place in a one term presidency.
Three o f them, including Somalia, Rwanda, and Libya, took place in the first term o f a
presidency, leaving Kosovo as the only one o f the four that took place in a second term.
The importance o f this is seen in the process o f decision making, the power o f the
President and the National Security Advisor as the leaders and coordinators o f the
decision making process, and the role allowed powerful leaders outside o f the presidency,
both in terms o f shaping policy and in framing the intervention efforts which followed.
This is a question o f coherency in decision making. The Bush administration, for reasons
discussed, was the most cohesive and effective decision making body o f the three
administrations examined. They had, in effect, been governing together at least since
1980, and in some cases back as far as the Nixon administration. They had ended the
Cold War together, and also planned and implemented operations in Panama and Iraq.
These were people who knew each other well, many were close personal friends, and
were all comfortable with working with one another while backing President Bush
implicitly. Bush was at the center, he was the key and most powerful decision maker,
and it was he alone who needed to be persuaded to act in Somalia. Once he did, the
administration fell into lock step behind his decision, and moved into an implementation
mindset. It is this unusual, and potentially unrepeatable level o f cohesion which actually
gives Somalia more in common with Clinton’s Kosovo intervention than with Rwanda or
Libya.
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Another factor in common between Somalia and Kosovo is that in both cases, the
presidents were keen to accomplish something big. For Bush, it was a closeout to his
administration and an effort to lock the newly elected Clinton into a path o f positive, but
seemingly painless, foreign policy action.

For Clinton, it was an effort to cleanse his

legacy o f the failure in Rwanda internationally, and for the Monica Lewinsky scandal
specifically, with a nearly risk free military option that would also preserve unity o f and
U.S. dominance o f European defense matters through strengthening NATO.2 Although
Clinton was on his second, and in some cases third set o f cabinet officers, by 1998, they
had, for the most part, worked together in one or another capacity for six years, and had
achieved some o f the familiarity and coherency that the Bush team enjoyed.
In contrast, the Clinton team which made the choice not to intervene in Rwanda
actually has more in common with the Obama administration which decided to intervene
in Libya in 2011. New in office, that team had been thrust immediately into crises in
Yugoslavia and Somalia. The senior leaders o f the administration were either Clinton
loyalists, or had been brought in from the last Democrat administration, that o f Carter,
twelve years before. Many did not know each other, or well know how to best work
together or with their boss, who was distinctly averse to foreign policy, preferring to deal
with domestic economic crises.3 Similarly, the Obama team also had two foreign wars to
deal with, in Iraq and Afghanistan. The events o f the Arab Spring took place further into
the administration’s tenure than that o f Clinton (Rwanda began in earnest about one year
after the inauguration, while the Arab Spring was two years after Obama’s inauguration),
however, and Obama’s cabinet was significantly different in structure. Unlike Clinton,
2 Gellman, Barton. “ A llies Facing the Limits o f Air Power.” The Washington P ost, March 28, 1999. 1A.
3 Hyland, William. Clinton's World: Remaking Am erican Foreign Policy. London: Praeger Books, 1999.
8.

247
Obama did not take a significant number o f senior leaders from the previous Democrat
administration, and those that he did take all had a deputy or senior subordinate who was
an Obama stalwart, and who often had better access to the president than his or her
appointed lead.4 This created a deep divide in the team, with further issues such as the
retention o f cabinet members such as Gates from the Bush administration. Returning to
the comparison, both the Clinton and Obama teams were divided, neither president
wanted foreign policy to be a leading issue, and neither wanted the specific events,
Rwanda and Libya, to take on a central role. Differences between the two events include
that Rwanda began just as another intervention, that in Somalia, was failing, whereas the
events in Libya took place in a post Rwanda world with key leaders such as Power, who
were specifically working with its memory in mind. Furthermore, the Libya crisis was
just one o f many that made the Arab Spring impossible for the White House to ignore.
The bottom line was that no notable cabinet or sub cabinet officials wanted to intervene
in Rwanda, whereas key empowered individuals, namely Power, Rice, and, later, Clinton,
pushed for and achieved the intervention in Libya.
As has been noted, U.S. policy toward interventions changed as a result o f the
perception of failure o f the Somalia intervention, with a significant reduction
recommended for future interventions.5 Since the major negative act o f the Somalia
intervention, the attempt to intervene in Somali politics which ended with the battle o f
Mogadishu and the “Blackhawk Down” debacle took place after the installation o f
Clinton as President, it would be under his administration that the lessons o f the
intervention would be learned and implemented. Unfortunately, those final events
4 Gates, Robert M. Duty, M emoirs o f a S ecretary at War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 291.
5 Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey. "Somalia and the Future o f Humanitarian Intervention." Foreign
Affairs, March/April 1996, (1996): 70-85. 70.
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happened so close in time to the early rumblings o f trouble in Rwanda that they
overshadowed an objective discussion on that crisis, and directly impacted the decision
not to intervene there. The lessons o f Somalia, then, appeared to be clear. In summary,
the U.S. government, from Congress to the White House to the cabinet agencies lost its
ardor for large scale use o f ground forces for humanitarian interventions, an opinion
which has not changed since 1994.6 The price in money, lives, and embarrassment was
more than any in government were willing to repeatedly bear.

For the Defense

Department, the Powell Doctrine was vindicated, and the idea o f sending in a large force
with what became in increasingly poorly defined mission and goals should not be
repeated. The idea o f being neutral in a humanitarian crisis also left the debate as the last
U.S. troops came home from Somalia. Future armed interventions would clearly support,
or protect, a victimized side against the government, and those actions would be part o f
the initial mandate o f the intervention.7 As noted previously, OFDA proposed that the
U.S. aid community and the Department o f State develop an early warning system for
humanitarian crisis which might allow for pre-emption, but this failed to materialize in a
way that brought about further interventions, and played no role in Rwanda, Kosovo, or
Libya.
Rwanda would clearly suffer both for the failure in Somalia and for the newness
o f the Clinton team and his lack o f interest at that time in Foreign policy. The genocide
in Rwanda, which began soon after the end o f the Somalia mission, would redefine the
terms o f western armed humanitarian intervention and shape future discussions o f state

6 Clarke and Herbst. 70.
7 Ibid. 82.

249
sovereignty, failed states, and human security.8 The Rwanda case study, on the decision
not to intervene, noted the different decision making dynamic o f the first Clinton
administration and the impact o f a perceived failure in the Somalia intervention on the
possibility o f involvement in the Rwandan Civil War and genocides.

The failure to

respond to genocide in Rwanda generated a discussion on human security and the
meaning o f state sovereignty when human rights and security were endangered which
would both encourage the Kosovo intervention.

The demonstration there that major

powers were willing to ignore the sovereignty o f other nations in furtherance o f
humanitarian goals fueled the development o f the R2P concept which eventually lead to
the Libyan intervention o f 2011.
Many players in the administration changed between the first and second Clinton
terms, but two were most important.

The first was the replacement o f Warren

Christopher with Madeleine Albright, who would turn out to be the prime activist for
intervention. The second was the replacement o f Anthony Lake with Sandy Berger as
National Security Advisor. Like Obama would do later on with Donilon, Clinton had
placed Berger, his own man, as deputy to Lake.

While their relationship was not as

acrimonious as that described by many o f the Obama cabinet secretaries towards their
Obama loyalist subordinates, there is no question that Berger was more in tune with
Clinton’s preferences and desires than Lake had been, and better able to translate to
requests o f the other interested parties in the foreign policy realm into actionable items

8 United Nations. “Report o f the Independent Inquiry into the actions o f the United Nations during the
1994 Genocide in Rwanda.” December 15, 1999. www.un.org/news/ossg/rwanda_report.htm. A ccessed
on September 15, 2014. This and other reports were not available at the time o f the decision making in
1994. 1.
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for the president.9 Because o f these factors, Berger stands with Brent Scowcroft as the
two most effective o f the four national security advisors examined in the case studies.
Each had a keen knowledge of the interests and desires o f their boss, they were also close
friends with that boss, had shared life experiences, and also understood the need for a
smoothly functioning cabinet. It is important to mention though, that the comparison has
its limits. Scowcroft did not make decisions for Bush, or speak in his name, both of
which Berger frequently did.10 Berger, furthermore, actively envisioned his role as a very
public one, in which he would be a primary salesman for foreign policy decisions,
position in stark contrast to that o f Scowcroft. It is possible to argue that Albright’s job
was not to convince Clinton, but Berger, o f the need to intervene in Kosovo.11
The similarities between Scowcroft and Berger are not meant to pair Anthony
Lake with James Jones or Thomas Donilon, the two Obama era National Security
Advisors examined. Lake was close to the president, but as a career diplomat tended to
operationalize his role in events rather than serve as arbiter for the president. His focus
on Russia in 1994, for example, helped to blind him and the cabinet to events in
Rwanda.12 Jones’ number one problem was that he was not an Obama insider. As a
hierarchically trained military leader at the highest level o f the armed forces, he was
unable to adapt to the Obama leadership circle, which was non-hierarchical and saw
numerous information streams go to the president, many o f them outside o f Jones’

9 Rodman, Peter. Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, an d the M aking o f Foreign P olicy fro m
Nixon to G eorge W. Bush. N ew York: Alfred A Knopf, 2009. 207.
10 Daalder, Ivo, and Destler, I.M. In the Shadow o f the Oval Office: Profiles o f the National Security
Advisors and the Presidents They Served - from JFK to George W. Bush. N ew York: Simon and Schuster,
2009. 248
11 Albright, Madeleine. M adam Secretary, a Memoir. N ew York: Harper Collins, 2013. 386.
12 Power, Samantha "Bystanders to Genocide." Atlantic Monthly September, 2001.
http://www.theatlantic.com /m agazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/ A ccessed on April
20, 2014.
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knowledge or control.

IT

Donilon also suffered from this issue, but he was new in his role

at the time o f the Libya decision, and in any case more entrenched players, Power, Rice,
and Clinton all carried more clout when the moment came to decide.

Comparing the Key Players Across Administrations - Seeking the “Powerful” Actor

In terms o f seeking the dominant actor for the foreign policy decision making and
framing processes, the first case study examined, Somalia, turns out to be an outlier for
the discussion, for several reasons.

The UN and the Secretary General had a greater

impact on U.S. decision making for Somalia than for any o f the other cases except for the
negative role in Rwanda. It is the one study in which U.S. players outside o f the normal
cabinet structure had influence. Herman Cohen and Frank Wisner at the Department o f
State fit this bill, as did ODFA lead James Kunder and USAID leader Andew Natsios.
Congress also took on a much greater role in pushing for intervention in Somalia than in
any other case, notwithstanding the individual role that John McCain took in pushing for
intervention in the Arab Spring events, most particularly in Libya in 2011. In spite o f
significant actions by these lower tier actors, more than in any o f the other interventions,
there is no question in the histories o f memoirs that the Somalia decision was solely in
the hands of President Bush, and that he made his decision to intervene with advice from
senior cabinet officers, but not from a cabinet vote or other collective decision making
means, as was the case in other interventions, such as the Obama cabinet’s Libya debate

13 Gates. 291.
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and vote for intervention.14 Bush, then is the “powerful actor” sought by the model, who
had the conviction and influence to dominate the decision making process for
intervention. Again, Bush is unique among the presidents examined for two reasons.
The first was his deep background in decision making at the highest levels o f
government. This was a man who was comfortable in his role, and unafraid to exercise
command.

The second reason, touched on repeatedly, was the unique nature o f the

George H.W. Bush cabinet. These were men who were not only friends, but had served
together in government for decades, with players sitting in different seats, sometimes
superior, sometimes subordinate to one another. This is clearly seen in the manner in
which the DOD turned on a dime in its approach to Somalia.

Bush and Cheney had

worked with each other on and off since the Nixon Administration, as had Colin Powell.
Each understood the hierarchy and their role in it, and once the boss decided, the
discussions ended.
Bush’s motivations for decision are not dissimilar in kind from those o f other
leaders examined, particularly in the case o f Clinton and Kosovo. To restate, Bush was
motivated by: African experience prior to his presidency; by the need to take decisive
action as the Republican National Convention and the reelection loomed (but in an area
that seemed easier to “win” than the growing quagmire in Yugoslavia); by media
reporting and the reports o f subordinates, most notably the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya,
and congressional leaders on the horrors occurring in Somalia;15 and then after the

14 Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey. Learning fro m Somalia. Boulder, Colorado: W estview Press, 1997.
9.
15 Brent Scowcroft, as interviewed by Western, Jon. "Sources o f Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs,
Information, and A dvocacy in the U.S. D ecisions on Somalia and Bosnia." International Security 26, no. 4
(2002): 112-142. 125.

253
election by the simultaneous needs to secure his political legacy and to lock the incoming
president into what was thought were salutary actions on the world stage.
The Rwanda mini case study is the other outlier in terms o f the quest for decisive
leadership in decision making. There simply was no decisive stance on Rwanda at any
level o f government. In the wake o f the Battle o f Mogadishu, there was no interest in
another entanglement, this time in a remote, hard to reach part o f the world, and one to
which the American people and government leaders were already inured to accept large
casualties and brutality on a regular basis. Unlike the case in Somalia, President Clinton
was not interested, which meant that powerful leadership would have to rise up from
lower levels o f the cabinet. Since the issue in Rwanda was not one o f reconstruction or
food aid, but primarily political, the actors one would expect to push for intervention,
USAID, OFDA, and the foreign assistance NGO’s were largely silent. Political officers
in the relevant sections o f the Department o f State, such as the Africa Bureau, were
motivated, but as mentioned above were inured to accept significant death and mayhem
before they realized the true gravity o f the massacres.16 By that point they largely
switched over from benign disinterest to being stunned by the enormity o f the atrocities.
At the next level o f government higher, the cabinet level, the only motivated actor
seemed to be U.S. Ambassador to the UN Albright, and even she noted that while she
was concerned, there was so much else going on in the world that the gravity o f the
situation was simply not evident.17
Similarly, NSC staffers, such as Susan Rice, were clearly more concerned about
the political fallout from Somalia, and about the potential impact o f more negative news

16 Power, 2001.
17 Albright. 149.
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on the upcoming mid-term elections.18 She was right to be so concerned, since the
Republican landslide o f that year did change the political landscape, and was in part due
to foreign policy failures by the administration. The DOD remained against potential
operations in Rwanda from the beginning, and there was no significant effort to sway
DOD from that stance.

One rung even higher up the food chain saw even more

disinterest on behalf o f the two leaders most likely to be able to sway the president and
the DOD, since National Security Advisor Lake was focused on Russian politics, and
Secretary o f State Christopher could not even find Rwanda on a m ap.19 It would be
simplistic to say that intervention will only take place when there is a powerful individual
interested, as in the case o f Rwanda it is one o f a plethora o f reasons why action did not
take place. But that lack is a significant cause for inaction and a key finding o f this study.
The Kosovo intervention and that in Libya both feature the intervention o f
powerful individuals who had the power to shape the decision making process to secure
their desired end state, presidential approval for action.

As noted above, the

administrations o f Clinton and Obama were in different places developmentally at the
time o f intervention, and the personalities o f the two leaders were quite different. The
Obama administration had a tendency to micromanage foreign policy, whereas Clinton
was far more likely to let Berger make choices, at least when things were going well.20
Furthermore, Clinton was strongly distracted by domestic politics, in particular the
Lewinsky scandal. While the Obama administration had no desire to be sucked further
into the Middle East, the Arab Spring joined the World Economic Crisis to dominate the
news and the administrations attention in 2011. As mentioned above, the Clinton cabinet
18 Rice quoted in Power, 2001.
19 Power, 2001.
20 Daalder. 254.
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had nearly all been with the president since the beginning, and their time together eased
some o f the decision making process, certainly the Kosovo intervention was decided on
much more readily than that in Libya. The main new player was outside o f the central
governing sphere, in the form of General Wesley Clark, whose own political acumen and
ease o f working with the real insiders in the Clinton administration gave him clout
beyond the normal role o f a combatant commander.21
Whereas in the Somalia case study, the Department o f Defense actively resisted
intervention until it was ordered otherwise, and Rwanda, where it successfully resisted
intervention, Kosovo represented a notable victory for the Department o f State against
DOD. Madeleine Albright, with Richard Holbrooke and Wesley Clark in support, waged
a multi month long struggle to motivate the rest o f the cabinet, in particular Berger and
Secretary o f Defense Cohen, to support intervention. Clinton him self came around when
the domestic challenges to his attention were resolved in winter, 1999, and when
atrocities and violation o f agreements by Serbia became too blatant to ignore.

His

motivations were in part driven by guilt over failure to act in Rwanda, and a need to
complete the still ongoing Yugoslav crisis in response to criticism over the failure o f the
Dayton accords.

Clinton was legitimately concerned about the suffering o f Kosovar

Albanians, and was able to be convinced by Albright, through Berger, that intervention
was necessary. He was so desirous o f intervention that, in lieu o f significant UN support,
he turned to NATO as the international legitimator o f action.
For the Libya intervention, the roles o f three players in convincing President
Obama to act are well known. Power, Rice, and Clinton directly convinced Obama to act
in a discussion and vote. Although the discussions took place over a two to three week
21 Halbertsam, David. War in a Time o f Peace. N ew York: Scribner, 2001. 433.
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period in March, 2011, the actual decision happened quickly, and in the most egalitarian
decision making environment seen in the three case studies. What is interesting about the
Libya decisions is that, unlike the other interventions, they were decisively influenced by
the actions o f second and third tier agents, meaning Rice and Power, respectively. It was
they who stood nearly coequal to a first tier advisor, Clinton, who in turn helped the other
two overcome cabinet opposition and pushed the president toward intervention. While
Kunder, Natsios, Cohen, and Wisner all had their roles to play in the Somalia decision
making process, there is no evidence that any o f them were allowed into the inner
decision making circle in the way that Rice and Power were for Obama.

This was

because o f the close and special nature o f the relationship that each o f them had with the
president, relationships that predated the administration and allowed them to circumvent
the usual channels for cabinet decision making.

Intervening Factors: Geography, Great Power Hostility or Support, International
Affirmation, Domestic Politics, and National Interest

Five intervening factors in decision making emerged from the research.

Each

played a major role in the decision making and framing process for armed humanitarian
interventions. The first is geography, meaning the ease o f access by military forces into
the area in which intervention is to take place. While the U.S. has an impressive array o f
land, sea, and air power, it prefers to utilize that power in certain ways. The preference is
for interventions which can be reached by sea, since sea lift is a major U.S. military
strength, and much larger logistical loads can be moved more effectively by ship than by
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air.22 Furthermore, the U.S. Navy is unrivaled in its medium, and control o f sea lanes
where desired by U.S. forces is generally assumed, particularly in an era when the U.S.
has less access to forward land bases than during the Cold War.23

An additional

geographic consideration is nearness to friendly airfields. While U.S. aircraft can strike
anywhere in the world, for logistical and pilot rest reasons, the preference is that aircraft
not be forced to refuel in the air or launch their missions from CONUS.24 Finally, the
U.S. Marine Corps, the military body most specifically tailored for sudden militarized
boots on the ground intervention, is sea based, and each region o f the world has Marine
forces afloat which can respond nearly instantly to crises within range o f its embarked
helicopters and amphibious vehicles.
How is this borne out in the case studies?

Somalia was easy to reach

amphibiously and by air from friendly locations. Marines could exercise their sea borne
supply option, and aircraft carriers could have provided rapid support if needed. In the
case o f Kosovo, nearby Italy served as the base for the majority o f U.S. airstrikes, along
with aircraft carriers in the nearby Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas. Ground forces could
have been introduced from the forces already located in neighboring Macedonia, Bosnia,
or readily deployed by helicopter or medium lift aircraft such as the C-130 from Italy or
from ships at sea. Libya was the easiest o f all in this regard. There was never a question
of ground forces in Libya, but since the overwhelming majority o f targets were coastal

22 Mullenbach, M. J. and Matthews, G. P. “Deciding to intervene: An analysis o f international
and domestic influences on United States interventions in intrastate disputes.” International Interactions,
3 4 ,2 0 0 8 ,2 5 -5 2 . 30.
23 Ignatieff, Michael. "The Challenges o f American Imperial Power." Naval War C ollege R eview 56, No. 2.
Spring, 2003: 9-18. 13.
24 A notable exception to this is the use o f Strategic bombers, most particularly the B2, which the U.S. does
not normally base outside its borders for security reasons.
25 U.S. Marine Corps 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. “About the 26th MEU.”
http://www.26thmeu.marines.mil/About/M EU.aspx. A ccessed on Novem ber 1, 2014.
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towns, deploying them by helicopter or amphibious assault would have been easy.
Airstrikes were launched from nearby aircraft carriers and from the European mainland.
Since NATO countries such as Italy, the UK, and France were involved in the airstrikes,
access to nearby bases for U.S. forces was not in question.
Rwanda forms the outlier for geography, and it’s remoteness was touted at the
time as a reason not to intervene. Landlocked, Rwanda was nowhere near the normal
sources o f U.S. maritime power. None o f Rwanda’s neighbors were U.S. allies, so there
was no way to get U.S. forces close enough to stage into the country, or in which to base
U.S. tactical and logistical aircraft.26 Any U.S. military effort would have had to be
staged in by aircraft, which would have generated their own requirements for escorts,
ground support security forces, and supplies. This assessment is in no way meant to
judge the decision not to intervene, but reflect part o f the Pentagon’s reasoning in
resisting intervention.27
The second and third external variables in determining intervention involve the
international community and the establishment o f legitimacy for militarized interventions
which would violate state sovereignty.

As a proponent o f international law and the

concept of state sovereignty, the U.S. seeks to act within the legitimization o f an
international mandate, as evidenced in its seeking o f such legitimization in each o f the
case studies.

For Somalia, this was the U.N., and is evidenced by President Bush

working directly with Boutros Boutros Gali to encourage passage o f UN Security Council
Resolution 1973, specifically tailored for what would become the U.S. led coalition.

26 Albright. 153.
27 National Security Council o f the United States. “Memorandum for Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs.” National Security Council. May 5, 1994. From Ferroggiaro, William, "The
U.S. And Rwanda, 1994, Evidence o f Inaction", George Washington University
http://w w w 2.gw u.edu/~nsarchiv/N SA EBB/N SAEBB53. A ccessed October 14 2014.
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Interestingly, the withdrawal o f U.S. forces in the wake o f the battle o f Mogadishu was
not mandated or forced by the UN, but was a choice o f the Clinton administration. In the
contrasting case o f Rwanda, the international community was working specifically
against intervention from the start, as the UN pulled more and more o f its own
peacekeepers out o f the country. This proved to be yet another factor which led to the
non-intervention there. In Libya, as well, pushing through a UN resolution, and rallying
other international bodies such as the Arab League, the GCC, and NATO were all central
both in the justification of the intervention and framing that justification to the American
people.
Kosovo provides a more interesting case, in that the legitimacy which would be
provided by UN support for intervention was distinctly lacking, in part due to Russian
doubts about the operation, forcing the administration to rely on NATO as an admittedly
lesser international legitimating body. That said, the Clinton administration saw both the
strengthening o f NATO and its support in the operation as vitally important, along with
mollifying Russia so that it would not actively oppose the intervention in the UN Security
Council.

Further, the future o f NATO itself as a cohesive alliance seemed to be at

stake, a factor which helped frame the intervention.
As a third factor, the role o f foreign actors turned out to be a critical factor in
decision making for and against interventions. For Somalia, this influence was primarily
provided by pressure from the UN and its Secretary General, Boutros-Gali. For Rwanda,
French support o f the Tutsis, and French and Belgian actions in the UN helped to
influence the U.S. against intervention. Russian resistance would have doomed an effort

28 Talbot, Strobe. The Russia Hand: A M emoir o f P residential D iplom acy. N ew York: Random House,
2003. 348.
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to intervene in Kosovo, since Moscow viewed Serbia as a client state.

By the same

token, initial German reluctance to intervene was significant, just as British support for
intervention was a strong motivating factor for the U.S.

Similarly, for the Libya

intervention, France and the UK strongly influenced the U.S. intervention, even
providing the “ahead” as the U.S. led from “behind.”
U.S. domestic politics form an additional, if coincidental, external factor which
was revealed through examination o f the case studies. The imminence o f presidential or
mid-term congressional elections seemed to be a factor in all but one o f the case studies,
although the impact o f those elections on the interventions is not consistent and may be
minimal or irrelevant.
factor.

Presidential elections, however, were much more obviously a

In 1992, the presidential election cycle was a major consideration.

The

challenger, Clinton, turned lack o f action in Somalia into a campaign issue which
influenced Bush’s decision making, leading to the approval o f the airlift in August, timed
to provide a bump in approval before the Republican National Convention.

Further,

during the main electioneering season, from September to early November, the
administration was completely absorbed in the campaign.29
1994 was a midterm election year for the Clinton administration’s first term, and
this directly impacted the decision making on the Rwanda intervention, as specifically
mentioned by then NSC staffer Susan Rice.30 Coming on the heels, as it did, o f the failed
peacemaking effort in Somalia, the election was a significant factor in explaining the
inaction o f the administration and the lack o f congressional pressure for an intervention

29 Redd, Stephen B. “The Influence o f Advisors and D ecision Strategies on Foreign Policy Choices:
President Clinton’s Decision to Use Force in K osovo.” International Studies P erspectives, V olum e 6,
2005. 137.
30 Power. 2001.
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that might have proven to be as unpopular as Somalia had become. Elections also bore
on the decision to intervene in Kosovo, with Clinton purposefully insisting on a discrete
mission that would be over with before the 2000 election cycle got fully underway, so as
not to saddle his chosen successor, A1 Gore with the burden o f a potentially
uncomfortable conflict.31 Like Bush during the election cycle, Clinton was also badly
distracted by domestic scandals, most notably the Monica Lewinsky affair and
subsequent impeachment.
Each of the four factors above combine with economics and history to suggest a
fifth, national interest.

U.S. national interest varies by region and subject, with the

traditional conflict between moralistic and realist actions seen in each.

At its core,

national interest, as described by Alexander George, is more than “minimum objectives”
which he states as survival, economic well being, and liberty.32 In the post Cold War era,
the U.S. was more willing to take realist, i.e. militarized action, in regions o f the world
where it had been directly attacked, where vital resources were at stake, where one o f its
allies or alliances was directly threatened, and where it had historically had a role.
National interest ultimately kept the U.S. out o f Rwanda, but into the other examples, and
it was the role o f the dominant actor in each decision making process to make the case
that U.S. interests were at stake. For Somalia, George H.W. Bush wished to lock his
replacement, Clinton, into a series o f policies that did not include intervention in Bosnia.
For Clinton, years later, intervention in Kosovo was couched in terms o f avoiding war in
Europe, and in strengthening the NATO alliance. Over a decade later, goals in Libya
were similar, to back the play o f allies in the region and prevent the spread o f instability.
31 Redd. 137.
32 George, Alexander. Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective U se o f Information
and Advice. Boulder, Colorado: W estview Press, 1980. 227.
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Decision Making Models

As stated in the methodology, this research sought to evaluate and validate several
models o f decision making. The first two are Graham Allison’s Rational Actor Model
(RAM) o f government politics, decision making, and group dynamics, while the second,
•>-3

influenced by the first, is the Governmental Politics Model.

To restate, the RAM’s core

concepts include: The ranking o f objectives, discussion o f alternatives, attachment o f
consequences to the alternatives, and a rational selection o f the alternatives to act upon
based on required goal completion.34 Further assumptions include the primacy o f unitary
states as actors, and the perception o f the international environment as a self-help
anarchic world with no higher authority to moderate state action.35 In each of the four
case studies, the RAM is evident in the decision making process, from the deputies level
up through the president. For Somalia, that process brought about the August airlift, and
led to the decision to intervene, but under strict guidelines that left out regime change or
political involvement.

For Rwanda, the discussion never got above the deputies, the

same types of discussions took place, and the situation was deemed not worth o f
intervention. In Kosovo, a wide range of pressures were tried, including attempting to
work diplomatically both with Serbia directly and through Serbian sponsor Russia, with
intervention occurring when those efforts were seen to dramatically fail. For Libya, the
decision to intervene was taken under some time duress, nevertheless, the compromise
solutions presented by Gates, Biden, and others, were considered before intervention was

33 A llison, Graham and Zelikow , Philip. Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban M issile Crisis. Vol. 2.
N ew York: Longman, 1999. 13-16.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid. 15-16.
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selected as the course o f action. Seeking international legitimacy for armed humanitarian
interventions also falls within the realm o f rationality, as an effort to mitigate the effects
o f the anarchical system.
The Government Politics Model (GPM), is less positively present through the
case studies. In this model, these decisions are viewed as “outputs o f large organizations
functioning according to standards o f behavior.”36 Outcomes will be influenced by
organizational, not individual, dynamics and cultures.37 The various bureaucracies which
make up the decision making process serve themselves first, then their higher authorities,
which can cause the creation o f gaps between the choices o f leaders and the
implementation capabilities and priorities o f subordinate organizations.38 In the cases in
which more junior leaders decidedly impact decision making, such as Libya, it is difficult
to see the GPM, and its assertions o f hierarchy in play.39 Under this model even a
paramount leader, such as the president, must seek consensus with his subordinates, if for
no other reason than to prevent misunderstandings, and even presidential power may be
curtailed by powerful subordinate bureaucracies.40
Looking at events through the prism o f the GPM, it is seen to be partially relevant
to the case studies. Regarding Somalia, each o f the cabinet and interagency players stuck
to their own institutional lines o f interest. DOD resisted intervention, as contrary to its
existing doctrine, until it perceived and acted on the president’s desires. Humanitarian
aid-focused agencies argued for intervention from their own points o f view. Where the

36 A llison and Zelikow. 143.
37 Ibid. 255.
38 Ibid. 257.
39 Bendor, Jonathan and Hammond, Thomas H. "Rethinking A llison’s Models." The American Political
Science R eview 86, no. 2 (1992, June): 301-322. 306. The term they use is “Single Time Period”
organization.
40 W oll, Peter. Am erican Bureacracy. N ew York: Norton, 1977. 206-207.
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GPM breaks down, however, in the case o f Somalia, is in the nature o f the final decision
to intervene.

There is no evidence that Bush was influenced in any way by the

organizational resistance o f the DOD toward intervention. Given his long career as a
foreign policy practitioner, he did not need to be told o f what and why the military
resisted intervention. He also did not have to cut deals with any agency or player in order
to give force to his directives. When he decided on intervention, the government acted.
Because o f this decisive and unchecked action, the GPM cannot be credited with well
explaining the Somalia decision making process. This is not to deny the power o f the
presidency in all o f the cases, however, the central role that Bush played in the process is
unique among the cases.
Rwanda may be the purest example o f the GPM in action o f the case studies,
however, this is not helpful since a successful GPM would then appear to mean that the
U.S. will not ever engage in armed humanitarian operations.

The Rwanda example

remains relevant, however, since it demonstrates one outcome that can occur when no
dominant actor makes the case the president for intervention. Since the issue o f Rwanda
was never seriously discussed at the highest levels, we must examine what did happen,
which was interagency discussions at the deputies level and below. In these, the GPM is
seen to function, with each agency making its arguments from its own bureaucratic point
of view, and none being able to overcome an overall reluctance to act. Since none o f the
major bureaucracies was motivated sufficiently to intervene, no recommendation to sway
a president, who was not focused on the issue, to take place.
The Kosovo intervention saw the GPM in action, with each o f the key players
arguing for or against intervention from an institutional point o f view, with National
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Security Advisor Berger at the pinnacle o f the decision making process. Given the nature
o f the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, the interagency community focused on food and
medical aid was not a major player.

The intelligence community did not play an

advocacy role, but served its customary function o f providing information, leaving the
Departments o f State and Defense as the two key players.

As in the Somalia case,

however, we see the GPM as only a partial solution, for several reasons. One is that there
is no evidence that President Clinton had to bargain in order to implement his decisions.
Once he decided, the key players, in this case Holbrooke at State and Clark at DOD
acted. Furthermore, while the Department o f State acted as a relatively unified body in
the decision making process, the Department of Defense was significantly divided, with
an institutional bias against intervention on the one hand, and a powerful player on the
ground in Europe, Wesley Clark, who was convinced o f the need for intervention and did
not hesitate to make that known outside o f his chain o f command, or to work with those
in other agencies outside o f his own bureaucracy, in this case the Department o f State, to
push for and implement intervention.41
O f the three case studies which observed actual interventions, the Libya case
study comes closest to an intervention which took place as the GPM would have
predicted, with the caveat that U.S. allies, most notably in France and the GCC, provided
powerful external catalysts for armed intervention.
institutional points o f view.

The players all spoke from their

While Rice, as an Ambassador, technically worked for

Hillary Clinton in her role as Secretary o f State, the reality is that the Ambassador to the
UN has often served as a personal delegate and confidante o f the president, particularly in
Democrat administrations, and this places Rice as her own power center. The institutions
41 Halbertsam. 433.
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which are customarily against intervention, most notably DOD, were against it in this
case, while those whose mandate covered humanitarian issues were in favor.

The

negotiations which took place saw bargaining, particularly on the issue o f whether or not
ground forces would be used in the operation. There is no memoir to suggest that Obama
was personally against this, as Clinton openly was throughout the Kosovo Crisis. Based
on polling data and Congressional statements, it appears that ground forces were not
bargained away to please the DOD, but rather as an assessment o f the prevailing public
opinion on the matter. Therefore, one key piece o f the GPM, bargaining from the top,
does not appear to be present.
Noteworthy criticism o f the GPM focuses on whether goals o f leaders at the
cabinet level are actually so disparate, and both whether and why a president would have
to bargain with his own appointees.42 They posit that a president would try to avoid
bargaining if possible, and that he would normally be in a paramount position to do so.
In all three o f the cases where intervention took place, presidential decision making was
final once the orders to intervene were given.

Therefore, looking at the case studies

through the lens o f the GPM is an inadequate vision o f how the decision making for the
examined interventions actually took place.
A third model, the Theory o f Government Politics Model (TGM), posits that key
leaders acted as “pied pipers” and brought others along with them through persuasive
power, particularly if the outlook o f and relationships among the group members were
similar and strong.43 Given that this model was built around the first Bush administration

42 Bradford, Jeffrey P. "Political Aspects o f Strategic Decision Making in British D efence Policy."
Cranfield University, 1999. 18.
43 Yetiv, Steve A. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. D ecision M aking an d the G u lf War. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2004. 120.
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and their actions in the first G ulf War, it is unsurprising that the model works well in
describing the actions which led to the Somalia intervention. Again, Bush him self was
the chief engine for decision making who provided the central guidance which got DOD
on board for intervention and made the actions o f December 1992 possible. The similar
outlook and close relations among the key leaders involved facilitated this, as it had done
in the G ulf War. The TGM is also sadly predictive o f the non-intervention in Rwanda, if
only, once again, in an unsatisfactory way, since the lack o f a strong spokesperson meant
that the de facto mindset, against intervention, could take hold and prevent action.
The model turned out to be partially useful for explaining the interventions in
Kosovo and Libya, in which powerful actors, although not always in paramount roles,
formulated their positions and drug other key leaders along. In the case o f Kosovo, and
for reasons previously discussed, the Clinton team, which had a term and a half o f
working together under its belt, and which had a president who had become very
comfortable in his role as international decision maker, comes close to the Bush model,
and the TGM is useful in predicting the outcome that Madeleine Albright would be able
to pull the decision making apparatus along to her point o f view. If one takes Wesley
Clark, not Defense Secretary Cohen, as the leading player for the Defense Department,
then the TGM fits the process even better. Indeed, it seems that the main competitor for
Albright’s attention on the issue o f Kosovo was not international, but rather Clinton’s
absorption by the events o f the Monica Lewinsky case and his impeachment.

When

those two issues were resolved, decisions on Kosovo came quickly, and Albright’s voice
found its full audience and impact.
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The TGM is very evident in the Libya case study, in which Rice and Power,
neither o f whom were in traditionally dominant influential positions, exercised the pied
piper role.

With the help o f pressure from the international community, actions by

France and other allies, and growing personal concern about reports o f violence and
genocide, Hillary Clinton was brought around to a pro-intervention stance.44 Between the
three o f them, they then convinced President Obama to act, in spite o f significant pressure
against intervention by other powerful players.

Where the model does not predict,

however, is that this took place in an environment in which the key players had nowhere
near the comfort level working with each other, and little commonality o f vision or
understanding o f authority compared to the Bush administration, for reasons discussed
previously. So Libya gives the result, but without what it predicts would be the necessary
factors.

Finally, Libya suffers somewhat from the same problem that critics such as

Bradford raise with Allison, which is that he covered his subject too recently after its
occurrence, and before all evidence was available in terms o f memoirs and classified
documents.45 The world is a much more partisan place now than it was in the 1960s, or
even 1990s, and the events in Libya are still central to a heated political debate which
will likely continue as long as any o f the players involved seek to run for elected office.
Further, many o f the key players are still in government, and their testimony will not be
available for some time. While the memoirs o f Clinton, Panetta, and Gates are available,
the critical memories o f Rice, Power, and President Obama him self are not. Based on
what is known about the Libya decision making process, the author does not expect

44 Clinton, Hillary R. H ard Choices. N ew York: Simon and Schuster, 2014. 364.
45 Bradford. 20.
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significant changes to take place in the story o f how the intervention came about, but
would be remiss in failing to note the possibility.
In summary, for decision making processes, the case studies bear out some o f the
predictions made in the introduction and methodology sections o f this dissertation. The
RAM turned out to be useful and more or less predictive, if overly general. The GPM
was the least useful o f the models, affirming criticisms o f its assumption on the
constraints organizations impose upon individuals.46 The TGM proved to be the most
predictive in the three cases, although, again, it works best when the specific factors it
needs to function are in place. Sadly, and unsatisfactorily, all o f the models, in one way
or another, are useful in predicting the lack o f intervention in Rwanda in 1994.

Framing and Intervention

According to Entman, the purpose o f a frame is “to generate support or opposition
to a political actor or policy.”47
Association Theory”.

This is what he calls the “Cascading Network

Since the government remains the primary source for

information, this creates a system o f asymmetric interdependence, but this can only be
taken advantage o f if there is unanimity in the message. Castells drew upon and added to
this concept in Communication Power, positing that Network Power is the power to
modify, change, or create networks.49 To Castells, power lies within networked systems.
According to Entman, the government is generally successful in framing when it can call

46 Bendor and Hammond. 309.
47 Entman, Robert M. Projections o f Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, an d U.S. Foreign Policy.
Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 2004. 47.
48 Ibid. 17-21.
49 Castells, Manuel. Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 45.
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on shared themes fitting the national mood and ideals and get its themes in “early and
often.”50
In all of the cases examined framing played some role in the decision making
process and in the justification o f intervention to key audiences, generally the media and
the American people, but also sometimes to allied nations and other audiences. In all
cases, the government was the organization with the power and interest to establish,
maintain, and capitalize on the power o f communication networks in order to frame the
debate on armed humanitarian interventions, and to persuade stakeholders o f the need to
intervene. Where the cases vary is the extent o f framing, and on the ability o f highly
placed, powerful individual actors who create the frames used to encourage intervention.
Conflicting frames also exist in each case, provided not only by the media, but by the
party out o f power. Counter framing was also occasionally provided by the government
o f the opposing power, meaning the country being intervened in.

As stated in the

methodology, a model drawing off the work o f Entman and Castells would expect to see
a concerted, planned effort by senior decision makers to set the terms o f public discourse
on a given issue, and to capitalize on the government’s unique position as a single source
for definitive information on key foreign policy and defense issues. Influencers outside
o f the foreign policy decision making process would be counteracted and refuted in order
to maintain information primacy. Narratives would attempt to draw simple parallels to
historical examples, not always contextually relevant, but well known and inflammatory
at times.

Control or influence on information networks would be established and

increased so that messaging could be enhanced.

50 Entman. 10.
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Entman’s theory is validated in the way in which the media were influenced by
government information, and later, in the impact that media reporting had back up the
information chain to President Bush during the Somalia decision making process.

As

noted, some o f the key second tier players such as USAID and OFDA leaders used the
media to facilitate their own efforts to force decisions on key issues, such as the airlift.51
But there is no evidence that framing by the government was undertaken in a systematic
way, or that such decisions were an implicit part o f the decision making cycle for the
decision to intervene.

Instead, the framing that took place was a byproduct o f the

primacy o f the government as an information holder and broker, and because o f the
unique nature, and high danger, o f the situation on the ground, which put the government
in the position o f having a monopoly on the information needed by the media to generate
accurate reporting.52
For Rwanda, public and congressional opinion was stacked heavily against
another intervention on the African continent. The frame o f the failure in Somalia was
dominant, along with an even grimmer frame that accepted a certain amount o f death,
mayhem and destruction in Africa as the norm.

That frame deadened government

officials to the crisis, officials who, had the same level o f mayhem occurred elsewhere,
would have been forced into action.

Finally, and along with the Somalia frame,

Yugoslavia, another crisis altogether, successfully dominated the national security
establishment o f the U.S. Rwanda showed no framing, except in a negative way, in an

51 Livingston, Stephen and Eachus, Todd. "Humanitarian Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and the
CNN Effect Reconsidered." P olitical Communication 12, 1 9 95,413-429. 424.
52 Ibid. 415.
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active attempt by the U.S. government to avoid use o f the term genocide so that
C l

intervention could be avoided.
In terms o f the Kosovo intervention, the American public were, when focused on
government policy at all, most interested in the scandals which surrounded the Clinton
administration, as well as his ongoing struggles with Congress, which culminated in
impeachment proceedings shortly before the intervention began.

As a result o f these

factors, the White House was on the defense in terms o f messaging and framing, slowing
both the U.S. response and the effort to justify that response through framing. Outside
public and congressional pressure to intervene was minimal.

As discussed, the

construction o f Slobodan Milosevic as the central villain o f the Kosovo crisis began some
months earlier, in fall 1998.54 The failure o f the Rambouillet conference is the event that
generated modest support for operations, as discussed in the case study.55 At this time,
presidential statements increased in stridency and directly hinted at the air campaign
which would follow if negotiations failed. A central part o f the framing effort was to
reassure the American people and allies and other great powers that the U.S. would not
place troops on the ground as part o f the intervention. The result o f these efforts was that
by the commencement o f hostilities, nearly half o f the American public saw Kosovo as a
security issue o f vital interest to the U.S.56
The Libya intervention shows different framing challenges, in part because o f
changes in the media, but it also presents conflicting frames, in particular Gadaffi’s
efforts to refute the U.S. frame, and the Iranian effort to frame the entire Arab Spring to

53 Power, 2001.
54 Butler, Michael J. Selling a 'Just' War: Framing, Legitimacy, an d U.S. M ilitary Intervention.
Chippenham and Eastbourne: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 146.
55 Redd. 136.
56 Ibid.
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its benefit. Furthermore, unlike the previous case studies, the Arab Spring dominated the
media in spring 2011, coming to eclipse even the ongoing economic crisis. This meant
that the American people did not have to be familiarized with information on the crisis,
and that the U.S. government had no monopoly on information, which was plentiful and
readily available. Framing the intervention in Libya began in the second week o f March,
2011, culminating with the decision to intervene a week later, and the ultimate speech
act, the Obama speech to the American people, the week after that.

In spite o f efforts by

President Obama and the senior leaders o f his cabinet to provide the moral imperative for
the intervention, public support for the operation stayed relatively flat, and barely crossed
over into the approval side o f the ledger, and even that only occurred because o f a strict
adherence to a policy o f keeping ground forces out o f Libya.

Correspondingly,

Congressional support for the operation also hinged on a basic promise to avoid a ground
invasion of Libya.

The Combined Decide/Frame Model

Based on the hypothesis that armed humanitarian interventions occur when a
powerful leader or small group o f leaders dominates the decision making and framing
apparatus to force and explain such an intervention, it is necessary to construct a theory
that explains the concurrence or nexus o f the decision making and framing processes.
Based on the literature review and a thorough examination o f the Allison, Yetiv, Entman,
and Castell’s models, it could be suggested that when the foreign policy decision making
process is dominated by powerful individuals with a motivation toward intervention, and
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the framing process is dominated by the same or similarly minded individuals, armed
humanitarian interventions take place driven by this alignment. Such individuals become
dominant actors due to a combination o f their holding o f a senior cabinet position, a
personal connection to the president, and the personal quality o f willpower to motivate
and explain decision making.
As noted in the methodology, this model would expect to see the decision making
process dominated by key stakeholders with powerful interests in a given issue formed by
their own experiences and pressures on them formed through their own participation in
events, both in forcing a decision on a given issue (in this case, armed humanitarian
interventions) and in framing that process and the associated decisions to the various
stakeholders (in this case, the public, through the media).
Once again following the framework o f taking each case study individually, the
Decide/Frame Model seems least relevant to the Somalia intervention. Framing, where it
took place, was spasmodic, and centered around key events. One example o f this is the
airlift o f August, 1992.

The decision was made so quickly that the only public

information available was the announcement o f the action.

Similarly, the actual

intervention in December was not preceded by a major framing effort by the government,
even in the intervening weeks between the Thanksgiving decision and the landing o f the
Marines two weeks later.57 This is not to say that there was no awareness or support on
behalf o f the American people, however, basic awareness o f the situation came from the
media. While the case study demonstrated that the media got most o f its information
from government sources, there is no evidence that the information given was developed

57 Klarevas, Louis J. "The Polls-Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia." Public Opinion
Quarterly 64, (2000): 523-540. 524-525.
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in such a way as to be anything more than informational, in other words, information
provided was not done so in order to frame an intervention, but rather to increase
awareness.
The model’s application to the Rwanda intervention is, as with many facets o f that
tragedy, non-satisfying, but that perversely helps to prove the point o f the research.
There was no order from the top ordering the non-intervention. Instead, the conversation
remained at the Deputies level and lower, and focused more on how to justify the non
intervention than any other factor.

Careful and assiduous avoidance o f the term

“Genocide” was the centerpiece o f the framing effort, and inasmuch as there was no
intervention, this can be seen as a clear, if unhappy, success.
The Kosovo intervention showed perhaps the most systematic example o f a
conscious effort to frame an intervention through the decision making process and to the
decision to intervene and the actual intervention o f U.S. forces.

Statements made by

Albright, Holbrooke, Clark, and others in the summer and fall o f 1998 were not
successful at creating public motivation for intervention, but set the stage for convincing
Cohen, Berger, and ultimately President Clinton o f the need for intervention, particularly
after the end o f the Lewinsky affair as a public factor and increasingly violent atrocities
in Kosovo itself in January and February 1999.

By February, the administration was

concurrently negotiating between the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, planning to
intervene, and actively running a media campaign designed to frame Milosevic and the
Serbs as genocidal, a national security issue, and needful o f a U.S. and western response.
That effort continued through the end o f the intervention, morphing to fit the changing
needs o f the frame. This is seen in the change from adamant refusal to consider ground
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forces to open threats o f their use as the Serbian will seemed to crack from April 1999
onwards.
The Libya intervention falls somewhere in between Somalia and Kosovo in terms
o f combined decision making and framing. The crisis had a much shorter lead up than
any o f the others except for Rwanda. Events in Egypt and Tunisia had only been going
on for weeks when Libya exploded, and U.S. intervention began about one month after
the first major atrocities had taken place there. That said, the Arab Spring was a number
one news event from nearly the moment that it started, so a long term effort to frame
potential intervention may not have been necessary.58 In terms o f the decision making
cycle, the main cabinet member to support intervention, Hillary Clinton, had to be
convinced that intervention was necessary by a combination o f the pressure o f growing
evidence o f atrocities in Libya, a growing sense that the administration was taking the
blame for mismanagement of the crisis, and the pressure o f advocates such as Rice and
Power. That trio, supported by an outside, but important actor, Senator McCain, then
brought about the pressure which led President Obama to decide on intervention.59 The
week following that decision saw a media blitz by the foreign policy decision making
leadership to justify the intervention that was coming, and to explain it after it began.
The premise of this research is that that by unifying the two key processes
(deciding and framing) into a single model, and incorporating the role o f the powerful
individual in the decision making and framing processes, the weaknesses o f all o f the
models can be overcome. This also helps to account for the impact o f external variables

58 Joumalism.org. “N ew s Coverage Index, February 29-March 6, 2011.”
http://www.joumalism.org/201 l/03/06/pej-new s-coverage-index-february-28-m arch-6-2011/. A ccessed on
October 27, 2014.
59 Talev, Margaret. Samantha Power: The V oice behind Obama’s Libya action. M cC latchy N ew spapers,
March 25, 2011.
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on as well as the experience o f past interventions on current and future intervention
decision making, since the decision and framing cycles do not end, and constantly feed
each other in accordance with Entman’s theory.

The research performed on the case

studies led to several conclusions on the validity o f such a model, affirming its utility.
One major revelation o f the research is that the decision cycle for interventions is
significantly shorter than had been envisioned at the outset o f the research. For Somalia,
while discussions had been ongoing for months, the decision cycle Bush to make choice
to intervene took place over approximately two weeks, the time from the electoral defeat
to Thanksgiving in 1992. The time from the decision to intervene to the actual landing o f
troops was another two weeks. For Rwanda, the time frame for an intervention decision
was similar, as intervention would have been most effective from mid-March to midApril, or a one month period after which the impact would have been minimal since most
o f the killing had been completed by that time. Kosovo, as noted, had the longest lead
up, with nearly a year o f discussion and active framing before the intervention. Even the
immediate decision cycle was longer, over about two months from January to March,
than that for Somalia. Finally, the Libya intervention decision cycle took place over a
three week period from late February to early March, 2011, with the broader Arab Spring
crisis extending back another month.
The brevity o f the decision cycles revealed limited government opportunities for
framing intervention. It cannot be said that any o f the interventions were bolts out o f the
blue, and there was public awareness o f all o f the events considered, with the exception
o f Rwanda. But in most o f the cases, time to build support for operations was limited,
and this is reflected in the relatively low public approval ratings o f the interventions,
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particularly the last two, Kosovo and Libya. This is in spite o f the long lead up for the
Kosovo intervention.
The role o f the powerful individual is clearly seen in all o f the interventions, as
well as being negatively demonstrated by the Rwanda example.

In each case o f

successful intervention, a powerful leader, who was not, in all cases, the president, made
the case for intervention both in the decision making cycle, and to the public. This is best
demonstrated in the Kosovo and Libya cases. In both cases, it was the Secretary o f State
who played the key role, with significant support. For Kosovo, that support came from
Holbrooke and Clark, for Libya, from Rice and Power. But, in both examples, it was
ultimately the Secretary o f State who compelled the president to agree to intervention.
Where there was no strong individual, there was no intervention, as was seen with the
Rwanda example.
None o f the models presented in the research provide a total, satisfying result
when applied to the case studies, however, each provides a useful piece o f the puzzle.
Rationality is an important foundation for all decision making. Bureaucracies matter in
decision making, and sometimes the inertia created by them must be overcome in order
for action to take place.

There is some give and take in negotiating among decision

makers. Powerful, motivated individuals are a key factor in interventions and framing.
Useful parts o f each model have been shaped to attempt to provide a more encompassing
model that covers both decision making and framing.

Considering the timelines o f

intervention, the decision cycle, and the role o f the dominant actor in decision making
and framing, the primary conclusion o f the study is that a Decide/Frame model based on
the influence o f a dominant actor is a useful answer to the question o f how foreign policy
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decisions are made in terms o f explaining U.S. armed humanitarian interventions in the
post-Cold War period. In the presence o f a powerful, motivated individual who sought
armed intervention, such interventions took place, and were framed to the American
people. In the absence o f such leadership, such interventions did not take place.

Models in Action: The Decision Not to Intervene in Syria, August, 2013

"We cannot accept a world where women and children and innocent civilians are
gassed on a terrible scale."
Statement by President Obama, August 30, 2013.60
“August 31st, 2013 - Obama says he had authorized the use o f military force to
punish Syria, with military assets to carry out a strike in place and ready to move
on his order, but he would first seek authorization from Congress. "Today I'm
asking Congress to send a message to the world that we are ready to move as one
nation," he said.”
Reuters. 2013. Timeline o f U.S. Syrian C risis.61

The second part o f the findings will look briefly at a more recent intervention
decision process to see if the findings o f the research are valid, or if they represented non
repeatable events. As each event o f the Arab Spring unfolded, the next seemed to be
even more violent, culminating, for now at least, with the Syrian rising against the Bashir
Assad regime and the civil war which followed, and is still ongoing.

The following

section will examine Syria by the same process as the case studies. To date, there has
been no armed humanitarian intervention in Syria, however, discussions o f intervention
60 Reuters. 2013. Timeline o f U.S. Syrian Crisis. August 31, 2013.
http://w w w .reuters.com /article/2013/08/31/us-syria-crisis-tim eline-idU SBR E97U 0D 820130831. A ccessed
Novem ber 14, 2013
61 Ibid.
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followed a significantly different path than was the case in Rwanda, the other non
intervention examined.

The time period deals specifically with the period ending in

August, 2013, with the decision not to intervene in Syria following a series o f atrocities
committed there involving the use o f chemical weapons.

In Brief: The Syrian Civil War 2011 -2 0 1 3

In terms o f general background, the Syrian Civil War was an outgrowth o f the
Arab Spring, as described in the Libya case study. The introductory events o f the Syrian
Civil War were concurrent with the Libya intervention and its aftermath, as well as the
ongoing world economic crisis, which included the U.S. government sequestration crisis
o f spring, 2013. Syria, however, was a very different case than other notable Arab Spring
events, for several reasons. Ambassador Stephen Ford, the U.S. envoy to Syria and a
noted Arabist in the Department o f State, was one o f a faction who predicted that the
Assad regime would respond positively to the Arab Spring, and not react in a manner
/ a

reflective o f Gaddafi.

That turned out to be nearly the opposite o f what actually

happened. Initially, a careful silence in Syria contrasted significantly from each other
and from other trends in U.S. Middle East policy.63 The administration dealt with each
country in the Arab Spring on a case by case basis, with strategic interests and oil, not
morality, as the key factors for policy making, and each case increasing in threat and
violence.64 In March, 2011, while the administration was deciding to intervene in Libya,

“ Gates. 523.
63 Pinto, Maria D o Ceu De Pinho Ferreira. "Mapping the Obama administration's response to the Arab
Spring." R eview o f Brasilian International Politics, 2012, 109-130. 109.
64 Ibid., 110.
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the first major Arab Spring protests were taking place in Syria, fueled by a release of
political prisoners by the Assad government.65
Syria’s connections with terror groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and its
meddling in Lebanon, as well as its enmity with Israel, are further factors which made it
difficult to isolate the regime or push forward an intervention, and W ashington’s
response to the outbreak o f rebellion was primarily rhetorical, in calls for regime change
in the country.66 As early as April, 2011, the U.S. involved itself in Syria, with sanctions
imposed as a result on the Assad regime’s attempts to quell the Arab Spring uprising.67
By the summer, President Obama and other western leaders were calling for the regime
*

•

to relinquish power.

68

*

•

Syria, o f course, did not involve oil, but it did involve Russia and

Iran, making intervention a difficult issue to justify and frame, particularly in concert
with the demonstrated capability o f the regime to resist efforts by social mediaaugmented rebels to discredit the regime, a factor which had been central to the other
revolutions.69
In July 2012, Syria upped the ante in the conflict by announcing that it had
chemical weapons with which to defend itself from aggression. This led to the infamous
“Red Line” statement against their use by President Obama in August.70 His statement
indicated that the “calculus” would change toward intervention if those weapons should
be used or deployed.

Further warnings in December did not prevent the use o f the

weapons near Aleppo in March, or the follow on attack on 21 August 2013, in which

65 Panetta, Leon. Worthy Fights. N ew York: Penguin Press, 2014. 410.
66 Ibid. 120.
67 Reuters. 2013. Timeline o f U.S. Syrian Crisis.
68 Ibid.
69 Lindgren, Simon. 2013. "The Potential and Limitations o f Twitter Activism: Mapping the 2011 Libyan
Uprising." Triple C. 2011, 207-220. 207.
70 Reuters. 2013. Timeline o f U.S. Syrian Crisis.
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1500 Syrians died, and which generated the intervention crisis which ended with the
decision not to intervene in September o f that year. There was considerable discussion,
and indications that the White House was willing to consider military strikes on Syria,
with significant support from Senator John McCain.

There was Little coordination

between Syrian rebel groups, in contrast with the cases o f Libya and Kosovo, this made it
unclear who was actually to be supported in the Syrian Civil War, and accordingly
difficult to frame an intervention.71 In June, 2013, President Obama increased aid to the
Free Syrian Army, however, knowing which groups to favor with support and which to
ignore was problematic, and has become even more so since the rise o f the Islamic State,
a radical movement with ties to al-Qaeda, in 2013.

By the time key U.S. allies, the very

allies who had pushed the U.S. into intervention in Libya, began to defect in late August,
the frame for intervention was in shambles, and the president turned the matter over to
Congress for approval, which was tantamount to backing down.73 In the end, resistance
to intervention proved to be too great and the status quo was selected over the attack
option.

The Obama Second Term: Some New Faces, Some Battered Egos

The Obama administration underwent some significant changes in between 2011
and 13, most notably in the changeover o f the Secretaries o f Defense and State. Gates
gave way to Leon Panetta, a strong Hillary Clinton supporter, but also a prominent
Democrat who was far more in line with the administration’s goals than his predecessor.
71 Panetta. 410.
72 Clinton. 465.
73 Reuters. 2013. Timeline o f U.S. Syrian Crisis.
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Panetta’s term lasted into the Syrian crisis, with his successor, former Republican Senator
Chuck Hagel, assuming control o f the Pentagon in February 2013. Hagel had originally
taken a stand against the Libya intervention, but later changed that position during his
confirmation hearings.74 Hagel’s appointment represented an effort by the administration
to bring in a moderate Republican who would have cache with the armed forces while
shaping the department along lines dictated by the White House.75
The most significant change in the leadership was the transition o f leadership o f
the Department o f State from Hillary Clinton to former Massachusetts Democrat Senator
John Kerry in February, 2013. Clinton came to express her regret over the events in
Benghazi, although not the overall intervention in Libya.76 The transfer o f office took
place after Susan Rice, the former Ambassador to the UN, withdrew her nomination for
the position following sharp criticism for her role in providing false explanations for the
causes for the Benghazi riots and attacks which led to the death o f four Americans,
including Ambassador Christopher Stephens, on September 11, 2012. Rice would go on
to become National Security Advisor after the departure o f Donilon on 5 June 2013.
Denis McDonough, in turn, moved from the Deputy NSC position to that o f White House
Chief o f Staff. Samantha Power, in turn, replaced Rice at the UN on 2 August, 2013,
shortly before the chemical attack crisis in Syria later that month. Given that Rice and
Power were already administration leaders, and that John Kerry had been Senate Foreign
74 Pollack, Joel B. “Hagel 2011: Obama wrong on Gadhafi, Libya was a m istake.” B rietbart, February 22,
2013. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2013/02/22/H agel-2011 -Obama-W rong-on-Gadhafi-LibyaWas-a-Mistake. A ccessed on Novem ber 2 8 ,2 0 1 4 .
75 Walt, Stehpen. “Top five reasons Obama should pick Chuck Hagel for SecD ef.” Foreign P olicy, 13
December 2012.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com /posts/2012/12/13/top five reasons obama_should_pick_chuck_hagel for s
ecdef. A ccessed on 20 Novem ber 2014.
76 Riley, M ollie. “Hillary Clinton: 'My Biggest Regret Is What Happened In Benghazi'.” The Huffington
Post, January 27, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.eom/2014/01/27/hillary-clintonbenghazi n 4674529.htm l. A ccessed on Novem ber 20, 2014.
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Relations Committee Chairman before he became Secretary o f State, Hagel was the only
person truly new to the foreign policy team.

However, President Obama’s role in

decision making has also changed, in part because o f the relentless partisanship o f the
political environment in Washington DC. Obama maintained a preference to hear the
direct opinions of interagency leaders, to hear the why and wherefore o f disagreements,
in detail, and then make his decisions, a process which drew significant criticism as being
slow and non-committal.77
In terms o f politics, 2012 saw Obama’s reelection, so that the Syria events of
2013 fall within his second term. Given that fact, and the relative cohesion o f his cabinet,
as well as the fact that they had agreed to intervene in Libya, one might expect that
Obama would have gone for intervention in Syria, in a manner similar to that which
drove Clinton to intervene in Kosovo. However, with some reservations, the Rwanda
intervention provides a better model for what actually occurred, since several pre-existing
frames competed against a frame for intervening in Syria. The major difference between
the two is that, unlike Rwanda, Syria was an issue for discussion by the Principal’s
Committee and the president, so that there was a conscious decision not to intervene at
the highest levels.

77 Lizza, Ryan. “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Barack Obama’s foreign policy.”
The New Yorker, May 2, 2011. http://www.newyorker.com /m agazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist.
A ccessed on 10 Novem ber 2014.
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Deciding, Framing, and Public Opinion in the Syria Non-Intervention

“all hell broke loose on social m edia... it was ordinary citizens who reported all
o f these horrors”.
Secretary o f State John Kerry on the Syrian chemical attacks, August 22nd,
2013.78

In spite o f flare ups o f interest in events in Syria, usually tied to high casualty
incidents in its civil war, it never became the central media event that Egypt and Libya.
But, by the time events in Syria truly rose to prominence in 2013, it had none o f the
influence on U.S. policy makers that Egypt or Libya had previously, and the primary
international influence on the revolution was coming from Iran and Islamist groups. This
different international dynamic is one key to understanding why there has been to date no
intervention.79 Unfortunately, the effort to frame the intervention in 2013 was not based
on human rights per se, but specifically on the use of chemical weapons. It cannot be
said with certainty, but the tepid U.S. and international response may indicate the
weakness o f chemical weapons as a framing tool.
O f note is this contrast between those in less combative or force oriented positions
favoring intervention, while military leaders opposed the effort. This is in keeping with
past models o f armed interventions, such as in Kosovo and Libya, in which diplomats
urged action while military leaders urged restraint.

In contrast, Syria had no regional

influence and did not threaten the Europeans directly, as Libya had done. Therefore, it

78 Hirsh, Michael. "How Social Media Could Help Obama Make his Case on Syria." The A tlantic
Monthly, August 30, 2013: 1-2. 2.
79 Akder, Derya Gocer. “Theories o f Revolutions and Arab Uprisings: The Lessons from the Middle East.”
Istanbul: O rtadogu Etutleri, 2013, 85-110. 100.
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proved to be impossible to form a valid coalition against them either within the U.S.
government or outside o f it, as was seen in the summer o f 2013 when the U.S.’s most
reliable ally, the UK, publicly voted against intervention and against the stated will o f its
Prime Minister.80
The level o f domestic resistance to the intervention in Libya meant that the frame
it supported may have been weak. Obama's "Lead from behind" strategy in Libya and the
great emphasis on the small size o f the U.S. involvement reflected this.81 Competing
frames in Syria were also too hard to overcome.

War weariness, for example,

particularly in the Middle East, was a heavily mitigating factor.

JO

The successful efforts

of the Syrian regime and its allies to disrupt rebel and U.S. framing efforts was another
factor.

Domestic dissatisfaction with other administration policies was also a major

consideration, as seen in the bitter partisan debate over the rival news story o f the August,
2013, the impending implementation o f the Affordable Care Act, which joined a list of
other issues, including Benghazi and other scandals to fuel Republican resistance to what
04

seemed to be all White House initiatives.

In terms o f foreign policy, the administration

was facing an increasingly strident Russia, while still attempting to implement its so
called “Pivot to Asia.”

The efforts o f Congressional Republicans to keep alive the

Benghazi attacks, which were blamed on these specific policies, were another factor.
80 British Broadcasting Corporation. “Syria crisis: Cameron loses Commons vote on Syria action.”
http://ww w .bbc.com /news/uk-politics-23892783. August 30, 2013. A ccessed on October 10 ,2 0 1 3 .
81 Wilson, Scott. “On Libya, Obama w illing to let allies take the Lead. The Washington, Post.
www.washingtonpost.com . 9 March, 2011. A ccessed on 1 April 2013.
820 s e , Erik. “War Weary Public Rejects Attacking Syria.” The Huffington Post. 12 September 2013.
www.huffingtonpost.com . A ccessed on Novem ber 10,2014.
83 Zennie, Michael. 2012. "Obama campaign website taken down by Syrian Electronic Army - the latest
target o f pro-Assad hackers." M ail Online. October 27, 2012. www.dailym ail.co.uk/news/article2478094/Obama-campaign-website-taken-Syrian-electronic-army-latest-target-pro-assad-hackers.html.
A ccessed October 2 4 ,2 0 1 3
84 People-press.org . “Public Opinion Runs Against Syrian Air Strikes.” September 3, 2013. A ccessed on
Novem ber 20, 2014. In the third week o f August, 39% o f respondents to the polling focused on Syria as
the top issue, with 23% focused on the impending healthcare regulations.
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Other than the indefatigable John McCain, there was limited bipartisan Congressional
support for intervention in Syria at any point between 2011 and 2013.85
R2P was never invoked in the case o f Syria, and this could be a result o f its
discrediting in Libya.

Just as the Rwanda crisis suffered in its timing following the

perceived failure in Somalia the year before, any further intervention in the Arab Spring,
particularly after the events in Benghazi in 2012, would be viewed in light o f what is
increasingly perceived as a failure there.

Other frames o f perceivably failed military

operations plagued efforts to build a frame for Syria. In particular, Obama and the new
Secretary o f State, John Kerry had to fight an older frame, that o f the justifications for
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.86 The Bush administration’s perceived folly in false
intelligence reporting on Iraqi weapons o f mass destruction development overshadowed
the Obama team ’s efforts to frame the Syrian regime’s use o f nerve gas and chemical
agents on its own population.

Government statements, such as discussing “multiple

streams o f intelligence” could not help but sound a lot like the testimony that Colin
Powell gave to the U.N. concerning Iraq’s elusive chemical weapons.

87

Unlike the case in Egypt and Libya, the international media has had very little
access to Syria, with a ban in place the beginning o f the conflict in 2 011.88 Without
outsiders, and with the success o f the regime in counter-framing, a so called “unreliable
narrative” has helped to mitigate against building a coalition for intervention as had been

85 Parker, Peter. “Obama seeks approval by Congress for Strike in Syria.” The N ew York Times, August
31, 2013. http://w w w .nytim es.com /2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html? r=0. A ccessed on Novem ber
1,2014.
86 Hirsh. 1.
87 Ibid.
88 Parker, Emily. “Why Don't We Care About Syria.” Slate, February 14, 2012.
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/02/syria uprising twitter and social media r
evolution fatigue .html
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done in Libya.89 The nature o f a post Assad regime and its potential Islamist character is
unsettling, particularly considering the course that the Egyptian uprising took before that
countries army restored order in the summer o f 2013.90
Another difference between Libya and Syria, but also dealing with the media, was
the question o f social media. This is an issue o f how a new technology can directly
impact framing in a way not seen or planned for previously. With a dearth o f social
media usage, the Libyan intervention was achieved through a variety o f methods and
channels, most innovative and notable of which was the invocation o f the UN doctrine of
R2P and the subsequent framing o f the Libyan intervention in humanitarian terms. At the
same time, Syrian threats and use o f chemical weapons failed to generate enough interest
in an armed humanitarian intervention there. While U.S. and international leaders made
successful use o f R2P as a framing tool to create an overwhelming need to violate
Libya’s sovereignty to protect its citizens, they did not do so in the case o f Syria.91
Social media was not a major factor in the Libyan revolution, primarily because
o f the backward state o f technology in the country. Telephones, texts, and radio served
as the primary ways to move information. In contrast, social media in Syria has served as
an important source for information and intelligence to the outside world, and this is in
line with conventional wisdom on social media utilization in other conflicts, particularly
in Egypt, with citizen posted reports far outstripping conventional news coverage,

89 Parker, Emily. “Why Don't We Care About Syria.” Slate, February 14, 2012.
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/02/syria_uprisingtw itter and s o c ia lm e d ia r
evolution fatigue .html
90 Keiswetter, Allen. "An Arab Spring Primer." Foreign S ervice Journal, 2012. 1 5 -18.18.
91 Realists would posit that the Libyan intervention was undertaken in pursuit o f power interests by the
great powers. This could include control o f Libya’s oil, its strategic position, or other, national level means
power sources and would have nothing to do with its mode o f leadership or the status o f its citizens.
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especially early in a conflict.

However, there are several reasons why the social media

has not had the same impact in the Syrian Civil War. One is that the Syrian government
has had a well-developed sense o f how to control and manipulate the media in general
and social media in particular. That regime is, in effect, a “Neopatrimonial state,”93 in
which it is profoundly difficult to organize any sort o f protest or revolt, since discontent
must spread to a very large group o f society in order to gain momentum and protect itself
from retaliation.94

This has allowed the Syrian government to successfully dispute

frames while establishing its own.
Facebook was banned in Syria almost from its inception in 2004, and although
those who were very determined could find a way around the blockage, the government’s
ability to interdict social media was and remains formidable.

Assisted by tracking

equipment supplied by Iran, this process continues to the present, with a new twist.95 The
Assad regime has come to understand the value o f social media for its own information
operations, and currently allows Facebook to remain open as a tool for its own outreach,
while countering and blocking opposition sites when and where it can.

In theoretical

terms, this amounts to a Syrian counter network powerful enough to disrupt U.S. efforts
at the consolidation o f networking and framing power.

In cases where it cannot

specifically target its enemies, or where volume is too high to controvert, the regime will
still resort to simply pulling the plug on Facebook until interest dies down.

92Nanabhey. 575.
93 Comunello, 454. Such a state is defined by Comunello as being based on the system atic expansion o f the
power o f an authoritarian leader or ‘Sultan’ who is able to control the fate o f a country for a long period o f
time but who does this at the expense o f formal institutions.
94 Ibid. 455.
95 I
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The “Syrian Electronic Army” may be the most well-known o f the counter
revolutionary elements who explicitly use social media tools for their political ends.
Most famously, they hacked President Obama’s campaign website during the summer o f
2012, however, their activities have been pervasive since they came into the spotlight
during the Arab Spring.96 The “Army” claims to be made up o f informed and cyber
savvy citizens who support the regime, but their independence or lack thereof from the
regime is uncertain.

What is certain is their usage o f the full range o f social media

manipulation to cast doubts on the veracity both o f the rebel cause and their messaging.97
According to Information Wars “Every serious political or militant actor with a
stake in what is happening in Syria has a presence on social media through some
combination o f officially hosted websites and blogs, as well as Facebook, Twitter,
Tumblr, YouTube, Flickr, online chat room forums, short message service platforms, and
other venues”98 That said, the density o f usage is not the same as it was in Egypt. Both
Libya and Syria had far fewer tweets per day in the revolutionary period than did Egypt.
The quoted report reinforces the view that social media has allowed the various rebel
groups to perform at a somewhat more leveled playing field, but that the prowess o f the
regime in the social media field has prevented successes such as those in Egypt. It is, in
effect, a tool that anyone can use, making anyone a potential journalist, or framer.99
Given the Assad regime’s lockdown on all types o f media, including traditional
news outlets, the ever harried social media users within the country proved to be the most

96 Zennie, 2012.
97 Ibid.
98 Zambelis, Chris. 2012. "Information Wars: A ssessing the Social Media Battlefield in Syria.” Com bating
Terrorism C enter at West Point, July 24, 2012, 1-3. 1. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/information-warsassessing-the-social-media-battlefield-in-syria. A ccessed on June 1 0 ,2013.
99 Ibid.
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effective at getting the word on events out to the international community. Thus, social
media outlets and vetting services, such as Storyful were used to break the central event
o f the conflict, the August 21st chemical attack which killed over 1400 people. In the
end, reports o f missiles raining “chemical death” were reported by over a dozen separate
locations on a variety o f social media.100 Platforms such as You Tube and other video
sharing services were central in a self-journalism role which helped to get vital
information and images to the west, and this proved to be true both in Egypt and in
Syria.101
In summary, there was no strong support within the Obama administration for an
intervention in Syria between 2011 and spring, 2014.

In fact, the only factor which,

over a year later, has finally driven the U.S. to intervene in Syria in a solely military way
is the emergence o f the fundamentalist Islamic State in Iraq in Syria, and the threat that
group posed to the world oil markets and overall stability in the region.

Models and the Syria Non-Intervention

Why did the U.S. avoid intervention in Syria in 2013? In accordance with the
Decide/Explain model, there was no powerful actor in the foreign policy decision making
apparatus with enough interest in the Syrian Civil War to force either the decision making
process or to frame the intervention in terms which might lead to action. O f course there
are other factors to consider, as discussed earlier in the findings section o f the study.

100 Panetta. 410.
101 Nanabhey, Mohammed. "From Spectacle to Spectacular: How Physical Space, Social Media and
Mainstream Broadcast Amplified the Public Sphere in Egypt's 'Revolution'." The Journal o f North African
Studies, (2011): 573-603. 574.
102 Panetta. 410.
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According to Joseph Nye, geography can play a greater than expected role in the use o f
the cyber domain and internet based social media. This is true both in terms o f physical
control o f network systems, but also in the political control o f the internet within national
or geographic borders.103 This would be borne out in the great disparities in reaction and
framing between the Syrian and Libyan cases, given Syrian adeptness at manipulating
opinion through social media usage.
The direct influence o f Iran in Syria, the lack o f oil, and Russian interests joined
those above to defeat efforts to frame a Syrian intervention in the same way as succeeded
in Libya.104 Pierre Atlas noted the dissonance in U.S. goals and framing efforts in U.S.
Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests for the Digest o f
Middle East Studies. He points out that the inclusion o f an idealistic strain into U.S.
dealings with the Middle East is the incongruity, and represents an ideational change in
U.S. policy toward the region.

The struggle has been particularly apparent in the

comparison o f the Libyan response, which had a realist undertone (oil) but no security
threats, and could therefore take on a moral character, and that in Syria, which had no oil,
many regional threats, and an impossible moral dilemma to solve, that o f who to support
and what the result would be.
Other important factors precluding an early intervention in Syria were its location
and the presence o f chemical weapons. Syria is not a primarily coastal country, as Libya
was, and its location and terrain made the prospect o f operations there problematic.105 It
was estimated that a ground force o f 75-90,000 troops would be necessary to effect a

N ye, Joseph. The Future o f Power. N ew York, Public Affairs, 2011. 134.
104 Pinto. 118.
105 Panetta. 410.

293
humanitarian intervention in the country.106 Most importantly, however, is the impact
chemical weapons and their use and potential use had on the efforts to frame the events.
By September, 2013, with the failure o f the British government to gain approval for
intervention, Obama was backed into a comer, claiming that he authorized attacks, but
turning to Congress for permission to attack which would never com e.107 In the end, the
Russians intervened politically in order to secure the destruction o f Syria’s chemical
weapons, and the rise o f the Islamic State has rekindled interest in Syria, at least in terms
o f interdicting supplies and troops moving from ISIL bases in Syria into neighboring
I AO

Iraq.

There is still no signaled intent to place U.S. ground forces in Syria as o f the time

o f this study.
A key factor, and difference, between the various revolutions, can be found in the
diversity o f those engaging in them. For Libya, it was eastern and western ethnic groups
struggling, for Egypt, a melange o f Socialists, Islamists, capitalists, and reactionary
conservatives.109 In Syria, the makeup o f the rebels is quite different, and includes proIranian, Shiite, and A1 Qaeda supported elements.

Unlike the others, the Syrian

leadership come from a minority group, the Allawaite Christians, but are far more
entrenched and capable, through the mechanism o f the Ba’ath political party o f
centralized resistance to rebellion than in other cases.

,U6 Panetta. 410.
107 Reuters. 2013. Timeline o f U.S. Syrian Crisis.
108 Gordon, Michael. “U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria’s Chemical Arms.” The New York
Times, September 15,2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/middleeast/syriatalks.htm!?pagewanted=all& r=0. A ccessed on Novem ber 20, 2013.
109 Auroagh, Miryiam. 2012. "Social Media, Mediation, and the Arab Revolutions." TripleC Cognition,
Communication, C ooperation, 2012, 518-536. 529. http://www.triplec.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/416. A ccessed on September 30, 2013.
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Conclusion

A brief case study on the decision not to intervene in Syria in 2013 has been
provided as a further check on the theoretical models and to assess the validity o f the
proposed Decide/Frame Model and the findings of the case studies of this research
project.

There was no strong support within the Obama administration for an

intervention in Syria between 2011 and spring, 2014.110 In fact, the only factor which,
over a year later, has finally driven the U.S. to intervene in Syria in a solely military way
is the emergence o f the fundamentalist Islamic State in Iraq in Syria, and the threat that
group posed to the world oil markets and Iraqi government through its invasion o f that
country.
Like Rwanda, there was no intervention, and so the results are not satisfactory in
that there has been no alleviation o f the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria. However,
the study does validate many o f the models examined in the other case studies. Like
other studies, one finds a sense o f the Rational Actor Model, in play. The RAM stands,
in this case, as one reason why no convincing argument has generated an intervention, at
least until the eruption o f the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria became such a threat to Iraq
in summer, 2014, that military intervention in Syria could be reframed in national
security terms. The GPM and TGP models are both seen to be in play, with the various
parts o f the foreign policy apparatus, most notably, the departments o f Defense and State,
taking positions reflective o f their bureaucratic stances.
In terms o f framing, too many competing frames, combined with the lack o f a
U.S. spokesperson interested enough and decisive enough to overcome them, have
110 Panetta. 410.
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defeated frames linked to the desirability o f armed humanitarian intervention. Extremely
effective use o f social media by the Assad regime to justify its own actions and discredit
those o f its opponents is a noted cause o f this failure, but geography, the lack o f an oilthreat narrative, such as existed in Libya, and the direct sponsorship and intervention o f a
great power, in this case Russia, also help explain the failure o f effective framing. As a
result o f these factors, no cabal o f leaders emerged with the clout and cohesiveness o f the
Bush or Clinton teams, or the persuasiveness and connectedness o f the Obama team
which generated the Libya intervention in terms o f pushing the administration to
intervene, and, more importantly, those leaders such as Kerry who appeared to want
intervention did not have the political clout to be able to frame Syria in as favorable light
in terms o f the need to intervene.
The graphic below summarizes the cases and the general explanatory power o f the
various models used. Weak is the lowest rating, while Strong is the highest.

Figure 9: Utility o f Models in Explaining Decisions on Armed Humanitarian
Intervention and Framing
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The decision to send U.S. troops into harm’s way is not an easy one. It is also not
easy to frame such a decision to the American people. The findings o f this study are
important because they show the power o f individual leaders in convincing a given
American President o f the need to act in cases where U.S. national interest is not
necessarily clear. The power o f the Secretary o f State, when used to persuade, is evident
in many o f the studies, and came as somewhat o f a surprise given the professional
experience o f the author, and the dominance o f that experience by the DOD.

In

retrospect, the three cases and two mini cases examined were enlightening and useful
since each showed the criticality o f decisiveness both in the president and his key
advisors. O f course a president cannot be decisively engaged on every issue at all times,
but must become so and be supported adequately in cases where U.S. armed force is to be
utilized.

But the cases used and the lessons learned apply across senior government

decision making, whether it be foreign policy, domestic, economic, or other policies.
While the cabinet position o f the dominant actor will change based on the issue area, the
need for one, both to channel internal and external support, will remain.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Armed humanitarian interventions have formed a significant part o f the military
and diplomatic history o f the post-Cold War world. If it had not been for the 9-11 attacks
and the U.S. military response to the, Somalia, Kosovo, and Libya might have been the
main military actions o f the decades since the Persian G ulf War in 1991. As such, these
interventions provide a useful tool for examining the foreign policy decision making
process, the framing process, and the role o f the individual decision maker in those
processes. This dissertation set out to explore those interventions in order to see exactly
what role each of these processes had in the interventions, and to see if it was possible to
use lessons learned from such a study to make predictions on when and how future
interventions might take place.
The fundamental finding o f the research is that interventions took place when a
dominant actor in the decision making apparatus, usually from either the Department o f
State or the National Security Council, becomes interested enough in an intervention both
to use his or her influence to convince others o f the need to intervene, and to be able to
frame that intervention to the public. This is not to detract from the ultimate decision
making power o f the presidency in decision making, but to rather to describe how the
president is convinced o f the need to act by well placed, eloquent, powerful thinkers.
Someone must make and sustain an argument that the need for intervention can be
conflated to some national security threat to the United States or its allies, or that the U.S.

298
is the only country capable o f required actions to alleviate suffering. There is no attempt
here to deny the power o f the President o f the United States in decision making. Indeed,
that power is clearly seen in the case studies.

The Somalia intervention is the most

glaring example of presidential power, with Bush notably making the decision to send
U.S. forces there after being briefed by his cabinet, but without the particular influence o f
any particular member.
Presupposing that armed humanitarian interventions are a good and useful thing,
what factors can lead to them happening, at least in terms o f U.S. foreign policy decision
making?

A unified national security cabinet is not critical, but does help.

This is

evidenced in primarily in the Bush cabinet and to a lesser extent in that o f Clinton. The
cabinet o f George H.W. Bush is well known as one o f the smoothest functioning and
synchronized in American history.

Bill Clinton’s second term cabinet, while not as

cohesive, was still seasoned both to each other and to Clinton’s governing style by the
time of the Kosovo intervention. Barack Obama’s cabinet was sharply divided, by the
rigors o f the electoral campaign and the rancor between the Obama team and the
adherents o f the presidential challenger cum Secretary o f State, Hillary Clinton.1 That
said, Clinton’s power, and her lock step, to that point, with Robert Gates, who was
against intervention, was such that she had to be brought into the fold for the final
decision for intervention to be made. Thus was the cohesiveness o f the earlier foreign
policy teams reached.
Another important lesson is that the Department o f State must be on board for an
intervention to occur. Why State? The answer to this lies in governmental politics. The
Department of Defense was not in favor o f a single one o f the armed humanitarian
1 Gates, Robert M. Duty, M emoirs o f a S ecretary at War. N ew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 287.
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interventions mentioned, indeed, in each case, it was ordered to act against its
recommendation.

In two o f the three cases, however, it was the specific initial or

converted support o f the Department o f State which proved to be the decisive influence
toward intervention. The major non-intervention covered, in Rwanda, never got raised to
the level of Secretary o f State, and as a consequence was never a serious discussion point
■y

for the president.
International support is another critical factor, demonstrated by the case studies to
be absolutely critical to an armed humanitarian intervention taking place. Usually, this
support comes in the form o f a UN resolution, and this was the case in Somalia and
Libya. Where UN support is not unified, such as in the case o f Kosovo, other bodies,
such as NATO, can provide the international top cover for an intervention to take place.
This was even more important when NATO itself seemed to be at risk o f a major loss o f
credibility, as was perceived to be about to occur because o f Serbian intransigence over
the issue o f Kosovo independence and the ongoing atrocities against Kosovar Albanians,
particularly from 1998 onwards.

In the period studied, the United States did not launch

an armed humanitarian intervention without the implied authority o f the international
community. Although there are other reasons, this stands as one leading cause for the
failure to intervene in Rwanda.
Concurrent with the issue o f international support is that there must be a lack o f
major international resistance to armed humanitarian intervention.

Russia, therefore,

became a key player in the Kosovo intervention, since its historical patronage o f Serbia
and its role as a great power seemed to be at stake with the NATO intervention.

2 Albright, Madeleine. M adam Secretary, a M emoir. N ew York: Harper Collins, 2013. 152.
3 Blair, Tony. A Journey: M y P olitical Life. London: Knopf, 2010. 252.

In
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addition to international support, Russia had to be given assurances on Serb regime
survival and its own national reputation in order to prevent its resistance to the
intervention. In each o f the other cases, there was little or no great power resistance to
U.S. and coalition actions. In Somalia, no great power significantly resisted the push to
armed intervention, and in Libya, as in Kosovo, Russia and China were satisfied enough
that their interests would be met that they did not exercise veto rights in the UN Security
Council. Notably, in the case o f Rwanda, there was significant resistance to intervention
by key U.S. partners, notably France.

This is not to assume that the U.S. was ever

significantly motivated to intervene there, but even if it had been, the international
community was not.
Domestic politics also play a key role in the question o f whether or not to
intervene.

The 1992 election cycle both deferred U.S. intervention in Somalia, but

perversely, may have made intervention more likely after Bush was defeated.

The

Lewinsky affair certainly delayed significant action in Kosovo. Conversely, the domestic
backlash against the perceived defeat in Somalia in 1993 virtually guaranteed that there
would be no intervention in Rwanda.

War weariness based on U.S. involvement in

Afghanistan and Iraq did not eliminate the chance for an effort in Libya, but did ensure
that the U.S. role would be limited to air support, and that even that effort would be
lessened over the course o f the air campaign and eventually turned over to NATO
leadership.
The findings o f this research should be useful in predicting when and where the
U.S. will engage in future armed humanitarian interventions. When powerful leaders,
most often in the Department o f State, can be convinced, and convince the president that
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intervention is necessary, and when there is international and domestic support for such
an intervention, it will occur. When those factors do not exist, an intervention will not
take place.

An informed, cohesive foreign policy decision making establishment is

important, but even more critical is an informed president with an understanding o f and
commitment to action in foreign policy.
An example of these principals in action provided by looking at the discussion on
armed humanitarian intervention in Syria in August, 2013.

The Obama team which

generated the Libya intervention in terms o f pushing the administration to intervene, and,
more importantly, those leaders such as Kerry who have made the push were not able to
frame Syria in as favorable light in terms o f the need to intervene. None o f the leaders
who were so adamant about Libya and the concept o f R2P were public activists for an
intervention in Syria, and neither was the Secretary o f State himself, so that, in
combination with significant domestic turmoil, war weariness, and international
resistance from Russia and China, meant that there would be no intervention.
Other cases also demonstrate how important it is for the intervention o f powerful
leaders and the alignment o f the external variables examined in the study for an
intervention to occur. The most notable o f current humanitarian disasters to suffer in this
way is the continuing crisis in Darfur. Darfur, a largely Christian region in north- west
Sudan, has been subject to drought, famine, and government sponsored oppression since
2003, however, there has been no boots on the ground U.S. intervention there, in spite o f
the fact that the death toll rivals that o f the Rwanda genocide.4 No senior U.S. official
has taken on Darfur in the way that was seen in Libya and Kosovo.

Significant

4 Tisdal, Simon. “Sudan fears US military intervention over Darfur.” The G uardian Online, January 15,
2009. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/janyi5/sudan-unamid-obama. A ccessed on 20 Novem ber
2014. There has, however, been delivery o f supplies to the region, but no armed intervention.
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international resistance to intervention exists, not only from great powers such as China,
but also from neighboring countries. There is no oil in geographically remote Darfur, and
western interest in the plight o f the population seems to fall victim to the same
acceptance o f a robust African death toll that was seen during the Rwandan genocide.
Framing o f armed humanitarian interventions by the foreign policy establishment
is another significant focus o f the study, and the case studies demonstrate that it is tied
into the decision making process, but only in those cases where a fairly lengthy decision
cycle, measured in weeks and months, rather than days and weeks, are available for
decision making and planning. In general the case studies showed that the U.S. public is
averse to lengthy involvement in combat operations for humanitarian purposes. Only in
Kosovo was a lengthy time period available to frame the intervention. In that case, too,
one must look farther back than the immediate time frame o f intervention to realize that
by 1999, Slobodan Milosevic had been an international villain for nearly a decade.5
Similarly, in spite o f his rapprochement with the west in the 1990s and 2000s, Muammar
Gaddafi had multi decade history as a supporter o f terrorism and specifically as an enemy
o f the U.S.

In spite o f this “free framing” in both cases, support numbers for the

interventions against the two dictators rarely topped 50%, and ticked up slightly only
when operations were actively underway.

The point o f this finding may well be that

framing is not that important to the implementation o f armed humanitarian interventions.
Only one of the interventions studies, Somalia, ended because o f a drastic change in
public opinion, and that was tied directly to what was perceived as the defeat in
Mogadishu.

None o f the other interventions studied ended simply because o f public

5 Independent International Commission on K osovo Report. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. 3839.
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opinion.

In all cases they continued until either the mission was accomplished, UN

mandate ended or changed, or the enemy gave in.
Having noted the results o f the research, the question must be asked if the
Decide/Explain model can be useful for other foreign policy activities.

This is a

significant question, which begs a weighter greater than “yes, if someone wants to.”
Clearly going to war, even in a limited way, is a task not to be undertaken lightly, if at all,
and any model that predicts when and how a country might go to war would be
welcomed by academics and policy makers alike.

History provides us with several

examples o f powerful leaders who had a goal and a voice. The most famous o f these is
probably Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder, who famously uttered the phrase “Cartago
Delendam Est”, in or out o f context, during Roman Senatorial debates over a period o f
years between the second and third Punic Wars, until finally Rome did attack and destroy
Carthage in 146 BC, ending a major threat to its domination o f the Mediterranean.6 This
simple and powerful framing shows how, over a period o f time, an argument for
intervention can be made at multiple levels. A further example o f this is the year and a
half long period after the September 11 attacks, which saw a steady framing campaign
against Saddam Hussein which culminated in the invasion o f Iraq and the overthrow of
the dictator in spring, 2003.

In that case, a small group o f committed and powerful

leaders convinced a reasonably cohesive foreign policy team, and the president, that there
was a national security threat, and that intervention was necessary. President Bush was
already predisposed toward an armed intervention in Iraq by the history o f his father’s

6 Carthage must be destroyed.
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presidency.7 Even in the absence o f a direct attack on the U.S., by Iraq, the fact that the
U.S. had been attacked made it easier to frame the invasion as well as other interventions
which make up the Global War on Terrorism. Even in this example, however, the U.S.
attempted to operate within an international mandate provided by the UN, and to go out if
its way to frame the operation as a response to a national security threat.8
Armed humanitarian interventions stand out in a review o f modem warfare for
two reasons. The first is that they are limited operations, usually not using combined
arms, and have limited objectives. The second is that they are not framed in terms o f
occupation o f conquest, but rather as human security operations, establishing a principal
o f human rather than national sovereignty as a paramount concern. While it was possible
to argue both that Kosovo was a threat to the U.S., and that the U.S. must lead a response,
there was very limited call for armed intervention in Georgia in 2008, when Russian
troops invaded and occupied part o f the country.

This is also true o f the Russian

occupation o f Crimea in 2013, or China’s occupation o f Tibet in 1950. Here the size o f
the potential military and political resistance and the likely lack o f international support
would predict that the U.S. will not intervene, and not perceive the actions taken as direct
threats to its own national security.

Kosovo, however, should serve as a warning to

Moscow that the U.S. does take NATO seriously as an alliance and an international body,
and will react strongly to any direct threats to it.

7 Haass, Richard N. War o f Necessity, War o f Choice: A M em oir o f Two Iraq Wars. N ew York, Simon
and Schuster, 2009. 198. Haas discusses the urging o f Paul W olfowitz to consider action against Iraq
immediately after the September 11 attacks, urgings which grew into the decision to invade by 2003.
8 United Nations General Assem bly Session 57 Verbatim Report 2. A /57/PV .2 page 6. Transcript o f
George W. Bush speech from September 2 ,2 0 0 2 .
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?sym bol=A/57/PV.2. Retrieved 10 Novem ber 2014.
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Two questions remain to be discussed. First, whither armed humanitarianism?
Following the Libya intervention, the idea o f R2P has faded from the forefront o f
political discussion.

This begs the question o f whether the whole idea o f armed

humanitarians a product o f a combination o f UN triumphalism and U.S. uni-polarity after
the Cold War? 2011 and the Libya intervention marked a watershed for several reasons.
The turn o f the Arab Spring into a victory for non-democratic Islamic fundamentalists,
combined with the rise o f China, the resurgence o f Russia, and the acknowledged failure
of the last great intervention, in Libya, to secure its goals o f protecting the people o f
Libya could mean the end o f the phenomena. The transnational threat posed by criminal
and extremist elements, such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria, may trigger a military or
humanitarian response such as was seen in Libya, or Somalia, if divisions on what to do
in response can be overcome in the national security cabinet by a dominant actor who can
influence the president decisively.

Beyond the U.S., it may be that China, Russia, or

other great powers may see such armed humanitarian interventions as a valid course o f
action should they choose to take on a greater burden in international security leadership.
In either case, the findings o f this research on how armed humanitarian interventions are
decided on, framed to the public, and implemented will be o f direct use.
Finally, what does this study mean for framing and decision making? A series o f
models were discussed, with a proposal to combine the models in order to better explain
the nexus between decision making and framing, as well as the role o f key individuals in
each.

A clear result o f the study is that the key leaders in the decision making and

framing processes must be motivated by an issue in order for armed humanitarian
interventions to take place.

As wars o f choice, these operations must be carefully
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explained to the American people, something that works best with a long lead time for
deciding on and framing intervention. Although many o f the sources consulted for this
study did not specifically discuss how they planned their framing efforts in each case,
they all noted that such efforts did occur. In addition, the key deciders in each case were
also the key framers, implying strong linkages between the two.

Since armed

humanitarian interventions were merely a prism through which to review the decision
making and framing processes, and the role o f key individuals in them, the critical lesson
o f the study, one which applies across the various decision making realms o f the U.S.
government, is that powerful leaders must be motivated to support decisions and frames
which are not inherently popular or obviously vital to the U.S. public.

Without a

powerful leader to counteract the entrenched interests and bureaucracies behind every
government decision, inertia will be the result, with potentially embarrassing, or even
disastrous consequences.
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